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ARTICLES
THE LAYERS PRINCIPLE: INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE AND THE LAW
Lawrence B. Solum*
Minn Chung4
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we address the fundamental questions of Internet
governance: whether and how the architecture of the Internet should
affect the shape and content of legal regulation of the global network
of networks. Our answer to these questions is based on the concept of
layers, the fundamental architectural feature of the Internet. Our the-
sis is that legal regulation of the Internet should be governed by the
layers principle: the law should respect the integrity of layered Internet
architecture. In this introductory section, we provide a rough and
ready introduction to the layers. We then preview the case for our
thesis and situate it in relation to prior work on the question of the
relationship between architecture and regulation. We conclude our
introduction with a brief reader's guide to our Article. The ideas that
we preview in the Introduction will be developed in much greater
depth in the main body of the Article. We front-load the basic ideas
in order to introduce a working conceptual vocabulary and to provide
the reader with a roadmap to the architectonic of our argument.
© 2004 by Lawrence B. Solum and Minn Chung.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
t Minn Chung Consulting. We owe thanks to Randy Barnett, Vinton Cerf,
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comments on an earlier draft of this Article. We also owe thanks to an anonymous
reviewer and to the participants at faculty workshops at Boston University on October
2, 2003, and at the University of San Diego on November 20, 2002.
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A. The Layers of the Internet
The Internet is a global network of networks that has been the
platform for revolutionary innovation.1 The role of the Internet in
enabling innovation is not accidental; rather it flows from the In-
ternet's architecture. The key innovation-enabling feature of Internet
architecture is comprised of layers, narrowly understood as defined by
code or broadly understood as functional components of a communi-
cations system.
What are the layers of the Internet? Viewed as a system of com-
munication between users, the six layers that constitute the Internet
are:
The Content Layer: The symbols and images that are
communicated;
The Application Layer: The programs that use the Internet, e.g.,
the Web;
The Transport Layer: TCP, which breaks the data into packets;
The Internet Protocol Layer: IP, which handles the flow of data over
the network;
The Link Layer: The interface between users' computers and the
physical layer; and
The Physical Layer: The copper wire, optical cable, satellite links,
etc. We flesh out this skeletal description in greater detail below. 2
The layers are organized in a vertical hierarchy. When informa-
tion is communicated via the Internet, the information flows down
from the content layer (the "highest" level) through the application,
transport, IP, and link layers to the physical layer (the "lowest" level);
across the physical layer in packets; and then flows back up through
the same layers in reverse order. Communication on the Internet re-
quires that content be digitalized by an application, and that the digi-
tal information be broken into packets by the transport layer and
addressed by the Internet protocol layer so that it can be passed on by
the link layer to the physical layer. Having reached the bottom layer,
information then moves horizontally. The physical layer transmits the
individual data packets by copper, fiber, and/or radio by various way-
1 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNET,
BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 2-5 (2001); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCI-
ETY 2 (2d ed. 2000); MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: HOW THE NEW WORLD OF
INFORMATION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES 17, 25-54 (1998); PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS S.
WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TRANSFORMS
STRATEGY passim (2000); MICHAEL HAUBEN & RONDA HAUBEN, NETIZENS: ON THE His-
TORY AND IMPACT OF USENET AND THE INTERNET passim (1997); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 5-23 (2001).
2 See infra Introduction B, C.
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points to an endpoint or destination on the network. Once at its des-
tination, the information then ascends vertically through the layers to
be interpreted by an application as content. 3 In a nutshell, the funda-
mental architecture of the Internet is layered.
B. The Layers Principle
Once the layered nature of Internet architecture is understood,
normative implications follow. Our thesis is that the design of legal
rules should respect a fundamental principle of Internet architecture,
which we shall call the layers principle.4 At this stage, we can roughly
formulate the layers principle as a rule of thumb for Internet regula-
tors: respect the integrity of the layers. 5 This fundamental principle
has two corollaries. The first corollary is the principle of layer separation:
Internet regulation should not violate or compromise the separation
between layers designed into the basic architecture of the Internet.6
The second corollary is the principle of minimizing layer crossing: mini-
mize the distance between the layer at which the law aims to produce
an effect and the layer directly affected by legal regulation. 7 The sec-
ond corollary has obvious implications for the evaluation of Internet
3 The brief sketch elides some important distinctions between these layers. All
of the layers except the physical layer are code or software. Two of the layers, the
transport layer and Internet protocol layer, are part of TCP/IP, the communications
protocol that is central to the Internet. One of those, the Internet protocol layer, is
sometimes said to be the "network" layer and, in a narrow sense, might be called the
layer that defines the Internet. We discuss these issues more fully below. See infra Part
I.
4 The layers principle is related to the end-to-end principle articulated by Larry
Lessig and others. We discuss end-to-end infra Introduction D; Part I.A. An approach
to layers that shares our emphasis on their fundamental importance but focuses on a
different set of issues is found in Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002). A sense of Werbach's overall argument is
provided by the following passage from his conclusion:
The layered model addresses ... the shortcomings of the current structure
in the age of the Internet. Focusing on vertical layers removes the assump-
tion that service boundaries are clear, and are tied to physical network
boundaries. It implies a more granular analysis within each layer, moving
from overarching policy goals to specific cases rather than applying catego-
ries that bring with them laundry lists of requirements. It brings the issues of
interconnection between networks, and between functional layers within
those networks, to the forefront. And it recognizes the significance of net-
work architecture as a determining factor in shaping business dynamics.
Id. at 67.
5 See infra Part II.A.1, 5.
6 See infra Part II.A.2.a.
7 See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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regulations. The best regulations attack a problem at a given layer
with a regulation at that layer. The worst regulations attack a problem
at the content layer by imposing a regulation at the physical layer-or
vice versa.
C. The Case for the Layers Principle
The aim of this Article is to state the case for the layers principle
and its corollaries. The arguments that comprise our case will pro-
ceed in stages that include both a technical analysis of the architec-
ture of the Internet and a policy analysis of a variety of particular
problems of Internet regulation. Thus, our argumentative strategy
has two dimensions. The first dimension might be described as top-
down. We start with facts about the Internet and construct a relatively
abstract and general argument: given certain widely accepted norma-
tive premises, the nature of the Internet requires the layers principle
and its corollaries that follow. The second dimension of the argu-
ment might be described as bottom-up. We consider a variety of partic-
ular problems in Internet regulation. We show that the layers
principle handles these problems in a way that coheres with reasona-
ble judgments about the appropriate way to handle the particular
problems. The bottom-up argument runs from specific examples to
the same general policy recommendations generated by the top-down
arguments. The convergence of the two lines of argument provides
strong evidence that the layers principle provides a sound basis for
Internet policy.
Although the full argument for the layers principle defies easy
summary, two themes run throughout the argument. The first theme
is based on the familiar idea of fit between the ends of regulation and
the means employed to achieve those ends. The second theme is
based on the idea that the transparency of the Internet is an essential
prerequisite for low cost innovation. We will investigate each of these
themes in some detail below. In these introductory remarks, we offer
a brief preview of each of the two themes.
The first theme is grounded in a fact that arises from the layered
nature of the Internet: regulations that violate layering (or cross lay-
ers) inherently interfere with substantial innocent uses of the In-
ternet. The fit thesis is the claim that layer-crossing regulations
inherently produce problems of fit between regulatory ends and regu-
latory means." That is, if a regulation attacks a problem at one layer
with a regulation that directly impacts a different layer, the nature of
the Internet guarantees that the regulation will suffer from problems
8 See infra Part II.D.1.
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of overbreadth (impacting substantial innocent uses) and underinclu-
sion (failing to eliminate the targeted harm). This thesis is most intui-
tively and accessibly illustrated by regulations that aim to achieve a
result at the content layer by regulating at the physical layer. For ex-
ample, a nation-state might attempt to address the problem of por-
nography on the Internet by severing the physical link between that
nation's Internet backbone and the rest of the global network of net-
works. 9 By severing the physical link, the flow of pornographic con-
tent might be reduced,10 but the consequence is that a wide variety of
innocent content, ranging from baseball scores to scholarly papers, is
interdicted as well. We demonstrate that the stunning overbreadth of
layer-crossing regulation illustrated by this example flows inevitably
from the design of the Internet. Despite its overbreadth, this regula-
tion will also be underinclusive: even if a nation's links to the Internet
backbone are severed, the nature of the Internet makes it highly likely
that other routes (using the international telephone system to gain
dial-up access, satellite links, etc.) will allow users to reach the forbid-
den content.
The second theme is based on the idea that the transparency of
the Internet enables low cost innovation. We shall demonstrate that
the transparency of the Internet is a product of layer separation. Sub-
stantial or systematic violations of the layers principle compromise the
transparency of the Internet and increase the cost of innovation. The
transparency thesis is the claim that layer-violating regulations inher-
ently damage the transparency of the Internet.1 We illustrate this
thesis with the example of Tim Berners-Lee's development of the
World Wide Web. 12 Without transparency, development of the World
Wide Web would have been substantially more expensive. At worst,
neither the Web nor a functional equivalent would have been devel-
oped; at best, the development of the Web would have been substan-
tially delayed.
We show that the fit thesis and the transparency thesis combine
to provide a compelling justification for the layers principle and its
corollaries. Regulations that fail to respect the integrity of the layers
preclude innocent uses of the Internet, cannot achieve their regula-
9 This abstract hypothetical has actual counterparts. See infra Part III.
10 For purposes of this Article, we do not discuss the question whether severing
backbone links would effectively cut Internet users in a particular geographic region
from the global Internet. Wire line telephony might, for example, be used to create
narrowband pipelines; many such pipelines might be capable of substantial
throughput. In this Article, we simply bracket these issues.
11 See infra Part I.B. and Part II.D.1.
12 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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tory goals, and threaten the transparency of the Internet and conse-
quently its ability to serve as the platform for innovation. We then
show that these abstract arguments work in the context of specific ex-
amples of layer-violating Internet regulations.
D. Situating Layers Analysis
The layers principle and its corollaries synthesize two related no-
tions. The first notion is drawn from software engineering and de-
sign. The Internet's architecture has been engineered through the
use of layers-paradigmatically, the layers of Transfer Control Proto-
col/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). Respecting the integrity of the lay-
ers is a fundamental principle of Internet design. The second notion
is drawn from the work of Yochai Benkler on the regulation of com-
munications; Benkler's analysis extends, generalizes, and abstracts the
notion of layers-enabling the conceptualization of content as a dis-
tinct layer of the Internet viewed as a communications system. 13
In addition, layers analysis builds upon and extends two funda-
mental insights that have been forcefully and eloquently presented in
the work of Lawrence Lessig.' 4 The first insight can be called the code
thesis: the notion that the architecture of the Internet has profound
implications for its legal regulation. 15 The second insight can be
called the end-to-end principle, an idea from network engineering that
Lessig applies to Internet regulatory policy.16 Lessig argues that the
end-to-end principle captures the key feature of the Internet architec-
ture that enables the Internet to become an engine of innovation.' 7
In this Article, we shall argue, pace Lessig, that the end-to-end princi-
ple does not fully and accurately capture the fundamental relation-
ship between Internet architecture and sound or optimal regulation
of the Internet. Layers analysis reconceptualizes the end-to-end prin-
ciple, yielding a richer and more accurate model of the fundamental
architecture of the Internet. The layers principle restates the norma-
tive implications of that analysis as a set of principles suitable for use
by Internet policymakers. We argue that the layers principle captures
13 Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Common and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562-63 (2000).
Benkler identifies three fundamental layers, which he calls "the physical infrastruc-
ture, logical infrastructure, and content layers." Id. at 568.
14 In addition to the sources cited below, see supra notes 15-17, see Lawrence
Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DurE L.J. 1783 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, The
Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501 (1999).
15 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
16 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 34.
17 See id.
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all of the content of the end-to-end principle, but that the layers prin-
ciple does more, providing guidance for regulators where the end-to-
end principle is silent or indeterminate. That is, the normative con-
tent of the layers principle is a superset of the normative content of
the end-to-end principle.
The Internet is a global network of interconnected computer net-
works, and TCP/IP is the network communication protocol that en-
ables the Internet to function as a network of networks.,, Expressing
the point more forcefully, without TCP/IP (or a functional substi-
tute), there would not be an Internet. 9 Despite the critical and essen-
tial role that TCP/IP plays in the design and the functioning of the
Internet, however, analysis of the architecture of the TCP/IP protocol
and its implications is conspicuously missing in nearly all previous dis-
cussions of the interplay of Internet architecture and legal regulation
of the Internet.20 This Article ameliorates that deficiency. Our analy-
18 1 W. RICHARD STEVENS, TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED: THE PROTOCOLS 1 (1994).
19 Strictly speaking, we should say, "If there were no TCP/IP or functional coun-
terpart, there would be no Internet or functionally equivalent communications sys-
tem." The particular communications protocol TCP/IP could be replaced by a
functional equivalent. Thus, TCP/IP is not, strictly speaking, necessary to the In-
ternet; thus, the claim in text is simplified for ease of communication. The germ of
truth in this textual claim is illustrated by the State of California's definition of the
Internet, which makes direct reference to TCP/IP:
"Internet" means the global information system that is logically linked to-
gether by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol
(IP), or its subsequent extensions, and that is able to support communica-
tions using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
suite, or its subsequent extensions, or other IP-compatible protocols, and
that provides, uses, or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high
level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure de-
scribed in this paragraph.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538(e) (6) (West Supp. 2002). For further discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
20 See, e.g.,Johannes M. Bauer & Steven S. Wildman, Rethinking Access: Introduction
to the Symposium Theme and Framework, 2002 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 605, 609
(2002) (discussing TCP as a feature of Internet architecture in the context of the
digitalization of communications infrastructure); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Impeach
the Internet!, 46 Loy. L. REV. 569, 580-81 (2000) (discussing TCP/IP as a feature of
Internet architecture and the idea that code regulates the Internet); David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 283 (discussing
TCP/IP as a feature of Internet architecture in the context of open-source software);
Dawn C. Nunziato, Exit, Voice, and Values on the Net, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 753,
755-56 (2000) (discussing TCP/IP as feature of Internet architecture and the idea
that code is the most effective regulator of the Internet); Philip R. Principe, Secret
Codes, Military Hospitals, and the Law of Armed Conflict: Could Military Medical Facilities'
Use of Encrypted Communications Subject Them to Attack Under International Law?, 24 U.
2004]
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sis will show that layers are the key architectural feature of TCP/IP
and, hence, of the Internet.21 And we show that this fact about In-
ternet architecture yields powerful normative conclusions about In-
ternet regulation. 22
In the context of legal doctrine, layers analysis contributes vital
information to familiar modes of legal analysis. First, in constitutional
law, the idea of fit plays a key role in equal protection and free speech
doctrine. The normative end of fit is facilitated by the familiar doctri-
nal concepts of underinclusivenss and overbreadth. Layers analysis
provides the analytic tools needed to identify and explain overbreadth
and underbreadth in the context of internet regulation. Second, lay-
ers analysis can identify a crucial policy consideration that traditional
overbreadth analysis would miss: the preservation of transparency that
is necessary for internet innovation. Layers analysis explains why cer-
tain regulations incur specific costs and benefits-which would other-
wise be opaque to policymakers. Finally, by helping to identify the
likely consequences of proposed Internet regulations, layers analysis
can also be used to identify their affects on individual liberties, a con-
sideration relevant to some rights-based legal theories. In sum, with-
out the information provided by an analysis of layers, much that is of
importance to the constitutionality, prudence, and justice of proposed
Internet regulations may either be neglected or missed altogether.
E. Structure of the Article
We return, in Part I, to the layers model of Internet architecture,
examining in detail the layers of the Internet, both in the narrow con-
text of TCP/IP and in the broader context of the whole communica-
tions system that constitutes the Internet. Part II then explicates the
layers principle and situates it in a broader jurisprudential context.
Part III applies the layers principle to a variety of particular problems
in Internet regulation. In this Part, we provide a detailed discussion
of several real or hypothetical layer-violating or layer-crossing regula-
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 727, 731 (2002) (discussing TCP/IP as a feature of Internet
architecture in the context of the history of the Internet); Philip J. Weiser, The In-
ternet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 541-42 (2003)
(discussing TCP/IP as a feature of Internet architecture in the context of explaining
how the Internet works); Dina I. Oddis, Note, Combating Child Pornography on the In-
ternet: The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 477,
483 (2002) (discussing TCP/IP as a feature of Internet architecture in the context of
the history of the Internet).
21 See infra Part I.
22 See infra Part II.
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tions, including: (1) the Serbian Internet Interdiction Myth, 23 (2) My-
anmar's "cut the wire" policy, 24 (3) China's Great Firewall, 25 (4) the
French Yahoo! case, 2 6 (5) cyberterrorism, 27 (6) Pennsylvania's IP ad-
dress blocking child pornography statute, 28 (7) port blocking and
peer-to-peer file sharing,29 and (8) the regulation of streaming video
at the IP layer. 30 The final Part presents our conclusions.31
I. THE LAYERS MODEL OF INTERNET ARCHITECTURE
A. The Code Thesis and the End-to-End Principle
What is the relationship between layers analysis and the growing
body of scholarship that argues for (or at least assumes) the proposi-
tion that an understanding of Internet architecture is essential to
sound Internet regulation? The relationship between Internet archi-
tecture and the law has been discussed in the context of Internet regu-
lation generally,3 2 and with respect to Internet governance issues, 33
23 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
24 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
25 See infra Part III.A.3.b.
26 See infra Part III.A.3.c.
27 See infra Part III.A.3.d.
28 See infra Part III.A.3.e.
29 See infra Part III.A.4.a.
30 See infra Part III.A.5.
31 See infra Conclusion.
32 See, e.g., Julian Epstein, A Lite Touch on Broadband: Achieving the Optimal Regula-
tory Efficiency in the Internet Broadband Market, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 37, 42-43 (2001)
(discussing Internet architecture in the context of broadband regulation); Barbara
Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPEC-
TUS 37, 49-57 (1999) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of regulation of
cable access to the Internet); Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment
and Cable Open Access, 8 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 23, 39-40 (2000) (discussing Internet
architecture in the context of cable and broadband access regulation); Llewellyn Jo-
seph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement
or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL' 475,
487-89 (1997) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of Internet govern-
ance); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sover-
eignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 477-90 (1998) (discussing Internet
architecture in an analysis of the relevance of territorial sovereignty to regulation of
the Internet); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice
Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network
and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 130-41 (2001) (discussing Internet
architecture in the context of privatization of Internet functions); Edward Lee, Rules
and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1322-28 (2002) (discussing
regulation of Internet architecture); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access
to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REv. 3, 4-34 (2000) (discussing Internet architecture
2004]
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including the relationship between Internet governance and demo-
cratic control of policy3 4 and content. 35 In addition, the role of In-
ternet architecture has been discussed in connection with a variety of
more particular issues and fields, including antitrust law, 36 civil proce-
dure (e.g., notice 37 and jurisdiction 38 ), commercial law,3 9 constitu-
in the context of broadband and cable regulation); Lewis E. Schnurr, Media and Tele-
communications Regulation and the Internet: Regulate or Strangulate?, 8 SPG MEDIA L. &
POL'Y 11, 12-14 (2000) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of regulatory
policy); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to "Internet Interconnection, "54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 243-47 (2002) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of
regulation of the Internet backbone);Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and Telecommu-
nications Services, Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the
Regulatory System, 16 YALEJ. ON REG. 211, 215-17 (1999) (discussing Internet architec-
ture in the context of universal service issues in telecommunications regulation);
Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1999)
(proposing an analysis of Internet regulation focusing on the application layer of the
Internet's architecture). But see Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1227 n.212 (2002) ("IT]he analysis of the access issue gains no
purchase from abstract theorizing about the appropriate architecture of Internet
technology. Framing the question as one of Internet network architecture only di-
verts attention from the issues of economic policy by implying that some unique tech-
nological principle is driving the analysis.").
33 See, e.g., Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of
Internet Regulation, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 445, 453 (2001) (discussing Internet architec-
ture in the context of institutions regulating the Internet); Philip J. Weiser, Internet
Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. REV. 822, 829-35 (2001)
(discussing Internet architecture in the context of Internet governance).
34 Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261,
271-75 (2002) (discussing democratic control and Internet architecture).
35 See, e.g., Julien Mailland, Note, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs of
Control: The French Example, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1179, 1198 (2001) (discussing
Internet architecture's effect on French regulation of content).
36 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 269-71 (2002) (discussing Internet architecture in
the context of antitrust regulation).
37 See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, Cyberslapp Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing
Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493,
519 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of identifiability of
litigants).
38 See, e.g., Sanjay S. Mody, Note, National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the
Concept of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365, 368-69 (2001) (discussing Internet
architecture in the context of jurisdiction).
39 See, e.g., Michael Lee et al., Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legiti-
macy: A Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839, 879-86 (1999) (discussing
Internet architecture in the context of commercial transaction security).
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tional law (e.g., the dormant Commerce Clause 40 and freedom of
speech 4 I), copyright law,42 disability rights, 43 domain name and trade-
mark issues, 44 gambling regulation, 45 privacy, 46 race and law,47 securi-
40 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 816, 826 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in
the context of the dormant Commerce Clause).
41 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 93-101 (2000) (discussing Internet architec-
ture in the context of freedom of speech); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate
Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURiMETmICS J. 629, 670 (1998) (discussing Internet
architecture in the context of freedom of speech); Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick,
Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REv. 395, 404-31
(1999) (discussing Internet architecture and freedom of speech); Alex C. McDonald,
Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors over the Internet, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
163, 165-69 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of protection of
children from harmful content); KarlJ. Sandstrom &Janis Crum, Is the Internet a Safe
Haven for Corporate Political Speech? Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce in the
Shadow of Reno v. ACLU, 8 COMMLAw CONSPEcTus 193, 194-97 (2000) (discussing
Internet architecture in the context of regulation of corporate speech); Alexander
Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
817, 826-32 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of regulation of
hate speech); Timothy Zick, Congress, the Internet, and the Intractable Pornography Prob-
lem: The Child Online Protection Act of 1998, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1147, 1153, 1201
(1999) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of freedom of speech and
regulation of child pornography).
42 See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Computer Ram "Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical Perspec-
tives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYrON L. REv. 423,
430, 461 (1997) (discussing the relationship of Internet architecture to caching prac-
tices); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastruc-
ture, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 286-93 (discussing the impact of Internet
architecture on the protection of intellectual property); Mathias Strasser, Beyond Nap-
ster: How the Law Might Respond to a Changing Internet Architecture, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 660
passim (2001) (discussing Internet architecture and copyright protection of digital
content); Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or Safe-
guard for Efficient Network Operation?, 4J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 281-94 (1997) (discuss-
ing Internet architecture in the context of copyright analysis of file caching).
43 Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job: Are Commercial Websites Places of
Public Accomodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?, 2 VAND.J. ENT. L. &
PRAc. 191, 193-95 (2000) (discussing Internet architecture's impact on accessibility to
the disabled).
44 G. Andrew Barger, Cybermarks: A Proposed Hierarchical Modeling System of Registra-
tion and Internet Architecture for Domain Names, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 623, 647-49
(1996) (discussing the connection between Internet architecture and domain name
policy); A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 93, 109-11 (2002) (discussing the role of Internet architecture in connection
with domain name system control issues); Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141, 263 (2001) (discussing the connection
between Internet architecture and domain name policy).
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ties regulation, 48 tax policy, 49 telecommunications regulation,50 and a
variety of other topics. 51 Given that Internet architecture is already on
the table for discussion, what value does layers analysis add? Our an-
swer to this question begins with an explication of the code thesis.
45 Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the Proposed
Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 437-38 (2000) (discussing
Internet architecture in the context of gambling regulation).
46 Carlos Perez-Albuerne & Lawrence Friedman, Privacy Protection for Electronic
Communications and the "Interception-Unauthorized Access" Dilemma, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 445 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the context
of privacy issues); Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and
Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1259-63 (2000) (discussing Internet architec-
ture in the context of privacy and security issues); Joshua S. Bauchner, Note and Com-
ment, State Sovereignty and the Globalizing Effects of the Internet: A Case Study of the Privacy
Debate, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 689, 708-09 (2000) (discussing Internet architecture in
the context of globalization and privacy).
47 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1160-61 (2000).
48 John G. Moon, The Dangerous Territoriality of American Securities Law: A Proposal
for an Integrated Global Securities Market, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 131, 188-90 (2000)
(discussing Internet architecture in the context of securities regulation).
49 Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study
in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1235-36 (2001) (discussing Internet
architecture in the context of tax policy); Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet
Commerce: Something New Under the Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1113, 1124-27 (1997)
(discussing Internet architecture in the context of taxation of e-commerce transac-
tions); W. Ray Williams, The Role of Caesar in the Next Millennium? Taxation of E-Com-
merce: An Overview and Analysis, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1703, 1707 (2001) (noting
that "[f]amiliarity with the Internet's architecture is critical to understanding the pol-
icy of taxing a transaction based on a nexus or a physical presence requirement");
Neal Harold Luna, Comment, Implications of Singapore's Income and Consumption Tax
Policies on International E-Commerce Transactions of Digitized Products, 10 PAC. RiM L. &
POL'VJ. 717, 723 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the context of Singa-
pore's tax policy).
50 Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC Jurisdiction over Internet Telephony, 5
CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 43, 43-44 (1997) (discussing Internet architecture in the con-
text of the regulation of Internet telephony); Steve Kelley, Liberating Our Digital Fu-
ture: How the 1996 Telecommunications Act Definitions Are Hobbling Change, 27 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REV. 2137, 2143-47 (2001) (discussing Internet architecture in the con-
text of telecommunications policy); Christopher Libertelli, Internet Telephony Architec-
ture and Federal Access Charge Reform, 2 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 13 passim (1996)
(discussing Internet architecture in the context of regulation of Internet telephony);
Tuan N. Samahon, Comment, The First Amendment Case Against FCC IP Telephony Regu-
lation, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 493, 501-02 (1999) (discussing Internet architecture in the
context of regulation of Internet telephony).
51 Principe, supra note 20, at 727, 730-37 (discussing Internet architecture in the
context of law of war).
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1. The Code Thesis
The distinctive contribution of layers analysis is illuminated by
comparison to two ideas advanced by Lawrence Lessig: the code thesis
and the end-to-end principle. Before we begin our exposition, we
wish to acknowledge our profound debt to Lessig's work. Although
we disagree with Lessig in some important ways, our analysis operates
within a framework that Lessig and others pioneered. We believe that
the move to the layers analysis both extends and supports the funda-
mental normative thrust of Lessig's work.
Lessig has argued for a fundamental idea that provides a frame-
work for analyzing Internet regulation-which we shall call the code
thesis. 52 The code thesis is the claim that the nature of the Internet or
cyberspace is determined by the code-the software and hardware
that implements the Internet.5 3 As a product of human endeavor,
cyberspace lacks inherent natural properties that can be attributed to
the various regions of physical space. This is a fundamental difference
between the Internet and the vacuum of outer space or the liquid of
the world's oceans. Although those environments can be modified by
human activity, their fundamental nature is not created or shaped by
engineering.
By contrast, how the Internet runs or cyberspace operates is com-
pletely dependent on the code that implements it. This point can be
missed. One might argue that the Internet has an inherent nature,
and that regulation of the Internet must respond to that nature. 5 4 So,
for example, one might argue that the Internet cannot be regulated
52 See generally LESSIG, supra.note 15.
53 Id. at 6.
54 This is not to say that the Internet has no essential characteristics. In this foot-
note, we digress briefly on the point. The term "Internet" is conventionally capital-
ized, indicating that it is a proper name (or in philosophical discourse, a "rigid
designator")-the existing global network of networks unified by TCP/IP as well as
the authoritative Internet Protocol (IP) address system and the authoritative Domain
Name System (DNS), managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) and sometimes called the IANA functions. See, e.g., INT.ET
CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, PROGRESS REPORT ON PERFORMANCE OF LANA
FUNCTIONS (May-July 2000), available at http://www.iana.org/periodic-reports/pro-
gress-report-may-jul00.htm; Stuart Lynn, What are the IANA Functions?, at http://
www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/archive/ripe-39/presentations/icann/sldOO3.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004) (displaying a slide show prepared by Stuart Lynn, then Presi-
dent of ICANN, and presented at the RIPE-NCC Meeting, Bologna, Italy, May 2001).
We can contrast the actual Internet with "an internet," e.g. any possible system for
creating a global network of networks. The Internet may evolve in various ways, but in
order for the Internet to count as an internet, the Internet must remain a global network
of networks and not something else.
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by national governments, because, as a global network of networks,
activity on the Internet can originate in any physical location, any-
where in the world. 55 This argument conveys a large measure of
truth, but it misses an essential point-the Internet has this property
because of the code or software that makes physical location irrele-
vant. That code could have been different or it could change in the
future.
In this sense, code is the prime regulator in cyberspace-in Les-
sig's felicitous phrasing, "the Code is Law."'56 The point is not that that
the software that enables the Internet is literally a law, in the sense
that it would satisfy a theory of the nature of law.57 Nor is it Lessig's
point that the role of software in determining the properties of the
Internet is the same as the role of the laws of nature in determining
the properties of the Pacific Ocean. 58 Rather, Lessig's point is that
software or code has regulative effects on human behavior. In this
sense, Internet architecture is like the architecture of buildings and
cities. Just as the architecture of a building enables and encourages
humans to move and congregate in certain ways, so the architecture
of the Internet enables some activities by users and regulators while
discouraging others.
For our purposes, the architecture of the Internet is the regulat-
ing entity that allowed the explosion of innovation in cyberspace. The
Internet is configured in a way that enables low cost innovation at the
application layer. The architecture of the Internet is a function of the
software (or code) and hardware that constitutes the Internet.
Software and hardware are the bricks and mortar of the Internet.
55 See Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359,
365-70 (2003).
56 Id. at 369.
57 Take, for example, H.L.A. Hart's theory that law is the union of primary and
secondary rules as identified by a rule of recognition. For Hart, the sine qua non of
law is a social rule. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Joseph Raz &
Penelope Bullock eds., 2d ed. 1997). Code is software, and although socially created,
software is not a social rule. Likewise, code is not law in John Austin's sense. It is not
the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment. SeeJOHN AUSTIN,
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18-37 (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., 1995).
58 Like the laws of nature and the ocean, the code that constitutes the Internet
causally determines the properties of the Internet. Unlike the laws of nature, code is
malleable. Humans cannot alter the specific gravity of H 2 0, but they can rewrite
TCP/IP.
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2. The End-to-End Principle
What then is the architecture of the Internet? This is, of course, a
very abstract and hence potentially ambiguous question. A narrower
and less ambiguous question would be: Which feature or features of
Internet architecture are responsible for the distinctive and valuable
functionality that the Internet provides? Lessig suggests that the an-
swer to these questions can be captured in large part by a single prin-
ciple; he has argued that the primary characteristic of the Internet
architecture that enables innovation is the end-to-end principle.59 As
Lessig explains, the end-to-end principle says to keep intelligence in a
network at the ends or in the applications, leaving the network itself
relatively simple. In short, the principle calls for a "stupid network"
and "smart applications." The network simply forwards or routes the
data packets and does not-and cannot by architecture-discriminate
or differentiate traffic generated by different applications.
This point may require further explanation, even for readers who
are very familiar with the operation of the Internet as end users. This
is because most contemporary Internet users are only aware of one
application, an application that is so ubiquitous that it can be con-
fused with the Internet itself. That application is Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol (HTTP), the software that enables the World Wide Web. 60
The Web is not the Internet. It is one application that communicates
using the Internet. Despite the ubiquity of the Web, most Internet
users have used two other applications, neither of which is the Web
(although they are accessed through the Web in some cases). The
first of these is File Transfer Protocol (FTP), the application that al-
lows a file to be transferred from one server on the Internet to an-
other.61 You are likely to have used FTP if you have downloaded a file
from a server on the Internet. Although FTP is available (with various
59 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 34. But see Christian Sandvig, Shaping Infrastructure and
Innovation on the Internet: The End-to-End Network that Isn't, in SHAPING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF RESEARCH (David H. Guston & Daniel
Sarewitz eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 25), at http://www.spcomm.uiuc.
edu/users/csandvig/research/CommunicationInfrastructureandInnovation.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (arguing that transparency, participation, and flexibility,
and not end-to-end, should guide regulatory policy).
60 See Webopedia, HTTP, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/HTTP.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (defining HTTP).
61 See Webopedia, TP, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/FTP.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004) (defining FTP). On the distinction between FTP and HTrP,
see Webopedia, The Difference Between FIP and H77TP, at http://www.webopedia.com/
DidYouKnow/Internet/2002/FrP-HTTP.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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interfaces) as a stand-alone program,62 it is also integrated with web
browsers, such as Internet Explorer, Opera, Mozilla, and Netscape
Communicator, which are used to access the Web. The second appli-
cation with which most users are familiar is Simple Mail Transfer Pro-
tocol (SMTP), the basis for e-mail. 63 Although the standard e-mail
application can be accessed via the Web, most users access the applica-
tion through a stand-alone program, such as Outlook or Eudora. Re-
cently a new family of applications has become familiar to many users.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing programs 64 such as the late lamented
Napster, and its cousins KaZaA and Bearshare, are especially popular
for the sharing of digital music (MP3) files. These programs are built
around distinct applications. 65
The Internet does not "know" whether a given packet of data is a
web page (HTTP), an article downloaded from an online service 66
(FTP), an e-mail message (SMTP), or an MP3 file being shared by use
of KaZaA.67 This point can be illustrated by considering a hypotheti-
cal reader, whom we call Alice, who downloads this Article from the
Social Science Research Network (SSRN). When we wrote this Article
using Microsoft Word, the content (the semantic content of the Arti-
cle expressed as syntactic content, e.g., letters, words, and sentences)
was encoded as a digital file in a particular format (a DOC file).
Adobe Acrobat then translated that file into a different format (a PDF
file), preserving its semantic and syntactic properties. When that PDF
file is loaded on a server by the Social Science Research Network
(SSRN), a web browser can be used to locate the file and initiate a
request to use the FTP application. The semantic and syntactic con-
tent of the Article has now been passed to the application layer. The
next step is the crucial one. The digital file (the PDF) file is passed by
the application (FTP) to the transport layer (the TCP part of TCP/
IP). The transport layer breaks the PDF file into data packets. The
62 One popular implementation of FTP is CuteFTP. See Globalscape, The World's
Favorite FTP Client, CuteFFP!, at http://www.globalscape.com/products/cuteftp/in-
dex.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
63 See Webopedia, SMTP, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SMTP.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (defining SMTP).
64 See Webopedia, Peer-to-Peer Architecture, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/
P/peertopeer-architecture.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (defining peer-to-peer
architecture).
65 See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing various peer-to-peer applications).
66 Social Science Research Network, Homepage, at http://www.ssrn.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2004).
67 The discussion elides the role of port number assignments, which do allow
TCP to discriminate between applications (but not content) on the basis of port num-
bers. For a discussion of port and the layers principle, see infra Part III.A.4.b.
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transport layer cannot differentiate between PDF files and MP3 files.
TCP does not distinguish the packets that carry a law review article by
Cass Sunstein from the packets that, when reassembled, would be a
popular song by Eminem. And, once the transport layer has broken
the data into packets, the Internet protocol layer (the IP part of TCP/
IP) cannot distinguish one packet from another on the basis of con-
tent. If Alice downloads our Article from SSRN, the software or code
that makes up the Internet cannot distinguish the packets of data that
comprise our Article from any other packets of data. The content
only becomes accessible to the code after the transport layer on Al-
ice's computer reassembles the packet into a PDF file. Once this has
happened, the operating system of Alice's computer (Microsoft Win-
dows) can recognize that the file is a PDF file associated with the Acro-
bat Reader program. That program in turn can read the digital file
and display its syntactic content on Alice's monitor. Alice will then
infer that the squiggly lines on her screen are letters forming words
and sentences, and she will attempt to determine what we (the au-
thors of this Article) meant.
This example illustrates what is sometimes called the "stupidity"
of the Internet. The Internet doesn't know that FTP is trying to send
a large file from one of our computers to Alice's computer. The In-
ternet cannot coordinate the routing of packets so that they all arrive
at Alice's computer at the same time. Ninety-five percent of the pack-
ets may arrive in the first minute, and the remaining five percent, trav-
eling by a different route on the Internet, might arrive minutes later.
The Internet cannot decide that delivery of PDF files is a high priority
for an academic institution and delivery of MP3 files is a low priority.
Nonetheless, the deaf, dumb, and blind Internet can sure transmit a
mean PDF file. Compare the efficiency of searching and downloading
works in progress from the Social Science Research Network with the
old-fashioned system of striking up conversations at conferences, lead-
ing the conversation to what you are working on, triggering an invita-
tion to send a draft, and then snail-mailing the draft in a bulky
envelope to one reader at a time.
3. Transparency and the Economics of Innovation
The end-to-end principle is shorthand for this feature of the ar-
chitecture of the Internet-the combination of a "stupid network"
and "smart applications." The network does not discriminate between
applications. The software at the transport and Internet protocol lay-
ers simply does not include code that would allow the Internet to asso-
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ciate data packets with application file types. 68 We can call this
characteristic of the Internet transparency. The Internet is transparent
to applications. The transparent, nondiscriminatory nature of the In-
ternet, Lessig has argued, is what has enabled the explosion of innova-
tion and creativity on the Internet.69 Because the network is
nondiscriminatory or transparent to applications, and the intelligence
is implemented at the ends by the applications, the innovation or cre-
ative activity is placed in the hands of the application creators. Thus,
innovation is decentralized and the opportunity to devise new applica-
tions is available to millions of creative individuals with Internet
access.
The economic significance of transparency is that it dramatically
lowers the investment required to produce a given innovation. Given
a transparent Internet, an innovator need only invest in innovation at
the application layer. 70 If the Internet were opaque, then new appli-
cations would also require investment in changes at lower layers (the
transport, IP, link, or physical layers).
Moreover, transparency reduces the cost of innovation to con-
sumers. Given a transparent Internet, a consumer need only invest in
an application itself in order to make use of it. For example, in order
to use KaZaA, I need only download the KaZaA program; I do not
need to ask my network administrator to reconfigure the network to
permit KaZaA to run-with one caveat.71 If the Internet were opaque,
68 A program called a packet sniffer can examine the content of packets on a
network. See Webopedia, Sniffer, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/snif-
fer.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). An example is "Sniff em," which is described by
its manufacturer as "[a] Packet Sniffer... that captures, monitors and analyzes net-
work traffic, detecting bottlenecks and other network related problems. Using this
information, a network manager can keep traffic flowing efficiently. A packet sniffer
can also be used legitimately or illegitimately to capture data being transmitted over a
network." Sniff'em, What is a Packet Sniffer or Network Sniffer?, at http://www.sniff-
em.com/sniffem.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
69 See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 120-34.
70 The cost of innovation at the application layer is affected by the constraints
imposed by the transport and IP layers. Simplicity at those layers reduces the cost of
innovation at the application layer. Complexity at those layers would increase the cost
of innovation at the application layer. For this reason, layer separation by itself does
not guarantee that the cost of innovation at the application layer will be low. Many
other factors affect those costs, including complexity introduced at lower layers.
71 There is an exception to this rule. If a network administrator closes the port
utilized by a particular program, that port must be opened to permit the application
to run. Cf Internet Assigned Numbers Auth., Port Numbers, at http://www.iana.org/
assignments/port-numbers (last updated Mar. 31, 2003); searchNetworking.com, Defi-
nitions: Port Number, at http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/
0,,sid7_gci212811,00.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
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consumers would be required to invest in changes to their network
infrastructure in order to utilize an innovative application. Because
networks are complex and are used by multiple users, network recon-
figuration may be relatively expensive. Because the Internet is even
more complex and is used by hundreds of millions of servers, recon-
figuration of the whole Internet to enable a new application would
involve a very large investment.
This point about transparency and adoption costs leads to an-
other important concept, networking effects. 7 2 The economic value of
some innovations depends on networking effects. The value of an ap-
plication like SMTP (e-mail) is a function, in part, of the number of
adopters; the more users of e-mail, the more valuable it is. 73 For some
applications, there may be a tipping point,74 at which the number of
adopters reaches critical mass resulting in a discontinuous and large
increase in value from networking effects or from similar phenomena
with respect to awareness of (or belief in) networking effects. Once
this tipping point is reached, the application becomes sufficiently val-
uable to broaden its appeal from early adopters to ordinary users. Re-
ducing the cost of adoption for consumers increases the likelihood
that these networking effect gains will be realized. If adoption costs
are too high for early adopters, the tipping point may never be
reached. For this reason, transparency may be required to enable in-
novations that would be efficient even given the large costs associated
with reconfiguring the Internet. Without transparency, the benefits
of the innovation would never become apparent and hence the invest-
ments would never be made.
The economics of Internet innovation are illustrated by the devel-
opment of the World Wide Web described by Tim Berners-Lee and
72 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998). See generally Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK
INDUSTRIES 1-6 (2001); Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as
Public Goods, 20J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1983); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 424 (1985); SJ.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 133 (1994).
73 For purposes of illustration, we set aside the possibility that there may be a
point at which additional users of e-mail actually reduce its utility by creating sorting
problems and encouraging "spare."
74 The idea of a tipping point is frequently used to describe norm cascades. See
Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
1832, 1846-47 (2002) (citing Martha Finnemor & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 896, 901 (1998)).
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others. 75 The core idea of the Web is the hypertext link: by clicking
here, on this word, you go there, to that word. By clicking here, on
this link, you go there, to that web page. Although Berners-Lee devel-
oped this idea independently, the same idea had been developed
before, on several occasions-all of them before the rise of the In-
ternet. 76 What the transparency of the Internet made possible was the
implementation of Berners-Lee's HTTP application without any need
for cooperation from or modification of the communications system
on which it was implemented. That is, the transparent nature of the
Internet dramatically lowered the investment that Berners-Lee and
others needed to make in order to produce the Web.
The World Wide Web sits on top of the Internet. From the appli-
cation user's point of view, the Internet is simply invisible-except, of
course, when network congestion calls it to our attention. If the archi-
tecture of the Internet had been opaque, then the counterfactual
equivalent of TCP/IP would have required modification for HTTP to
run on the Internet. And, if that had been the case, there is good
reason to believe that there would never have been a World Wide
Web. The networking effects that transformed the World Wide Web
from a merely great idea into an enormously useful communications
tool would never have begun cascading if the platform on which the
Web runs hadn't already been widely accessible. Berners-Lee faced
real obstacles in getting HTTP accepted, even though he was giving it
away and it could be run for free (at least from the point of view of
short-run marginal costs).77 Had Berners-Lee been required to con-
vince managers of the Internet to expend resources to enable the In-
ternet to run HTTP, 'we have every reason to believe that he would
have failed. Indeed, he might have been unable to convince his own
employers to allow him to make the necessary modifications in the
network at CERN for the experimental work that developed HTTP.
The economics of Internet transparency and networking effects
are very powerful. HTTP enabled what we now think of as "the In-
ternet revolution." But the dot com boom and bust, eBay and Ama-
zon.com, homepages and browsing-the cyberspace phenomena that
have become the furniture of our day to day ordinary existence-all
of these are the product of a single innovative application-HTTP.
The peer-to-peer phenomenon (from Napster to KaZaA and beyond)
75 See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB passim (2000).
76 See Dan Connolly, A Little History of the World Wide Web from 1945 to 1995, at
http://www.w3.org/History.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (presenting a timeline
with precursors to the World Wide Web's hypertext features).
77 BERNERS-LEE, supra note 75, at 30-34.
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is the product of a small number of innovative applications. We have
no crystal ball, and Kenneth Arrow's work on valuing innovation 78
tells us that we cannot reliably estimate the discounted present value
of the future Internet innovation. Nonetheless, if past is prologue, we
have reason to believe that the potential gains are very large indeed.
If you insist on a number of dollars, we submit that it could easily have
fifteen or even sixteen digits. 79
B. Transparency and the Layers
Lessig's analysis of Internet architecture is essentially correct.
Lessig has properly focused our attention on the key innovation ena-
bling feature-the transparency of the network to applications. More-
over, Lessig's attribution of this transparency to the end-to-end
principle does capture an important, indeed crucial, part of the full
story as to how the architecture of the Internet enables transparency.
But, it is only part of the story. Transparency is not a direct result of
the end-to-end principle, but rather is a built in characteristic of the
layered architecture of the Internet. That is, layers are the key, cen-
tral characteristic of the Internet architecture. The end-to-end princi-
ple emerged from the layers model as an articulation and abstraction
of implicit ideas inherent in the layers model. In this section, we de-
scribe in some detail the end-to-end principle and the layered archi-
tecture of the Internet communication protocol, the TCP/IP, in
order to clarify these concepts. Then we present an argument that
the layers model is the key characteristic of Internet architecture. Fi-
nally, we discuss how layers and end-to-end relate to the innovation
and regulation on the Internet.
1. Layers and End-to-End Principle
The end-to-end principle derives from pioneering work in the
theory of network design by Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David
Clark. As they put it, end-to-end is an argument (or a class of argu-
ments) that says "[t]he function in question can completely and cor-
rectly be implemented only with the knowledge and help of the
application standing at the endpoints of the communication system.
78 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIvrrY 609-26 (Nat'l Bureau Comm. for
Econ. Res. eds., 1962).
79 Ira Magaziner estimated that "almost two-thirds of the real growth of the U.S.
economy [during the mid- and late-1990s came] from the Internet economy." Ira
Magaziner, At The Crossroads of Law and Technology: Keynote Address, October 23, 1999, 33
Loy. L.A. L. Rrv. 1165, 1166 (2000). This translates into trillions of dollars.
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Therefore, providing that questioned function as a feature of the com-
munication system itself is not possible. 8 0
Stated in a generalized form, the end-to-end argument counsels
against low-level function implementation.81 What does this mean?
Avoiding low-level function implementation means that a functional-
ity desired by an application should be implemented at the level of
the application rather than at a lower level. The version of end-to-end
quoted above is a statement of the end-to-end principle for the engi-
neering of the Internet and the software that uses the Internet.
For example, the functionality of ensuring data integrity for a file
transfer application is better implemented at the application level
than at the network communication level. Even if the network deliv-
ered data without corruption, the reasoning goes, the file transfer ap-
plication still needs to do the data checking because the data
corruption could happen before the data reach the network-due to
a bad disk, for example.
The simple example of error checking illustrates two general fea-
tures of the end-to-end argument: vertical hierarchy and information mis-
match. Each of these two features must be explicated and clarified in
order to illuminate the meaning and significance of the end-to-end
principle in relation to the layers model.
a. The Layers Concept is Implicit in the End-to-End Argument
The end-to-end argument presupposes some sort of vertical hier-
archy-that is, it assumes lower and upper levels. In the above exam-
ple, the file transfer application is at an upper level with respect to the
network communication system, which, in turn, lies at a lower level
with respect to the application. The vertical hierarchy in the above
example is illustrated in Figure 1:
80 Jerome H. Saltzer et aL, End-To-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSAC-
TIONS ON COMPUTER Svs. 277, 278 (1984).
81 Id.
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FIGURE 1. VERTICAL. HIERARCHY
File Transfer File Transfer
Upper Level Application Application
(END) (END)
Computer System Computer System
Lower Level
Network
Communication
System
The fundamental insight of the end-to-end principle is that any
given functionality should be implemented at a level where it is
needed-the "end" point. Thus, an essential task of understanding
and applying the end-to-end principle is identifying and understand-
ing the relevant levels. Where is the "end"? "End" with respect to
what? That is, identifying and understanding the relevant vertical hi-
erarchies is essential to appreciate the end-to-end argument in specific
circumstances. In the context of Internet architecture, the relevant
vertical hierarchy implicit in the end-to-end argument are the layers of
the TCP/IP protocol.
b. Information and Layer Mismatch
Given the relevant vertical hierarchy, the core of the end-to-end
argument is that it is impractical, if not impossible, to provide a given
functionality at a level lower than the level where the function is
used-the "end" layer-because the lower layer may lack the informa-
tion necessary to fully perform the function.
In the file transfer example above, the data integrity function at
the network level is incomplete and redundant because data corrup-
tion-the key information in this functionality-can take place at a
higher level and the network has no reliable information on this mat-
ter. Only the application knows or can know what the uncorrupted
data look like, and it is impractical, if not impossible, to convey this
information to the lower levels. The subtleties of the application re-
quirement in many cases are not easily communicable to the lower
levels. Furthermore, the requirements may not be static, but may
change over time.
Network
Communication
System
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It should be noted that the general principles of the end-to-end
argument are applicable in many areas outside the network system
design. In fact, the creators of the end-to-end argument prefer to call
it a class of arguments applicable to many areas, including, but not
limited to, the design of encryption system, reliable storage system,
and the CPU architecture.8 2
2. The Layers Model of the TCP/IP Protocol
a. The TCP/IP Protocol is the Code of the Internet
In general, a network protocol is a set of rules and conventions by
which computers can communicate with each other.83 Because a
computer network is nothing but a set of computers connected with
each other, the network architecture is determined by the architec-
ture of the network protocol.8 4 The TCP/IP suite is the network com-
munication protocol for the Internet.8 5 Thus, the architecture of the
Internet as a network is determined by the architecture of the TCP/IP
protocol.
The fundamental goal of the initial Internet architecture was to
create a network of networks by interconnecting various computer
network systems already in existence at the time.8 6 In order to meet
this goal, TCP/IP was designed to be a software-only protocol, inde-
pendent of any particular computer and network hardware. That is,
TCP/IP is "pure code." It is the code of the Internet that determines
the architecture of the Internet.87
Many protocols other than TCP/IP are involved in Internet com-
munications, such as Ethernet for Local Area Networks (LANs) and
Frame Relay or Asynchronous Transer Mode (ATM) for Wide Area
Networks (WANs). The key point is that, without a common set of
protocols, these various networks will not be able to communicate
with each other, and thus cannot form an interconnected network of
networks. For the Internet, TCP/IP is the common protocol that ties
together all these otherwise disparate networks into a functional net-
work of networks. TCP/IP is the protocol that makes the Internet pos-
sible as a network of networks. Without TCP/IP there can be no
82 Id.
83 ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 17 (1996).
84 Id. at 18.
85 1 STEVENS, supra note 18, at 1.
86 David D. Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, 1988 PRoc.
SIGCOMM 88, reprinted in 18 ACM COMPUTER COMM. REV. 106 (1988).
87 See supra note 19.
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Internet. Thus, in this very important sense, TCP/IP is the Internet
or, perhaps, is "the Internet as we know it."88
b. Layers Model of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
TCP/IP is a layered network communication protocol that con-
sists of four independent layers-the application, transport, network,
and link layers-as illustrated in Figure 2:89
FIGURE 2. LAYERS MODEL OF TCP/IP
Application Layer HTTP, E-mail, FTP, Instant Message, DNS
Transport Layer TCP, UDP
Network (Internet Protocol) Layer IP, ICMP, IGMP
Link Layer Interface to the Physical Layer
Physical Layer Ethernet, Modem, DSL, Cable, TI, FiberOptics, Satellite, Bluetooth
i. The Physical Layer
The physical layer is not a part of the TCP/IP protocol suite. It is
the physical medium over which the actual transfer of bits takes
place-e.g., Ethernet, modem, DSL, cable, TI, fiber optics, satellite
link, etc. However, since no communication will take place without
some physical medium, the physical layer must be considered as a part
of the networking system to get a complete picture of the communica-
tion system. Importantly, the physical layer is rarely an architectural
issue for TCP/IP, because of the protocol's independence from
hardware.
ii. The Link Layer
The link layer handles all of the details of physically interfacing
with the computer hardware and network hardware. As such, this
layer is responsible for TCP/IP's freedom or independence over hard-
88 See supra note 19.
89 1 STEVENS, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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ware. If new hardware-say a high-speed satellite link-is to be used
for Internet communication, all that needs to be done is to imple-
ment the appropriate interface details at this layer.
Typically, the link layer is implemented as a device driver for the
particular network hardware. Supporting new hardware is accom-
plished by swapping in a new device driver that provides the link be-
tween TCP/IP and the hardware. The upper layers do not need to be
changed at all. In fact, the upper layers have no idea over which phys-
ical media the communication will take place. Thus, the link layer
gives the hardware independence to the TCP/IP communication and
consequently frees TCP/IP from the bondage of a variety of computer
and network hardware.
iii. The Internet Protocol Layer
The Internet protocol, sometimes called the network layer, In-
ternet layer or IP layer, handles the movement of data packets around
the network. The encoding of IP addresses and the routing of the
data packets for packet switching takes place here.
At this point, we need to dispel some unfortunate confusion
about the naming of this layer. Because the IP layer was originally
called the "network layer" or "Internet layer," many original design
papers talk about "network design" or "Internet design" when what is
in fact discussed are the design issues relevant only to this layer.90 In
order to avoid the confusion, it is a common practice among network
software developers to call this layer the "Internet Protocol layer" or
"IP layer." We shall adopt this naming convention for the remainder
of this Article.
iv. The Transport Layer
The transport layer provides a flow of data between two hosts for
the application layer above. This is where the data received from the
application layer is broken up into data packets to be handed over to
the network or IP layer, and the data packets received from the IP
layer are assembled into a data stream to be delivered to the applica-
tion layer.
90 See, e.g., Memorandum from B. Carpenter, Network Working Group, to the
Internet Community (Feb. 2000), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2275.txt [hereinafter
Internet Transparency]; Memorandum from B. Carpenter, Network Working Group,
to the Internet Community (June 1996), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt.
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v. The Application Layer
The application layer handles the details of the particular appli-
cation. Examples of the application layer protocols are-HTTP for
web communication, SMTP for e-mail, FTP for file transfer, and the
Domain Name System (DNS) for mapping IP address numbers to eas-
ily recognizable character strings.
c. An Example: Web Communication over Ethernet
To illustrate how these layers work together, let us consider a sim-
ple example of web communication over Ethernet, illustrated by Fig-
ure 3. The user launches a web browser to access a web server that is
connected to the user's computer via an Ethernet link.
FIGuRE 3. ETHERNET WEB COMMUNICATIONS
(User on a PC (Web server
running Windows) running on a Sun
Workstation)
Application Layer Web Browser Web Server
HTTP protocol
Transport Layer TCP TCP
-d TCP protocol
Network Layer IP IP
IP protocol
Link Layer Ethernet Ethernet
Interface Ethernet protocol Interface
Physical Layer (Ethernet)
At the application layer, the web client (the browser) communi-
cates with the web server using HTTP (the protocol of the World
Wide Web) to exchange data. Although the horizontal communica-
tion between the web client and server takes place completely within
the application layer, the communication mechanism is handing and
receiving the data to and from the lower layer-the TCP layer. The
same process is repeated down and up the layers.
d. The Horizontal Protocols
A key aspect of the TCP/IP protocol is complete and indepen-
dent horizontal communications-independent of the lower layers as
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well as any computer hardware or operating system it runs on. As a
communication protocol specification, HTTP does not know nor de-
pend on which computer or network medium it runs on. The HTTP
protocol specification is complete within the application layer-it is
'Just software." As long as the web server gets a protocol string that
says something like "get me so-and-so document," the web server will
send the file over to the requesting party without caring or ever know-
ing from what type of computer or over what kind of network medium
the request came. Each of the other layers works in a similar fashion.
e. Vertical Protocols-Encapsulation of Data
Another key aspect of the TCP/IP protocol is how upper and
lower layers communicate with each other. The vertical communica-
tion between the layers is achieved by a technique called encapsula-
tion. A lower layer treats the data passed down from the upper layer
as structureless "pure data" (or "payload" in network terminology),
and puts header and/or trailer around the payload-i.e., "encapsu-
lates" the payload data.
All of the information necessary for the horizontal communica-
tion at a specific layer is contained within the headers. When data is
received from the lower layer, the upper layer looks for its layer
header, and performs its layer function according to the information
found in the headers. When the layer is satisfied that it has received a
complete unit of data ready to be passed up, it then strips out the
header and passes the payload up to the upper layer. The process is
illustrated in Figure 4 for the web communication over Ethernet ex-
ample above:
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FIGURE 4. VERTICAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LAYERS
(user data /
content)
HTTP header user data
______________ HTTP Layer
payload for TCP Layer
TCP header HTTP header user data
, , TCP Layer
- payload for IP Layer
IP header TCP header HTTP header user data
- a L IT Layer
, " payload for Ethernet Layer v
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f. IPv6
Before proceeding further, we pause briefly to discuss IPv6 or ver-
sion six of the Internet Protocol, the IP in TCP/IP. The Internet En-
gineering Task Force (IETF) designed IPv6 to update Internet
Protocol, IP version 4 (IPv4), which is now nearly twenty years old.
The most important feature of IPv6 is that it vastly expands the num-
ber of available IP Addresses-addressing the current shortage. The
IETF expects IPv6 to gradually replace IPv4, with a period of several
years during which the two protocols will coexist.91 There are IPv6
task force organizations in North America, the European Union, In-
dia, and Taiwan.92
Most of the issues raised by IPv6 are outside the scope of this
Article, but one point requires a very brief discussion. Because of the
global shortage of IP addresses, many networks use Network Address
Translation (NAT). "NAT allows two networks to be joined together,
and is typically used to join a network of machines with non-routable
IP addresses to the global internet. '' 93 NAT impinges on transparency
for technical reasons.94 Because IPv6 may eventually end the global
91 See IPv6, Information Page, at http://www.ipv6.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
92 See IPv6 Task Force, TFAround the World, at http://www.ipv6tf.org (last visited
Feb. 11, 2004).
93 Posting by Michael, michael@slashdot.org, to Slashdot, The Fight for End-to-
End: Part One (Dec. 6, 2000), at http://slashdot.org/articles/00/12/06/
1613233.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
94 See id.
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shortage of IP addresses, it should mitigate this particular threat to
transparency. 9 5
3. Layers and Transparency
From the above discussions, the key features of the TCP/IP pro-
tocol suite can be summarized as: (1) layered protocol, (2) horizontal
protocols with complete and independent horizontal communication,
and (3) vertical protocol with encapsulation. A key architectural prin-
ciple implicit in these concepts is the separation of layers. The end-to-
end principle and the transparency of the Internet to applications
flow from the principle of separation of layers.
a. Separation of Layers and End-to-End Principle
Under TCP/IP design, various network functions are organized
into several layers, and these functions are independent of each
other-that is, the functions (and thus the layers) are separated. In
other words, the internal workings of the layers are hidden from each
other because that is the only way layers can be independent of each
other. In fact, encapsulation is a method of information hiding in
software design. 96
Although separation of layers may seem obvious (why divide func-
tion into different layers if not to separate them?) the concept makes
clear or articulates a very important design choice implicit in the lay-
ers model-that the layers are separated for a sound reason of net-
work engineering, and hence that functions should not cross layers
unless there is an exceptional reason to do so. For example, the de-
signers and programmers are not free to implement application layer
functions in the IP layer. It is implicit in and fundamental to the lay-
ers model that the application layer is created and placed above the
network layers because we want to put application functions there and
not at the lower network layers.
Therefore, the end-to-end principle-which, as described by Les-
sig, "keep[s] intelligence in a network at the ends, or in the applica-
tions, leaving the network itself to be relatively simple" 97-follows
from (and is an articulation of) the implicit design principle inherent
to the layers model of the TCP/IP protocol.98 One might be tempted
to argue that the TCP/IP's layered model is a result of the end-to-end
95 See id.
96 GRADY BoOCH, OBJECT-ORIENTED ANALYsIS AND DESIGN 49 (1994).
97 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 34.
98 Computer scientist Edward Felten, reacting to a prior version of this Article,
questions this point, writing:
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principle, not the other way around. That argument, however, would
be erroneous historically, conceptually, and functionally. Historically,
the end-to-end principle was first articulated in the early 1980s,99 and
the layered model of TCP/IP was developed in the mid-1970s. 00
Conceptually, the layer separation does not follow from the end-to-
end principle, because the end-to-end principle doesn't tell us to sepa-
rate the TCP, IP, and physical layers, whereas the end-to-end principle
does follow from the separation of the application layer from the
lower network layers. Functionally, satisfaction of the end-to-end prin-
ciple is guaranteed by the observance of separation of layers, but the
reverse is not the case. The end-to-end principle simply does not dic-
tate a robustly specified functional design for the network.
Our claim-that for the purposes of policy analysis, layers analysis
is in a sense more fundamental than the end-to-end principle-
should not obscure the fact that the end-to-end principle is important
to the issues of Internet architecture and regulation on the Internet.
The end-to-end principle is a guiding normative principle that clari-
[Solum and Chung] are on shak[y] ground, though, when they relate their
layering principle to the end-to-end principle that Lessig has popularized in
the legal/policy world. (The end-to-end principle says that most of the
"brains" in the Internet should be at the endpoints, e.g. in end users' com-
puters, rather than in the core of the network itself.) Solum and Chung say
that end-to-end is a simple consequence of their layering principle. That's
true, but only because the end-to-end principle is built in to their assump-
tions, in a subtle way, from the beginning. In their account, layering occurs
only at the endpoints, and not in the network itself. While this is not entirely
accurate, it's not far wrong, since the layering is much deeper at the
endpoints than in the core of the Net. But the reason this is true is that the
Net is designed on the end-to-end principle. There are alternative designs
that use deep layering everywhere, but those were not chosen because they
would have violated the end-to-end principle. End-to-end is not necessarily a
consequence of layering; but end-to-end is, tautologically, a consequence of
the kind of end-to-end style layering that Solum and Chung assume.
Edward W. Felten, Layers, FREEDOM TO TINKERJune 18, 2003, at http://www.freedom-
to-tinker.com/archives/000410.html. Felten is approaching the question from the
standpoint of an engineer designing the system, and his point is correct from that
perspective. The abstract concept of layering does not dictate end-to-end. Our claim,
which is consistent with Felten's analysis, is that the layers model of the TCP protocol
yields end-to-end. Nonetheless, Felten's perception clarifies our analysis and yields an
important corollary-not just any layered protocol would guarantee the transparency
of the Internet. This clarification would become important in the event that a basic
redesign of the Internet's communications protocol were on the table. In that situa-
tion, both layers analysis and the end-to-end principle would be required to ensure
transparency in what would be, in an important sense, a new Internet.
99 Saltzer et al., supra note 80, at 287.
100 Clark, supra note 86, at 114.
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fies, articulates, and illuminates the implicit design principle inherent
to the layers model of the TCP/IP. In the words of the original inven-
tors of the end-to-end idea, "[e] nd-to-end arguments mar be viewed as
part of a set of rational principles for organizing layered systems."101
b. Separation of Layers and Transparency
From our discussion above, it also follows that the transparency in
Internet architecture is an inherent, built-in characteristic of the
layered architecture of the TCP/IP protocol. If transparency is
loosely described for the present purpose as a nondiscriminatory char-
acteristic of the network to application data (a more precise definition
will be given later), then such nondiscriminatory behavior is a direct
result of the way the data from the upper layer is treated by the lower
layer as a consequence of the principle of separation of layers.
Because of the requirement of the layer separation principle, a
lower layer does not impute intelligence or information function to
the payload data received from the upper layer. A lower layer is "stu-
pid" with respect to the data from the upper layers because, by design,
the lower layer treats or is supposed to treat the payload as an encap-
sulated stuff the content of which it does not know nor wants to know
about. Thus, the lower layer, by design, cannot or is not supposed to
discriminate the payload from the upper layer based on its content.
Nor is the lower layer allowed to modify the content. Hence, the
lower layer is transparent with respect to the upper layer.
Furthermore, the expectation of transparency is an essential and
inherent part of the workings of the layered protocol architecture.
The horizontal communication within a layer cannot take place relia-
bly unless it is expected that the lower layers will not modify or dis-
criminate-that is, horizontal communication with respect to any
given layer requires that all of the layers that are lower in the vertical
hierarchy are transparent to the higher layer. Horizontal communica-
tion requires vertical transparency.
c. Layers, End-to-End, Transparency, and Innovation on the
Internet
Transparency is a consequence of the layers model. Trans-
parency means that the Internet is a neutral platform. Anyone can
develop network applications with or on top of the TCP/IP protocol,
and they will run on all of the networked computers and across all of
the routers in the world running the TCP/IP protocol. All of the hun-
101 Saltzer et al., supra note 80, at 287.
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dreds of millions of computers connected by the global network-
including the high-speed Internet backbones-a colossal computa-
tional resource that far surpasses even those owned by the largest na-
tions in the world, in effect become a commons that is placed at the
disposal of every end user and developer. No permission is necessary
for anyone to develop applications on top of the TCP/IP layers, or for
the application to run on the vast global network that is the Internet.
Furthermore, guided by the end-to-end principle, nearly all user
functions are implemented at the upper, application layer. Users
more or less know what functionality they want, and developers use
the information at the application layer to provide the functionality
that users want. Thus, innovation is decentralized and placed in the
hands of individual innovators. The Internet has become an innova-
tion commons that has enabled the most powerful and diverse spur to
innovation in modern times. 10 2
It should be noted that much more than the architecture of the
Internet is responsible for the rate and significance of the innovations
associated with the growth of cyberspace. Open access to protocol
documentation, to the code that implements it, to development tools,
and to computer operating systems that support development and im-
plementation, were all key ingredients. These factors for the produc-
tion of innovation were a set of commons that coordinated with the
Internet. Moreover, the substantial market incentives for Internet in-
novations are likely to have played a significant role in determining
the pace of innovation. However, if those factors had been in place,
but the fundamental architecture of the Internet had not enabled in-
novation, then, it seems likely, indeed all but certain, that the rate of
innovation would not have been as great. As we have already seen
through the example of the development of the World Wide Web,
without transparency the Internet would have been qualitatively and
quantitatively different. The external social benefits of the Internet
have been, in large part, a product of its architecture. It is, of course,
difficult to estimate the magnitude of these social benefits. As ex-
plained by Ira Magaziner, President Clinton's senior policy advisor,
"almost two-thirds of the real growth of the U.S. economy [during the
mid- and late-1990s came] from the Internet economy." 103
C. Communication System Layers
Another advantage of looking at Internet architecture in terms of
layers is that the model fits more naturally with the layers framework
102 See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 5-23.
103 Magaziner, supra note 79, at 1166.
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in a larger communication systems context-the layers framework
proposed by Yochai Benkler. Benkler suggests that we understand a
communication system by dividing it into three distinct layers. At the
bottom is a physical layer, in the middle a logical layer, and at the top
a content layer. The logical or the code layer, as Lessig calls it, is a
software layer that includes the TCP/IP protocol layers, application
software, and/or services. 10 4 This idea is illustrated by Figure 5:
FIGURE 5. TCP/IP LAYERS WITHIN COMMUNICATION SYSTEM LAYERS
Content Layer
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network / IP Layer
Link Layer
Physical Layer
Text, Speech, Music, Pictures, Video, etc.
Web Browsers, E-mail Client Programs, MP3
Ripping Software, Word Processors, etc.
HTTP, SMTP, FTP, DNS, etc.
TCP, UDP
IP, ICMP, IGMP
Interface to the Physical Layer
Ethernet, Modem, DSL, Cable, TI, Fiber
Optics, Satellite, Bluetooth, etc.
Thus, our approach to layers analysis integrates the TCP/IP laj-
ers within a generalized communication systems layers framework.
This integrated framework enables an analysis that uncovers impor-
tant issues-issues that might have otherwise been overlooked-aris-
ing from the interaction of the TCP/IP layers with the content layer
104 See Benkler, supra note 13, at 562.
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above and the physical layer below. We explore these implications in
Part III, when we apply the layers principle to both the narrow con-
ception of TCP/IP layers and the broader conception of layers in a
communications system. At this point, we turn from engineering to
policy and flesh out our development of the layers principle.
II. THE LAYERS PRINCIPLE: RESPECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAYERS
A. Explication of the Layers Principle
In this section, our aim is to provide both a general and abstract
conception of the layers principle and a relatively particular and con-
crete set of guidelines of the implementation of that conception.
1. A First Approximation of the Layers Principle
We have already provided a preliminary statement of the layers
principle: respect the integrity of the layers. We can now provide a
fuller statement of the principle and a richer explanation of its mean-
ing. The layers principle itself is general and abstract. It conveys a
fundamental aim of Internet regulation. The two corollaries to the
layers principle, layer separation and the minimization of layer-cross-
ing regulation, operationalize this abstract goal, offering a concrete,
action-guiding statement of its implications.
What normative ideal is expressed by the layers principle itself?
The injunction to respect the integrity of the layers expresses a goal
for Internet regulation. Regulation of the Internet should aim to
avoid interference with the layered nature of Internet architecture.
This aim is expressed as a negative-and not a positive-injunc-
tion.10 5 That is, the layers principle tells regulators to avoid regula-
105 Of course, there is a positive flip-side of the negative injunction: the Internet
should be layered, but this positive goal cannot (or should not) be pursued by In-
ternet regulators. Take an extreme case. Imagine a statute that requires respect of
the layers principle, and provides a private right of action for injured parties against
the members of the Internet Engineer Task Force (or other body) that violated the
principle. This would, quite obviously, be a terrible idea, and not just because it in-
volves the courts. A similar provision enforced by a regulatory agency would be al-
most as bad-as would direct legislative mandates of layering (such as a statute that
prohibited the use of a particular version of TCP/IP). Judges, regulators, and legisla-
tors lack the institutional capacity to make sound decisions regarding the implemen-
tation of the layers principle. See generally Cass R. Sustein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003). Similarly, adversary pro-
ceedings, notice and comment rulemaking, and interest group legislating are poor
processes for deciding how to implement layering.
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tions that would compromise the architecture of the Internet, but it
does not tell regulators how they should achieve their policy goals. l0 6
To whom is the layers principle addressed? The layers principle
can be interpreted broadly, so as to apply to any actor with the power
to affect Internet architecture, or narrowly, so as to apply to a more
circumscribed set of Internet regulators. On the broad interpreta-
tion, the layers principle addresses software designers and network ad-
ministrators-that is, it reaches what constitutional theorists might
call private actors. On the narrow interpretation, the layers principle
addresses governments or quasi-governmental entities, which we shall
call public Internet regulators. This set includes international organiza-
tions with regulatory power, national and subnational legislatures, ex-
ecutive and administrative policymakers, as well as judges and other
adjudicators-state actors in the parlance of constitutional theory.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) and related organizations10 7 pose a special case. ICANN is a
private, nonprofit corporation, organized under the laws of the State
of California. ICANN acts in some ways as a regulator of the Internet,
and it performs the so-called Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(ANA) functions, its coordination of the DNS, and the global Root.
Likewise, the IETF and the Internet Architecture Board (LAB) play a
role in coordinating the design of the TCP/IP protocol. We call
ICANN and related organizations transnational Internet regulators.108
For most of the remainder of this Article, we adopt the narrow inter-
pretation of the layers principle, with the caveat that we understand
the narrow interpretation to include transnational Internet regula-
106 Because the layers principle is negative, it does not provide a comprehensive
framework for the evaluation of Internet policy. See infra Part II.A.3.
107 Other organizations related to ICANN for this purpose include the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA) and the IETF.
108 We realize that this terminology is potentially contentious. There are many
different views about ICANN's nature. Here is a very brief survey of the possibilities:
(1) ICANN is an agent of the U.S. government, operating on the basis of a contractual
or quasi-contractual relationship with the Department of Commerce; (2) ICANN is
simply a private entity that operates the LANA functions as a nonprofit private enter-
prise; (3) ICANN is a "club" or association of private and public Internet actors, in-
cluding ISPs, backbone operators, Internet service providers, domain name registries
and registrars, and other stakeholders; (4) ICANN is a nascent international organiza-
tion (10), evolving from one of the three models above, and evolving toward a for-
mal, treaty based 1O; or (5) ICANN represents a new paradigm, a transnational
regulatory body, that exercises regulatory authority over the Internet without authori-
zation from national governments.
We do not mean to take sides in the debate over ICANN's nature. We believe the
phrase "transnational Internet regulator" is at least loosely descriptive of ICANN's
nature, but we leave the question as to ICANN's ultimate status for another day.
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tors. Our adoption of the narrow interpretation is motivated solely by
the scope of our inquiry. We do not believe that private Internet regu-
lators should ignore the layers principle; rather, our analysis for the
most part does not extend to their actions.
2. Corollaries of the Layers Principle
The layers principle itself expresses a general and abstract goal
for Internet regulation. We now explicate the content of the two cor-
ollaries to the layers principle.
a. The Principle of Layer Separation
The first corollary of the layers principle is the principle of layer
separation. This principle directs public Internet regulators not to vi-
olate or compromise the separation between layers designed into the
basic architecture of the Internet. The content of this principle can
be expressed as a constraint on the relationship between information
and the layers. The principle of layer separation proscribes any regu-
lation that would require one layer of the Internet to differentiate the
handling of data on the basis of information available only at another
layer. This is the most general articulation of the principle of layer
separation; it states the principle at the abstract level of information
theory.
The most fundamental threat to the principles of layer separation
would be a regulation that required the global ability to differentiate
content at the transport layer and/or the IP layer on the basis of infor-
mation from the content layer and/or the application layer. Imagine,
for example, that regulators concerned with peer-to-peer file sharing
decided to require Internet service providers or Internet backbone
operators to proscribe the transmission of data packets that originated
from a P2P application. The current architecture of the Internet
makes this difficult or impossible; the data packets do not provide the
information in readable form to the physical layer. 10 9 But, a funda-
mental change in the architecture of the Internet could make this
information available. There could be a central registry for Internet
applications, and the header for each packet of data could contain a
registry number that identified the packet by application. Going
down this road, however, would compromise the principle of layer
separation, and hence compromise the transparency of the Internet.
109 So-called "packet sniffing" applications can intercept data packets and may be
able to decode them. See, e.g., Steve Gibson, OptOut: How to Watch Spyware Watching
You!, at http://grc.com/oo/packetsniff.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
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b. The Principle of Minimizing Layer Crossing
The second corollary to the layers principle is the principle of
minimizing layer crossing. The second corollary directs Internet regu-
lators to minimize the distance between the layer at which the law
aims to produce an effect and the layer directly targeted by legal regu-
lation. When we say "minimize the distance" we are employing a spa-
tial metaphor for a logical relationship between the layers of the
Internet. Recall that we identify six layers, arranged in a vertical hier-
archy from top to bottom: (1) content, (2) application, (3) transport,
(4) IP, (5) link, and (6) physical. 110 The closer the layers are in the
vertical hierarchy, the smaller the distance between the layers. Adja-
cent layers are closest to one another. The maximum distance is be-
tween the content layer and the physical layer.
This concept can be stated more formally. We can assign each
layer an ordinal value corresponding to the layer's position in the ver-
tical hierarchy. The distance between a pair of layers is the absolute
value of the difference between their ordinal values.1 "' That is, the
distance between the first layer, the content layer, and the second
layer, the application layer, is one. Similarly, the distance between the
third layer, the transport layer, and the sixth layer, the physical layer,
is three.
110 See supra Part II.A.
111 The formulation in text can be notated as D (LLy) = 0 O (Lx) - 0 (L) ,
where 11 is the absolute value function, L. is layer x and L, is layer y, D is the distance
function for any pair of layers x and y, and 0 is the ordinal ranking of a given layer, L,
corresponding to the following ranking matrix:
OrdinalLayer Rank
Content 1
Application 2
Transport 3
IP 4
Link 5
Physical 6
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The principle of layer separation does not provide a formal
mechanism for comparing within the class or regulations that violate
the principle. Formally, we might say that layer separation is a binary
function, yielding values of "violation" or "no violation." The princi-
ple of minimizing layer crossing, by contrast, does permit ranking
within the class of layer-crossing regulations. The greater the number
of layers crossed, the worse the regulation; the fewer the layers
crossed, the better the regulation.
3. A Partial, Not Comprehensive, Set of Principles
Taken together, the principle of layer separation and the princi-
ple of minimizing layer crossing constitute a set of tools that yield ro-
bust evaluations of possible Internet regulations. Where the two
principles do not provide clear guidance, recourse may be had to the
more general conception of the layers principle. At this point, how-
ever, we should be clear that we have not provided a general theory of
Internet regulatory policy.
Our analysis is aimed at a particular evil: violation of the integrity
of the layers. What our analysis does not include is a framework for
evaluating the various rationales that might be provided as justifica-
tions for a particular regulation. Of course, our theory does provide a
goal for Internet regulators. In some cases, that goal might justify
public Internet regulators acting to proscribe or discourage private
action that threatens the integrity of the layers. Nonetheless, for the
most part, our analysis provides only a negative program for Internet
regulation. This suggests a natural question: is our theory incomplete
or deficient without a more complete analysis on the positive side?
Ought we to develop a comprehensive theory of the various ratio-
nales for Internet regulation? Our answer to this question is no. We
give this answer because the Internet is a pervasive medium of com-
munication. The goals of Internet regulation run the gamut of sub-
stantive policy goals. These include protection of intellectual
property, protection of consumers, safeguarding reputation, preserv-
ing privacy, discouraging the exploitation of women and children by
pornography, encouraging free expression, and so forth. Because the
Internet is a multipurpose, global communications medium, the posi-
tive program of theorizing the rationales for Internet regulation is
identical with legal and political theory in general.
We avoid this larger enterprise for two reasons. First, and obvi-
ously, it is beyond the scope of this Article for practical reasons-the
Article is long enough without presenting and defending a general
theory of jurisprudence. Second, and more importantly, the ques-
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tions of general legal and policy theory are perennially controversial.
For example, welfarism contends with law as integrity and virtue juris-
prudence. As we argue below, acceptance of the layers principle does
not depend on the acceptance of any particular theory in general ju-
risprudence. 12 Rather, the layers principle can be supported by argu-
ments generated from within a variety of jurisprudential perspectives.
4. The Constraining Force of the Layers Principle
The layers principle and its corollaries provide a powerful evalua-
tive tool for legal analysts and policymakers. So far, however, we have
not addressed a crucial question: what should policymakers do when
faced with a conflict between the layers principle and some other pol-
icy goal? In this subsection, we provide an abstract answer to this
question. That abstract answer will become more concrete in Part III
below. Although our approach at this stage of our argument is very
general, it is not indeterminate.11 3 We argue that the layers principle
should be entitled to substantial weight in Internet regulatory policy
and that, absent compelling justification, marginal benefits do not jus-
tify violation of the layer separation principle, even if the apparent
marginal benefits outweigh the apparent marginal costs. Where viola-
tion is justified, the principle of minimizing layer crossing suggests
that regulators may not adopt a layer-crossing regulation if an alterna-
tive regulation that crosses fewer layers would achieve the regulator's
goal at an acceptable level of cost.
We begin our analysis of the constraining force of the layers prin-
ciple by examining incrementalism as an alternative approach to In-
ternet regulation. The reasons for our rejection of incrementalism
lead naturally to the approach we favor, based on the notion of a
strong presumption or, metaphorically, a weighted scale. We then ex-
plain our reasons for rejecting an alternative approach, based on abso-
lute prohibitions of regulations that violate the layers principle.
a. The Case Against Incrementalism
By incrementalism we mean an approach to policymaking that
takes each decision on its own merits, without consideration of the
cumulative impact of similar decisions.' 14 Incrementalism is often the
way to go. By making incremental decisions, we can focus on the mar-
112 See infra Part II.C.
113 See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 462, 473 (1987).
114 Incrementalism can be used in another sense to distinguish small-scale
changes from large-scale changes. That use is related to ours, but it is not identical.
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ginal costs and benefits of each decision-an approach that may offer
the best chance of reaching the optimal outcome available in the deci-
sion space. In the context of Internet regulation, however, incre-
mentalism is a poor institutional strategy for three reasons: (1)
incrementalism leads to a scope of decision problem-the tyranny of
small decisions; (2) incrementalism is ill suited to decisions in infor-
mational environments characterized by ignorance, that is in situa-
tions in which there is uncertainty that cannot be reduced to risk; and
(3) incrementalism requires that low-level decisionmakers, legislators,
judges, and administrators possess certain institutional capacities that
they almost always lack. Each of these three problems is considered in
turn.
i. Tyranny of Small Decisions
An incrementalist approach to the impact of Internet regulation
on the layered architecture of the Internet might use the familiar de-
cision procedure of ad hoc, case-by-case balancing. 1 5 For each In-
ternet governance decision, the policymaker would weigh the benefits
of the decision against all the costs, including the marginal effect of
the decision on the transparency of the Internet. If marginal costs,
including a loss of innovation resulting from the marginal reduction
in transparency, outweighed the benefits, then a proposed regulation
would be rejected; if the benefits exceeded the marginal costs, it
would be adopted.
Incrementalism (or case-by-case balancing) assumes an answer to
the scope of decision question: On what class of cases should our deci-
sions operate? Should we take each case as it comes or should we
adopt a general rule (or principle) that decides (or guides decision
in) a class of cases? Incrementalism faces a well known scope of deci-
sion problem, sometimes called the tyranny of small decisions.1 16
This problem can be illustrated with a classic objection to act-utilitari-
anism with respect to promise-keeping. Act-utilitarianism takes each
decision whether to keep or break a promise as the relevant scope of
decision. In each case, the act-utilitarian determines whether keeping
or breaking the promise will produce more utility. If we consider only
one decision, this procedure is unproblematic, assuming we are inter-
ested only in consequences. But if this procedure were adopted gen-
115 See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 1026 (2003) (describing mechanisms by which a decision now (t) can constrain
the feasible set of choices at some point in the future (t2)).
116 Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and
the Limits of Economics, 19 KyLos 23 passim (1966).
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erally, it would erode the institution of promising. I could not rely on
you keeping your promise, because you will break it for a marginal
utility gain. The act-utilitarian might reply that the calculation of utili-
ties should take into account the effect of promise-breaking on the
institution of promising, but the critic will reply that any one broken
promise will likely produce no marginal effect on the institution itself.
Rule-utilitarianism solves this problem by adopting a different answer
to the scope of decision question. We decide what general rule with
respect to promise-keeping will maximize utility, and then act in ac-
cord with the general rule.
A case-by-case approach to Internet transparency would lead to a
scope of decision problem. Suppose we are deciding whether to com-
promise the integrity of the layers in order to address a particular pol-
icy goal. Incrementalism would counsel us to weigh the benefits of
the proposed layer-violating regulation against the costs, including the
effect on transparency. But, for any particular regulation, the effect
on transparency is not likely to be appreciable. Application program-
mers can cope with any particular single compromise in layer separa-
tion. So long as there is only one violation (or a very small number of
violations), software and network design engineers can program
around the violation. But, as the violations increase, the complexity of
the programming task increases in a more or less logarithmic fashion.
In this way, a series of seemingly cost-beneficial incremental decisions
can lead to a pattern of decisionmaking that leads to an outcome in
which costs outweigh benefits. In theory, a perfectly informed deci-
sionmaker could avoid this problem; in practice, however, the slippery
slope may be unavoidable, given incremental decisionmaking. 117
ii. Ignorance
Internet regulation is fraught with problems of unforeseen and
unintended consequences. Indeed, in a very real sense the central
purpose of this Article is to provide a framework for Internet regula-
tion that avoids unintended consequences. The problem of unin-
tended consequences has more than one cause. In part, this problem
results from the limited institutional capacities of courts, legislatures,
and administrative agencies. We discuss this aspect of the problem
below.118 In part, the problem of unintended consequences is also a
function of irreducible uncertainty. We discuss that aspect of the
problem in this subsection.
117 See Volokh, supra note 115.
118 See infra Part II.A.4.a.iii.
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One source of irreducible uncertainty stems from what we call
the transparency thesis:' 19 layer-violating regulations inherently dam-
age the transparency of the Internet. As we illustrated with the exam-
ple of Tim Berners-Lee and the World Wide Web, 120 damaging
transparency increases the cost of innovation. But how are these costs
to be weighed for case-by-case balancing? For any particular decision
whether to realize some gain at the cost of damaging transparency,
there are several sources of uncertainty as to the magnitude of the
cost. First, we do not know what innovative applications may be af-
fected by the transparency loss. Until Tim Berners-Lee conceived of
the World Wide Web, there was no way to know that a transparent
Internet would enable its invention. Second, we do not know how
much cost a particular loss of transparency will impose on any particu-
lar innovation. This problem is compounded by the fact that trans-
parency-damaging changes in Internet architecture will interact with
each other in unexpected ways. Third, we do not know what value
particular innovations will produce. The value created by the World
Wide Web did not become apparent until after networking effects had
passed a tipping point that resulted in the widespread use of web
browsers and the creation of substantial content that could be ac-
cessed by users. Even after this point was reached, the magnitude of
the value was extremely difficult to estimate-witness the wild swings
in market capitalization of Internet based enterprises. The combina-
tion of these three sources of uncertainty means that the cost of dam-
aging transparency cannot be reduced to an expected value-none of
the values necessary to calculate the amount of the loss discounted by
its probability are available to decisionmakers.
These particular uncertainties are familiar to economists in the
form of Arrow's work on the valuation of innovation. 12 1 We cannot
know the benefits of innovation until they are realized, 122 but we must
value innovation to make investment decisions. In the case of In-
ternet regulation, we cannot know the innovation costs of damaging
119 See infra Part II.D.1.
120 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
121 See Arrow, supra note 78, at 609-26.
122 We believe that in the case of the Internet, the ignorance problem with respect
to the benefits of innovation are acute. In other contexts, historical experience may
permit policymakers to reduce the uncertainty problem to a problem of risk. For
example, pharmaceutical companies may be able to reduce their decisions to invest in
research to expected utility (profit) calculations. We assert, although we do not have
a strong empirical foundation, that it is intuitively plausible to believe that we lack the
basis for making expected utility calculations with respect to the benefits of Internet
innovation that might be damaged by transparency-compromising Internet
regulations.
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the transparency of the Internet, but we must consider those costs
when formulating Internet regulatory policy.
Rational choice theory (or decision theory) attempts to give a for-
mal account of how rational beings can make decisions under condi-
tions of uncertainty. 12 3 Let us distinguish between two different kinds
of uncertainty. When we are uncertain about the consequences of
our actions but are able to estimate the probabilities of various ac-
tions, let us call this kind of uncertainty risk. When we cannot esti-
mate probabilities, let us call this kind of uncertainty ignorance.12 4
Incrementalism, or case-by-case balancing is an appropriate deci-
sion strategy for decisions involving uncertainty as risk. Under condi-
tions of risk, rational choice theory suggests that we should select the
alternative with the highest expected utility.1 25 We calculate expected
utilities by discounting the utility of each possible outcome of a choice
by the probability of its occurrence. 26 But, as we have seen, decisions
whether to violate the transparency of the Internet are not susceptible
to expected utility calculations on a case-by-case basis. For any partic-
ular case, we lack sufficient information to estimate the costs and their
probabilities. Decision theorists have proposed a variety of strategies
for decisionmaking under conditions of ignorance, but for reasons
that are beyond the scope of this Article, all of these strategies have
significant problems. 127
All is not lost, however. By changing the scope of decision, we
can transform the information space in which the decisions-i.e.,
whether to compromise the transparency of the Internet-are made.
Although in any particular case we have no reliable basis for estimat-
ing the magnitude or probability of innovation costs, we do have rea-
son to believe that the cumulative impact of a general practice of
sacrificing transparency for marginal benefits will be the imposition of
very large costs. For this reason, the uncertainties associated with in-
novation losses suggest that incrementalism is a poor decision strategy
as compared to an approach that works with a large-scale scope of
123 For an account of decision theory, see generally R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD
RAiFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); and MICHAEL D. RESNICK, CHOICES (1987).
124 See generally Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal
Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1149-50 (1987) (delineating
the difference between uncertainty based on risk as when based on ignorance); Law-
rence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 691, 696-98
(1994) (delineating the difference between uncertainty based on risk versus
ignorance).
125 See Solum & Marzen, supra note 124, at 1151.
126 See id.
127 See Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The Problems of In-
tergenerational Ethics, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 163, 217-18 (2001).
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decision. The point of the layers principle is simply to provide a deci-
sional heuristic that widens the scope of decision.
iii. Institutional Capacity
In addition to the tyranny of small decisions and ignorance, there
is a third reason to doubt the efficacy of incrementalism or case-by-
case balancing as a decision strategy for legal regulation of the In-
ternet; we call this third reason institutional capacity.128 Our thesis is
simple: the agents who make case-by-case decisions about Internet reg-
ulation will frequently lack the institutional capacities necessary for
consideration of the impact of Internet regulation on transparency on
a case-by-case basis. Judges, legislators, and regulators are relatively ill
prepared to understand Internet architecture in a subtle, fine-grained
way. For this reason, they are more likely to make good decisions by
respecting the layers principle as a general rule than by attempting a
case-by-case assessment of the effects of particular regulations on the
transparency of the Internet.
We believe this point is supported by uncontroversial assump-
tions about the institutional capacities of legal decisionmakers.
Judges, legislators, and regulators are not software engineers. Al-
though these policymakers may possess a variety of virtues, including
the ability to grasp new subject matter, the task of making case-by-case
judgments about the impact of Internet regulation on transparency is
a particularly difficult one. This is because assessing the impact of
particular layer-violating regulations on transparency requires the
ability to imagine the impact of the regulation in the concrete and
particular context of trying to program a new application. Few legal
actors have experience as programmers, making this act of imagina-
tive reconstruction particularly difficult. 129 Moreover, this problem is
compounded by the two other sources of difficulty for incremental-
ism: the tyranny of small decisions and the ignorance problem. The
combination of all three difficulties suggests that entrusting case-by-
128 Cf Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, U. CHI.
JOHN M. OLIN L. & ECON. WORKING PAPER No. 156, PUB.'L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING
PAPER No. 28 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_
id=320245 (arguing for consideration of institutional capacities in the context of ap-
proaches to interpreting legal texts).
129 See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, U. CHI. JOHN M.
OLIN L. & ECON. WORKING PAPER No. 165, PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER
No. 33, at 5-9 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=344620.
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case incremental decisionmaking to judges, legislators, and regulators
is unlikely to produce reliable outcomes.
It might be argued that the problem of institutional capacity
could be remedied by creating a specialized regulatory agency, with
expert decisionmakers aided by a staff that included competent net-
work software engineers. There may be particular contexts in which
such a body would provide an appropriate policy formulation mecha-
nism, but this strategy is not generally available for Internet regula-
tion. The reason is obvious. The Internet is a general purpose
medium of communication. The problems of Internet regulation run
the whole gamut of issues faced by the law, from intellectual property
and electronic commerce to freedom of speech and privacy. The dif-
ficulty with a specialized agency is that it would face a generalized
docket of regulatory issues. This problem is compounded by the fact
that Internet regulation is divided between local, state, national, and
international agencies. Our hypothetical Internet regulatory agency
would be faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the agency could
take a narrow view of its jurisdiction-leaving important Internet-af-
fecting decisions to actors with the requisite institutional competence.
On the other hand, the agency could take a broad view of jurisdic-
tion-essentially becoming a super-legislature of the Internet.
Neither solution is satisfactory. The narrow view leaves the problem
unsolved, and the broad view is not feasible, as it would trample the
constitutional authority of national and subnational legislatures.
b. A Constraining Framework for Internet Regulation
If incrementalism does not provide an adequate framework for
the integration of the layers principle into the policy formulation pro-
cess, what is the alternative? In this subsection, we argue that the lay-
ers principle and its corollaries should be viewed as establishing a
framework for analysis of alternative policies for Internet regulation
that incorporates a strong presumption against regulations that vio-
late the layers principle. Policymakers who adopt this framework of
analysis should consider two questions before adopting a layer-violat-
ing regulation: (1) Is the regulatory interest compelling?, and (2) Are
layer-respecting regulatory alternatives available? We contend that
this framework can provide an adequate basis for institutional utiliza-
tion of the layers principle as a practical constraint on legal regulation
of the Internet. We begin our exposition of these ideas by explaining
our notion that this framework for analysis should utilize principles as
the fundamental analytic unit.
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i. The Status of a "Principle" in Law and Policy
As an expositional heuristic, legal norms can be sorted into three
general classes- rules, standards, and principles-that vary in terms of
the degree of constraint they impose upon decisions. 130 Because dif-
ferent legal theorists use these terms differently, we will stipulate the
following meanings. Rules are the most constraining and rigid. If the
layers principle were a rule, then it would strongly constrain decisions.
For example, public Internet regulators could impose regulations that
would require a lower layer to obtain information from a higher layer
without violating the rule. Standards provide an intermediate level of
constraint. Standards guide decisions but provide a greater range of
choice or discretion-for example, a standard may provide a frame-
work for balancing several factors. Principles are less constraining
still. As a principle, the layers principle and its corollaries provide
mandatory considerations for public Internet regulators. Whereas
standards identify an exhaustive set of considerations for adjudication
or policymaking, a principle identifies a nonexhaustive set, leaving
open the possibility that other considerations may be relevant to the
decision.
There is an obvious difficulty with our choice of a principle,
rather than a rule or a standard. Because principles provide only
weak constraints on decisionmaking, it might be argued that princi-
ples are simply not up to the task of providing the necessary guidance
to public Internet regulators. In the subsections that follow, we ex-
plain how principles can provide meaningful constraints and why we
reject the more constraining alternatives, i.e., a rule or standard based
approach to the protection of layers.
ii. Compelling Regulatory Justification
The law is familiar with the problems of case-by-case balancing
that we have examined.1 3 ' One strategy for decisionmaking that ame-
130 See Barnabas Dickson, The Precautionary Principle in CITES: A Critical Assessment,
39 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 211, 222-23 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 56-59 (1992). Dworkin's important dis-
cussion can be found at RONALD DWORUIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977);
see also Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IowA L. REv. 739, 740
(1997).
131 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the Central Hudson test as "very difficult to apply" because of
"the inherently nondeterminative nature of a case-by-case balancing 'test' unaccompa-
nied by any categorical rules"). There is vast literature on this topic. See, e.g., Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44
Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 158.
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liorates these problems is the notion of a presumption 132 or, meta-
phorically, a weighted scale. We propose that the layers principle and
its corollaries be treated as presumptive rules of decision. This puts
the burdens of production and persuasion 133 on the advocate of a
layer-violating regulation. What kind of justification should be re-
quired to overcome the presumption? By analogy with constitutional
law, we suggest that public internet regulators adopt the following de-
cisional heuristic: before adopting a layer-violating regulation, a regu-
lator must articulate a compelling regulatory justification.
What constitutes a compelling regulatory justification? Our first
reaction to this question is that is that it is the wrong question, or that
it is not a well framed question. No definite criteria for what consti-
tutes a compelling regulatory justification can be set out in advance,
although we wish it could. We can gloss or restate the notion of com-
pelling regulatory justifications. By a compelling regulatory justifica-
tion, we mean a justification that is truly substantial. The evil to be
avoided or the good to be gained should be very large or of great
import. One way to clarify what we mean is by analogy to well known
standards in constitutional law. The most obvious example is the idea
of a "compelling state interest," well known from equal protection
doctrine. Another analogy is the "clear and present danger" formula-
tion for freedom of speech. Merely glossing or restating the idea of a
compelling regulatory justification can only take us so far-more clari-
fication is needed.
Another strategy for clarifying the meaning of the compelling
regulatory interest standard is to give examples of interests that count
as compelling and those that do not. On the one hand, we take it that
a serious threat to national defense would count as a compelling regu-
latory interest. On the other hand, we take it that the elimination of
content that was merely offensive would not count as a compelling
regulatory interest. We could continue the listing of interests that are
(or are not) compelling indefinitely, but this procedure does not deal
132 "Presumption" is a slippery term in legal discourse. In the law of evidence,
presumptions are sometimes considered "bursting bubbles." See R. Alexander Acosta
& Eric J. von Vorys, Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof: Disagreements on the Summary
Judgment Standard in Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 207 passim (1998); Leo H. Whinery, Presumptions and Their Effect, 54 OKLA. L.
REV. 553, 556 n.14 (2001). That is, we sometimes say that a presumption can be over-
come by any evidence, no matter how slender. In other contexts, however, the law
treats presumptions as having "weight" and requires that a presumption be overcome
by a significant quantum of evidence, e.g., "clear and compelling evidence." We
mean presumption in the latter, and not the former, sense.
133 See Solum, supra note 124, at 700-01.
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with the kind of case that is likely to be problematic-one in which
the interest is serious, but not clearly compelling.
Marginal cases are the kind in which guidance is needed, but it is
precisely those cases where guidance is more difficult to provide. In
marginal cases, we offer the following three rules of thumb or deci-
sionmaking heuristics:
Rule One: It should count in favor of an interest counting as com-
pelling that there is widespread social agreement on its importance; it
should count against compelling status that there is substantial dissen-
sus about the importance of the value;
Rule Two: It should count in favor of an interest counting as com-
pelling that the interest has a very large economic value; it should
count against compelling status that the economic value is small or
highly uncertain; and
Rule Three: It should count in favor of an interest counting as
compelling that the nature of the interest is qualitatively important
(e.g., life, fundamental constitutional rights, and so forth); it should
count against compelling status that the interest is qualitatively insub-
stantial (e.g., convenience, entertainment value, etc.).
We realize that our discussion will strike many readers as inade-
quate. Our position is that the compelling interest standard is an im-
provement over ad hoc unstructured case-by-case balancing. It is a
reasonable compromise between unguided discretion and a hard and
fast rule. It is far better than nothing. Moreover, as public Internet
regulators gain experience in applying the standard, its abstract terms
should begin to acquire more concrete meaning. In other words, the
problem of underdeterminacy 13 4 should gradually ease.
iii. Layer-Respecting Alternatives
The power of the requirement that violations of the layers princi-
ple be justified by a compelling regulatory justification is enhanced
when combined with a second requirement: mandatory consideration
of layer-respecting alternatives. Thus, we suggest that the layers prin-
ciple can be implemented at a practical level by adherence to the fol-
lowing decision procedure: before a layer-violating regulation is
adopted, decisionmakers should be required to consider the availabil-
ity of layer-respecting alternatives and alternatives that minimize layer
crossing. The fact that a layer-respecting alternative is more costly or
less effective should not, by itself, constitute sufficient justification for
adopting the layer-violating regulation. Rather, the proponent of the
134 See Solum, supra note 113, at 473.
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regulation should be required to show that considerations of cost or
_""effectiveness are compelling regulatory justifications for rejection of
the layer-respecting alternative.
iv. Institutional Difficulties with Principles
By itself, the layers principle is highly abstract and general; it is
too soft to guide decisionmaking. Even after we add the two corol-
laries and the accompanying decision heuristics, we do not have hard-
edged rules. Questions remain. What kind of a justification counts as
compelling? What is adequate consideration of layer-respecting alter-
natives? Answering these questions requires the exercise of practical
judgment that is sensitive to the regulatory context. More particu-
larly, sound application of our principles requires an appreciation of
the importance of the presumptions expressed by the layers principle
and its corollaries. The fact that the notion of a compelling regula-
tory justification requires the sensitive exercise of practical judgment
suggests an objection to our suggestion that the layers principle is su-
perior to incrementalism (or case-by-case balancing). If the applica-
tion of the layers principle requires sound practical judgment and a
contextualized assessment of regulatory justifications, then won't the
layers principle suffer from the same problems (tyranny of small deci-
sions, ignorance, and institutional incapacity) that plague
instrumentalism?
We want to frankly acknowledge these problems. Our formula-
tions are necessarily vague or fuzzy at the edges. There will, of course,
be cases in which the asserted regulatory justification is clearly not
compelling, or where layer-respecting alternatives provide an obvi-
ously adequate alternative. But, there will also be cases in which the
application of our preferred interpretation of the layers principle will
call for the sensitive exercise of practical judgment by decisionmakers.
Given the limited institutional capacities of Internet regulators, we
should expect that judges, administrators, and legislators will some-
times err. Given that the best solution, fully-adequate institutions, is
not available, 135 we argue that treating the layers principle and its cor-
ollaries as strong presumptions represents the second-best solution to
the problem of institutional design. But, before we reach that conclu-
sion, we need to consider an important alternative: the possibility that
the layers principle could be treated as an absolute rule.
135 We put to the side the question whether the institutional capacities of public
Internet regulators can be improved, for example, by educational programs, judicial
colleges, and so forth.
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c. The Rationale for Rejecting Absolutism
Why shouldn't the layers principle be treated as a rule rather
than a presumption? Isn't this the natural solution to the tyranny of
small decisions, the problem of ignorance, and the limited institu-
tional capacity of Internet regulators? Our answer to these questions
is "no." The absolutist approach is undesirable for several reasons.
First, as a matter of theory, the values protected by the layers principle
do not possess the necessary trumping force that would justify an abso-
lute rule. What are those values? In some cases, rights are at stake.
For example, Internet regulations may impinge on freedom of
speech. In those cases, the layers principle can aid the analysis of the
legal questions, but the trumping force of the rights should be consid-
ered on the merits of the particular case. In other cases, the interests
at stake are properly assessed as consequences that can be subject to a
process of comparative evaluation-even if the information necessary
for formal cost-benefit analysis is unavailable.
Second, an absolutist approach is undesirable precisely because
of the problem of uncertainty that we have discussed. We believe that
the value of transparency is well established. The layers principle is
supported by sound considerations of network engineering. But,
there is no reason to believe that these principles of network design
are written in stone for all time. As the Internet evolves, it is possible
that superior architectures may be conceived. Moreover, just as the
Internet changed the total electronic communications system, there
may be similar revolutionary innovations in the future. An absolute
rule (especially a constitutional rule) would be based on the assump-
tion that the general facts on which the argument for the layers princi-
ple relies are eternal facts, but we have no reason to believe that this is
the case. 136
Third, an absolutist approach, even if it were justified as a matter
of theory, would likely be unavailable as a practical matter. Internet
regulators are unlikely to accept the layers principle as an absolute;
they are more likely to accept the layers principle as a presumption.
That is, the layers principle operates in the world of nonideal theory
or the world of the second-best. There are theoretical mechanisms by
which an absolutist regime could be institutionalized, ranging from a
constitutional amendment to statutory mandates. If, as a practical
matter, these options are outside the feasible choice set, the question
136 We acknowledge that rules can be changed as circumstances change, but once
entrenched, hard-edged rules may be difficult to change. If the rules are entrenched
constitutionally, then rule change is even more difficult. Having recognized these
issues, we now set these questions aside.
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becomes: What are the best available feasible alternatives? The argu-
ment of this Article is that the layers principle is feasible and better
than the alternatives that we can envision.
5. A Restatement of the Layers Principle and Its Corollaries
We can restate the layers principle and its corollaries as follows:
The Layers Principle. Public internet regulators should not adopt
legal regulations of the Internet (including statutes, regulations, com-
mon law rules, or interpretations of any of these) that violate the in-
tegrity of the layers absent a compelling regulatory interest and
consideration of layer-respecting alternatives.
Corollary One: The Principle of Layer Separation. Public Internet reg-
ulators should not adopt any regulation that would require one layer
of the Internet to differentiate the handling of data on the basis of
information available only at another layer, absent a compelling regu-
latory interest.
Corollary Two: The Principle of Minimizing Layer Crossing. If compel-
ling regulatory interests require a layer-crossing regulation, public in-
ternet regulators should adopt the feasible regulation that minimizes
the distance between the layer at which the law aims to produce an
effect and the layer directly targeted by legal regulation.
Whereas the preliminary formulations of the layers principle
were too abstract to operate as practical principles to guide regulatory
action, the restatement of the layers principle and its corollaries are
formulated to act as practical principles of action.
B. The Role of the Layers Principle
So far, we have formulated the layers principle and its corollaries
as principles for Internet regulators in general. In this section, we
make the principles even more concrete by considering their applica-
tion in a variety of institutional contexts.
1. In Regulation and Legislation
The role of the layers principle in legislation and regulation is
relatively straightforward. As we illustrate in Part III, layer-violating
regulations are tempting to legislators. Legislation is frequently
aimed at problems that occur in the content layer. The layers princi-
ple can operate in legislative and regulatory processes in a variety of
particular, concrete, institutional ways. Some obvious possibilities are
that: (1) legislative and regulatory staff can incorporate the layers
principle and its corollaries into their analysis of proposed legislation
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or regulatory action; (2) participants in the legislative and regulatory
process (e.g., those who provide comments in notice and comment
rulemaking or those who testify in legislative committee hearings) can
raise arguments for or against particular proposals on the basis of the
layers principle; or (3) regulators or legislators who specialize in In-
ternet regulation can become acquainted with the layers principle
through staff briefings or other educative mechanisms.
We recognize that the potential for the layers principle to influ-
ence legislative and regulatory proceedings is limited by the likeli-
hood that other factors may dominate these processes. Legislation
and regulation processes are likely to be dominated by special interest
politics on the one hand and ideology on the other. The layers princi-
ple is unlikely to prevail if it suggests results that are in direct competi-
tion with more powerful causal forces.
Nonetheless, we believe that the layers principle can play a valua-
ble role in lawmaking and rulemaking. First, regulators and legisla-
tors are not impervious to rational argument. Second, the layers
principle is grounded on arguments that transcend particular ideolo-
gies and interests. Internet transparency yields a great social good.
Although there may be antitechnology ideologies (Luddites) that
would actually approve of barriers to innovation, this is not likely to be
a dominant political ideology. Moreover, a variety of different interest
groups converge on support for a transparent, innovation enabling
Internet.
More simply, our point is that the layers principle can be used in
legislative and regulatory debate. Although our presentation of the
layers principle is prolix and long-winded-after all, this is a law re-
view article-the principle itself need not suffer from these defects.
The layers principle itself can be explained and defended in a manner
compatible with the norms of public political debate. The layers prin-
ciple is a simple and powerful idea. The layers principle is compatible
with the values of the mainstream of both the political right and left.
The layers principle can appeal to a wide range of economic interest
groups.
2. In Adjudication
The layers principle can play an important role in public policy
debate, and it can also play a similar role in adjudication. Because
legal processes are governed by norms distinct from those that govern
legislation and regulation, the presentation of the layers principle to
judges will differ from its presentation to legislators and regulators.
How different? Our answer to this question is fine-grained. We will
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briefly survey the ways in which the layers principle can come to bear
in common law adjudication, statutory interpretation, and constitu-
tional adjudication.
a. Common Law Adjudication
We begin with common law adjudication. At first blush, it might
seem that the layers principle is an unlikely candidate as a principle or
rule recognized by the common law. After all, the common law is
based on an accumulation of precedents, and the layers principle is
novel in two dimensions. First, the domain of application for the lay-
ers principle is the Internet, and the common law has very limited
experience with the Internet. Second, the layers principle itself is
novel. Common law time and Internet time are measured on scales
that vary by orders of magnitude. If the layers principle is compara-
tively ancient as a principle of Internet design, it is a mere babe by the
standards of the common law. It is not surprising then, that only a
handful of common law decisions rendered in American jurisdictions
have recognized the layered nature of the Internet.13 7
How then might the layers principle come to be recognized by
the common law? Widely accepted understandings of common law
adjudication suggest a variety of techniques by which the common law
could absorb or incorporate the layers principle. Consider the follow-
ing simplified model of the process by which this could take place:
Step One: A court must decide an issue of common law that in
some way implicates the layered nature of the Internet, and recog-
nizes that the integrity of the Internet is one factor that should be
137 See British Telecommunications PLC v. Prodigy Communications Corp., 217 F.
Supp. 2d 399, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("To establish a TCP/IP connection, the transport-
layer protocol software initiates a request to connect to a special protocol port of the
Web server."); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Crescent Pub. Group, Inc., No. 00-CIV-6315,
2001 WL 128444 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001):
"Internet" refers to the global information system that is logically linked to-
gether by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol
(IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; is able to support communica-
tions using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible
protocols; and provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or pri-
vately, high level services layered on the communications and related infra-
structure described herein, including, but not limited to, the following
forms of electronic communication: electronic mail and email mailing lists,
the World Wide Web, USENET newsgroups, Internet Relay Chat, instant
messaging, wireless data messaging, FTP/file transfer protocol, and remote
computer access from anywhere in the world thereto.
Id. at *2.
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considered in determining whether an existing line of cases should be
extended to the new situation.
Step Two: A second court faces an identical, similar, or analogous
situation, and actually relies upon the layers principle as a necessary
or sufficient group for its decision on the facts of the particular case
before it.
Step Three: A third or subsequent court faces an identical, similar,
or analogous situation, and relies upon the prior court's reliance on
the layers principle as evidence that there is a general common law
rule or principle requiring respect for the layered nature of the
Internet.
This familiar process can lead to the emergence of the layers
principle and its corollaries as a principle-an articulated premise for
reasoning-by common law courts. The process could be accelerated
to the extent that other public Internet regulators recognize and artic-
ulate the layers principle.1 3 8
b. Statutory Interpretation
The layers principle could also play a role in statutory interpreta-
tion. Of course, there are many different theories of statutory inter-
pretation. Some theories emphasize strict adherence to the plain
meaning of the text; others give more weight to legislative intent or
legislative history. 139 Some approaches to statutory interpretation give
weight to the general aims or goals of legislation; others allow a variety
of policy concerns into the mix of factors that should be consid-
ered.1 40 We are agnostic about these debates. We concede that some
138 See generally GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (suggesting that the common law can respond to statutory change).
139 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative Histoy in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845 passim (1992) (arguing for the use of legislative history). But see
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis,
70 TEX. L. REv. 1073, 1088 (1992) (noting the dearth of support for originalist statu-
tory interpretation).
140 Even an overview of the literature is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988) (promoting
consideration of legislative history); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983) (including legislative history as a factor to consider); Daniel
A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281 (1989)
(describing a preference for adherence to legislative intent); Philip P. Frickey, From
the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 241 (1992) (describing the movement away from sole reliance on legislative in-
tent); Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 624 (1994) (emphasizing legislative intent and history
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powerful theories of statutory interpretation would rule out use of the
layers principle as an aid to construction. Judicial practice, however,
is quite varied. Judges tend to be pragmatic in their approach to stat-
utory interpretation, employing a variety of techniques, including
straightforward policy analysis.
As a practical matter, then, the layers principle might come to be
employed as an aid to statutory interpretation in a variety of circum-
stances. Here are a few:
Interpreting abstract and general statutory mandates. When a statute
related to Internet governance contains broad language, e.g., "in the
public interest," the layers principle can give more particular and con-
crete meaning to the ambiguous statutory command.
Gapfilling and tension resolving. When a statutory scheme or a re-
lated set of statutes requires resolution of an issue, but fail (due to
oversight or deliberate omission) to provide a directive, the layers
principle can step in to fill the gap.
Narrowing and broadening. Frequently, statutory language can be
read broadly or narrowly without going outside the limits of the text.
The layers principle can aid courts in determining whether to give
Internet-related legislation a broad or a narrow reading.
Avoiding absurd consequences. Courts frequently read statutes so as
to avoid absurd consequences. A reading of a statute that would re-
quire a serious violation of layer separation, and hence that would
endanger the viability of the Internet, should be considered absurd-
unless the evil to be avoided is of the highest order or the statutory
language and legislative history clearly indicates that the legislature
knew what it was doing.
This is only an incomplete list of the many situations in which the
layers principle might be brought to bear on an issue of statutory
interpretation.
c. In Constitutional Adjudication
How might the layers principle play a role in constitutional inter-
pretation? One thing is for sure: there is no Layers Clause. Nonethe-
over textualism); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 179 (1986) (suggesting that
legislative history can be, but does not have to be, utilized); Frederick Schauer, Statu-
tory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 231
(promoting the use of plain meaning); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921 (1992) (noting the Supreme Court's shift
away from legislative history and toward plain meaning); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989) (discussing purpose, in-
tent, and history as tools of interpretation).
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less, the layers principle might come to play a role in constitutional
interpretation in a variety of contexts. Before considering the specif-
ics, we pause for an obligatory caveat. There are a multitude of ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation, both in the academy 141 and
on the bench. 142 Some constitutional theories emphasize the plain
meaning of the text; others focus on the original meaning of the text
or the original intentions of the Framers. Other approaches empha-
size the idea of a living constitution or the notion of contemporary
ratification. Some constitutional theories would approve of the use of
the layers principle in constitutional interpretation; others would dis-
approve. Of necessity, we must set these controversies aside. As in the
case of statutory interpretation, we assume that most judges are not
theoretical purists.
The first and most obvious way in which the layers principle is
relevant to constitutional interpretation focuses on the First Amend-
ment freedom of speech. 143 One of the primary themes in free
speech doctrine is overbreadth, the notion that a regulation that im-
pacts more speech than is necessary for its regulatory goal is constitu-
tionally suspect.1 44 There is a close connection between First
141 Not even the longest, fattest footnote could do justice to this literature. See
generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747 passim (1999); Lino
A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1024
(1992); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 passim (1988); Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1127 passim
(1998); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 885, 887-88 (1985); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. Riv. 877 passim (1996); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules,
Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARv. L. Rzv. 730 passim (2000).
142 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1119, 1119 (1998); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REv. 849, 854 (1989).
143 And, freedom of speech is itself the subject of vast literature and an enormous
set of contending theories. See, e.g., Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative
Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54 (1989)
(proposing a meaning for the phrase "freedom of speech").
144 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing
space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered leg-
islative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to
other compelling needs of society.
Id. For commentary, see Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Over-
breadth, Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31 passim (2003). For
an example in the context of the Internet, see Michael Johns, The First Amendment and
Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1383, 1418-20
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Amendment overbreadth analysis and one of the key supporting argu-
ments for the layer's principle-the fit thesis: "A given lower layer nec-
essarily has substantial innocent use with respect to problems that
originate at the upper layers." 145 The connection between the two
ideas is intuitive and obvious. One way to regulate content (speech)
on the Internet is to attack the source; for example, to require In-
ternet service providers to block the IP addresses of websites that serve
up the proscribed content. One of the implications of the fit thesis is
that such layer-crossing regulations are inherently overbroad. The
second corollary to the layers principle, minimize layer crossing, is a
natural fit with First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
Yet another theme in First Amendment jurisprudence is the idea
that regulations of speech on the basis of content are suspect-and
that courts may balance the benefits of such regulations against their
costs. 14 6 The layers principle has nothing to say about content regula-
tion. Indeed, there is a sense in which the layers principle runs
against the grain of First Amendment doctrine, which generally favors
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions over content-
based regulations. Thus, it might be argued that free speech doctrine
allows regulations that violate the integrity of the layers-so long as
the regulation is not targeted at particular viewpoints or subject mat-
ters. This is true, as far as it goes.
However, when a content-based regulation also violates the layers
principle, then layers analysis can play a role. Because content-based
regulations trigger a balancing test, the layers principle can play a role
by assisting the courts in the difficult task of making open-ended bal-
(1996). For a discussion of overbreadth and underinclusiveness, see Kenneth W.
Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REv. 447, 451-55,
482-88 (1989).
145 See infra Part II.D.2.
146 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 190 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation] ("The Supreme Court
tests the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions with an essentially open-en-
ded form of balancing."). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Cen-
tral Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 49 (2000); Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revision-
ist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the
Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
647 (2002); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA.
L. REv. 203 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978); Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991); Note, Content
Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1854 (1983).
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ancing determinate enough to guide decisions in individual cases. In
particular, the layers principle suggests that layer-violating regulations
that are content-based should only be upheld if there is a compelling
regulatory justification 47 and no layer-respecting alternative is
available. 14
8
A second possible avenue of incorporation of the layers principle
into constitutional doctrine is via the dormant Commerce Clause. 149
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has, for some time, been in a
state of confusion, but one theme in the cases is the notion that the
states are not permitted to regulate in ways that impose undue bur-
dens on interstate commerce. In American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,15
0
the Southern District of New York struck down a New York statute that
prohibited the intentional use of any "computer communications sys-
tem" to transmit to minors content that "depicts actual or simulated
nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is harm-
ful to minors."1 51 The court found that the statute violated the dor-
mant Commerce Clause in three ways:
First, the practical impact of the New York Act results in the extra-
territorial application of New York law to transactions involving citi-
zens of other states and is therefore per se violative of the
Commerce Clause. Second, the benefits derived from the Act are
147 See supra Part II.A.4.2.ii.
148 See supra Part II.A.4.2.iii.
149 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 40, at 788-91; Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls
the Internet? States' Rights and the Reawakening of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1423 passim (2000); see also Lemley & Lessig, supra note 32, at 10. Lemley and
Lessig note that
[t]he principle of End-to-End is not unique to computer networks. It has
important analogs in American constitutional law and in other legal con-
texts. Vis-A-vis the states, for example, the dormant commerce clause im-
poses an End-to-End design on the flow of commerce: No state is to exercise
a control over the flow of commerce between states; and the kind of control
that a state may exercise over commerce flowing into that state is severely
limited. The "network" of interstate commerce is to be influenced at its
ends-by the consumer and producer-and not by intermediary actors
(states) who might interfere with this flow for their own political purposes.
Vis-A-vis transportation generally, End-to-End is also how the principle of
common carriage works. The carrier is not to exercise power to discriminate
in the carriage. So long as the toll is paid, it must accept the carriage that it
is offered. In both contexts, the aim is to keep the transportation layer of
intercourse simple, so as to enable the multiplication of applications at the
end.
Id.
150 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
151 Id. at 163 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21 (McKinney 1997)).
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inconsequential in relation to the severe burdens it imposes on in-
terstate commerce. Finally, the unique nature of cyberspace neces-
sitates uniform national treatment and bars the states from enacting
inconsistent regulatory schemes. Because plaintiffs have demon-
strated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim
under the Commerce Clause and that they face irreparable injury in
the absence of an injunction, the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion is granted. 15 2
Layers analysis is relevant to the dormant Commerce Clause in at
least two respects. First, layers analysis provides a framework for the
identification of the burdens on commerce created by state laws that
regulate the Internet. Any state regulation that compromises layer in-
tegrity would substantially affect the global Internet. Second, layers
analysis can play a role in dormant Commerce Clause balancing that is
similar to the role suggested with respect to First Amendment balanc-
ing, above.
The layers principle might also be relevant to equal protection
analysis. Assuming the standard three tiers of equal protection scru-
tiny, we can reach the following tentative conclusions. First, if a regu-
lation simultaneously discriminated against a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and violated the layers principle, then layers analysis might be
highly relevant to the question whether the regulation in question
possessed the necessary degree of fit between ends and means. In
particular, the fit thesis suggests that layer-crossing regulations are
likely to be overinclusive and underinclusive.1 5 3
3. In the Design of Institutions for Internet Governance
It goes without saying that the layers principle is relevant to the
decisions made by transnational Internet governance institutions,
such as ICANN or the IETF. These institutions are populated by net-
work engineers; they understand the importance of transparency and
layer separation better than we do and far better than governmental
Internet regulators ever will. The layers principle is already a norm
within these institutions. We shall not preach to the converted.
We shall, however, step back and briefly consider the implications
of the layers principle for the design of institutions for Internet gov-
ernance. Transnational Internet governance institutions, such as the
IETF and ICANN, should be organized so that their institutional de-
sign is consistent with their role as the guardians of a transparent
Internet.
152 Id. at 183-84.
153 See infra Part II.D.2.
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There are, however, reasons to believe that this role might be
compromised. One threat comes from the movement to democratize
Internet governance structures.15 4 Undoubtedly, many of the advo-
cates of Internet democracy favor a transparent Internet and would
endorse the layers principle. There are, however, reasons to believe
that Internet democratization might actually undermine, rather than
enhance, the ability of Internet governance institutions to safeguard
the integrity of the layers. There are a number of reasons for believ-
ing that this might be true.
Advocates of Internet democracy may support direct elections of
the governing bodies of institutions such as ICANN. Such elections
are subject to capture by various interest groups that may have goals
that conflict with the layers principle. For example, national govern-
ments may favor national control over the Internet. Commercial in-
terests, e.g., the intellectual property industry, wish to reconfigure the
Internet's architecture so as to permit greater control of content by
intermediaries, such as Internet service providers.
Even populist Internet democracy might threaten the layers prin-
ciple. For example, popular majorities may strongly favor content reg-
ulations, including regulations on child pornography, other adult
content, hate speech, radical speech, and so forth. If populist groups
were able to control Internet governance institutions through demo-
cratic elections, they might deliberately compromise the principle of
layer separation in order to facilitate content regulation.
Democratic elections are likely to bring a different set of institu-
tional competences to the governing bodies of transnational Internet
regulators such as ICANN. Whereas the current ICANN governance
structure favors Internet insiders, democratic elections might result in
the election of populists with little or no technical expertise. The
elected leadership would be less likely to appreciate the importance of
layer separation and the various ways in which it could be damaged.
In the end, democratization may or may not threaten the ability
of transnational Internet governance institutions to safeguard the in-
tegrity of layers. Our argument is very modest. We believe that the
layers principle ought to be a consideration of fundamental impor-
tance in designing Internet governance institutions. That is, we be-
154 See Internet Democracy Project, Homepage, at http://www.internetdemocracy
project.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) ("The Internet Democracy Project seeks to
enhance the participation of Internet users worldwide in non-governmental bodies
that are setting Internet policy and to advocate that these bodies adhere to principles
of open participation, public accountability and human rights.").
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lieve that Internet governance institutions should be biased in favor of
maintaining the integrity of layers.
C. The Foundations of the Layers Principle
What are the deep foundations of the layers principle? That is,
how is the layers principle grounded by general jurisprudence, politi-
cal philosophy, and moral theory? These are questions that for the
most part we wish to avoid and evade. In this section, we will lay out
the reasons for our failure to deliver the theoretical goods.
Our fundamental reason for avoiding foundational questions is
that such questions are endlessly controversial. In legal theory, conse-
quential theories like welfarism 55 contend with fairness based ap-
proaches such as "law as integrity"156 and aretaic theories such as
"virtue jurisprudence."'1 7 In political philosophy, egalitarian theories
like 'justice as fairness" 5 8 do battle with communitarian theories,159
Hobbesian approaches, 160 and libertarian theories. 161 In moral the-
ory, virtue ethics 162 contends with deontology163 and utilitarianism. 164
None of these great historical debates over normative theories of law,
politics, or ethics is likely to be settled soon. Moreover, issues at each
of the three levels (law, politics, and morality) can affect the resolu-
tion of controversies at other levels. We want to be clear. We are not
endorsing relativism or taking a stand against normative objectivity.
We are simply stating the obvious. Arguing for a normative theory is
outside the scope of this Article.
Instead, we will suggest (but not mount a full argument) that the
layers principle can be supported from within a variety of theoretical
perspectives. In other words, the layers principle can be the subject of
155 See generally Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002).
156 See generally RONALD DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
157 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).
158 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-53 (1971).
159 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE passim (2d ed.
1998).
160 See S.A. LLOYD, IDEALS AS INTERESTS IN HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN: THE POWER OF
MIND OVER MATTER passim (1992).
161 See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY. JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAW 63-83 (1998).
162 See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS passim (1999).
163 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 48 (Mary
Gregor trans., 1998).
164 SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION 1-7 (Athlone Press 1970) (1781).
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what John Rawls calls an overlapping consensus' 65 and Cass Sunstein
calls an incompletely theorized agreement.1 66 We assert that this is so
with some confidence, because the case for the layers principle is
quite powerful. 167 Consequences count for almost every plausible ac-
count of law, politics, or morality. Damaging the integrity of layers
would have very bad consequences, and almost any sensible theoreti-
cal approach to Internet regulation must take that fact into account.
Similarly, any sensible account of regulation will count alignment of
means and ends as a good; the fit thesis demonstrates that layer-cross-
ing regulations are unlikely to cure the evil they target and are likely
to have unintended ill effects.
There is one final reason for our confidence that the layers prin-
ciple can be supported by those who adhere to a wide variety of theo-
retical perspectives on moral, political, and legal theory. We have
formulated our normative injunction as a principle, as opposed to a
rule or a standard. This formulation creates a good deal of play in the
normative joints. It allows those who might oppose the rigid enforce-
ment of a layers rule to support a principle that can accommodate
concerns outside the scope of the layers principle. Of course, some
theoretical perspectives may find resources within their theories to
support a more robust version of the layers principle. It may be that
given a particular legal theory, the case can be made that public In-
ternet regulators should never violate the integrity of the layers. We
neither agree nor disagree with such views. Instead, we rest our case
on the shallow arguments that we make in this Article. Our decision
not to go deep is a deliberate one; hence there is no more for us to say
about the ultimate moral and political foundations of the layers
principle.
165 See JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM passim (1993).
166 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1733,
1735-36 (1995).
167 We should note, however, that different theories of law, politics, and morality
will assign different roles to the layers principle. Here is one example. We have ar-
gued that the layers principle might be relevant to statutory interpretation. But, some
views of statutory interpretation assign priority to the plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage or to the intentions of the legislators as revealed in legislative history. It could
well be the case that the concerns identified by layers analysis, while relevant to the
interpretation of statutory language, cannot easily be accommodated by plain mean-
ing or legislative intent theories. This would move the layers principle from the
courts to the legislature. Similar points could be made about the role of the layers
principle in the common law or in constitutional interpretation.
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D. A Summary of the Case for the Layers Principle
We are at a turning point in our argument. We can now summa-
rize the case for the layers principle, picking out two theses, the fit
thesis and the transparency thesis, as the central premises of the first
half of our argument.
1. The Transparency Thesis
Our purpose here is to tie together the threads of our trans-
parency argument. We begin by making clear and explicit precisely
what we mean by transparency. Initially, the idea of transparency was
discussed in the context of the IP layer (or network layer) of the TCP/
IP protocol suite. In this setting, the "transparency" refers to the origi-
nal concept of the function of the IP layer where the data packets flow
from a source IP address to a destination essentially unaltered. 168
However, as we discussed above, transparency is a more general con-
cept applicable to all TCP/IP layers. A generalized test of trans-
parency may be given as follows: 169 (1) the lower layer does not access
or otherwise analyze the content of the payload received from the up-
per layer; and (2) the lower layer does not process the data differently
based on the upper layer information.
We have already demonstrated that layer-violating regulations in-
herently compromise transparency. We have also established that the
transparency of the Internet produces a very great social good, an in-
novation commons that has served as an engine of economic growth
and cultural evolution. And the layers principle, especially the first
corollary, formulates the conclusion of this argument in the form of
the injunction: do not regulate the Internet in a way that would violate
the integrity of the layers.
The transparency thesis summarizes this argument. We can state
it as follows: the fact that layer-violating regulations damage trans-
parency, combined with the fact that Internet transparency lowers the
cost of innovation, provides compelling support for the principle of
layer separation; public Internet regulators should not violate or com-
promise the separation between layers designed into the basic archi-
tecture of the Internet.
The transparency thesis is one of the two pillars of our case for
the layers principle. We now turn to the second.
168 Internet Transparency, supra note 90.
169 Hans Kruse et al., The InterNAT: Policy Implications of the Internet Architecture De-
bate, PROC. 28TH REs. CONF. ON COMMUNICATIONS, INFO. & INTERNET POL'v 9 (2000),
available at http://www.csm.ohiou.edu/kruse/publications/InterNAT-v4.pdf.
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2. The Fit Thesis
Layer-crossing regulations-regulations at one layer that attack a
problem at another layer-are undesirable for a second reason, inde-
pendent of their effects on transparency. This second problem is a
problem of fit between regulatory ends and regulatory means. It
stems from the following fact: a given lower layer necessarily has sub-
stantial innocent use with respect to problems that originate at the
upper layers.
This fact is a necessary result of the separation of layers and con-
sequent transparency that are inherent in the layers model of Internet
architecture. As we discussed above, a lower layer in the Internet lay-
ers model is required by architecture to be transparent to the upper
layers. The lower layer does not know, or is not supposed to know,
about the content of the payload data received from the upper layers.
Consequently, the lower layer must necessarily have substantial inno-
cent use with respect to the problems that originate at the upper
layers.
Furthermore, because the lower layer is not supposed to, or ex-
pected to, know about the upper layer information, the upper layers,
by design, do not pass down to the lower layer complete information
necessary to perform effective discriminatory functions. This is just
another aspect of the separation of layers. Thus, by architecture, the
lower layers lack the information to effectively perform discriminatory
functions with respect to the problems that arose at the upper layers.
Therefore, for the same reason of information mismatch discussed
above in the end-to-end argument section, layer-violating regula-
tions-regulations targeted at a lower layer to discriminate against the
problems in the upper layer-are inherently overinclusive and
underinclusive.
We can summarize this argument as the fit thesis, which can be
stated as follows: the fact that layer-crossing regulations result in in-
herent mismatch between the ends such regulations seek to promote
and the means employed implies that layer-crossing regulations suffer
from problems of overbreadth and underinclusion; avoidance of these
problems requires Internet regulators to minimize the distance be-
tween the layer at which the law aims to produce an effect and the
layer directly targeted by legal regulation.
Together, the transparency thesis and the fit thesis summarize
our case for the layers principle. We now move from theory to
practice.
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III. APPLYING THE LAIRS PRJNCIPLE
Does the layers principle yield attractive results when applied to
particular cases? Does layers analysis illuminate problems of Internet
regulation or does it instead obscure them? We answer these ques-
tions in the discussion that follows. We organize our discussion by
categorizing the nature of the layer violation. At the macro level, we
distinguish between violations that occur in the TCP/IP layers 170 and
those that occur in the more generalized communication system lay-
ers.1 71 This distinction is important. The TCP/IP layers express the
architecture of the Internet. The communications system layers are
analogous in some respects, but different in one crucial way: the com-
munication systems layers are not the architecture of the Internet.
A. Application at the TCP/IP Layers
In the discussion that follows, we discuss particular regulations
that fail to respect the integrity of the TCP/IP layers. We apply the
layers principle and its corollaries to these regulations, and show that
layers analysis is normative, attractive, and illuminating. We can begin
with a quick overview of the purposes that would motivate regulators
to target the TCP/IP layers.
1. Introduction: Purposes of Regulations Directed at the TCP/IP
Layers
We introduce our discussion of examples with a preliminary ques-
tion: Why are Internet regulators tempted to violate the layers princi-
ple? One kind of regulation that directly violates the architectural
principles of the Internet is a regulation directed at a lower TCP/IP
layer in order to address problems that originated at an upper layer-
usually, although not necessarily, the content layer. This type of regu-
lation is almost always motivated by the desire to aggressively deal with
problems by targeting the technology that enables the undesirable
conduct. It is a sort of "cut the problem down at its knees" approach.
Consider, for example, the ripping program that creates MP3
files from music CDs. Without the Internet, all one can do with the
ripping software is download the MP3 files to a device like Rio or iPod
(MP3 players for personal use), or users can mix and burn the music
files (also by and large for personal use). But, the Internet changes
this picture fundamentally by enabling mass distribution of MP3 files
through peer-to-peer file sharing programs, such as the now defunct
170 See infra Part III.A.
171 See infra Part III.B.
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Napster, KaZaA, and so forth. The net effect is that, because of the
Internet, the ripping application is now a part of an extremely effi-
cient global distribution system of digital music (although the ripping
application is not technically a part of a network protocol in the sense
that the HTTP or SMTP protocol is).172 Looked at this way, it is not
surprising at all that the stakeholders of vested interests, such as the
music distribution industry, believe that the Internet represents a
threat. When faced with a sudden, imminent threat, it is understanda-
ble that the reflexive reaction is to target the enabling technology, the
Internet. In their aggressive "cut the problem down at its knees" ap-
proach, the industry might seek to persuade public Internet regula-
tors to adopt legal norms that target one or more of the TCP/IP
layers.
Another motivation for violating the integrity of the layers is the
desire of regulators to reassert control over content. Because of the
global reach of the Internet and its fundamental architecture of trans-
parency, the Internet has become an extremely powerful medium to
disseminate any type of speech across the globe. As Lessig insightfully
pointed out, "[w] e have exported to the world, through the architec-
ture of the Internet, a First Amendment in code more extreme than
our own First Amendment in law."173 As we know, many policymakers
and stakeholders find such power of the Internet threatening, or at
least objectionable. It is no surprise, then, that many of the reactions
have been to target the networking (TCP/IP) layers to impair or de-
stroy the transparency of the Internet. Although these reactions are
understandable, it is quite another matter whether such regulations
violate the architectural principles of the Internet are wise or desira-
ble on balance for everyone concerned.
Yet another example of the desire to control content is provided
by regulations that seek to block all data from a particular IP address
due to the nature of the content coming from the site. Some filtering
programs operate this way. The proxy servers and IP filters can be
configured to do the same. These programs target or operate at the
IP layer, and discriminate the data based on the nature of their con-
tent. Instead of treating the data received from the content layer as
payload, the blocking programs either analyze the payload data or
make assumptions about the nature of the content based on the IP
address, then discriminate-i.e., allow or drop the data-on the basis
of the nature of the content of the payload data.
172 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 123, 123-26.
173 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 167.
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We now move to an even more concrete level, by discussing the
application of the layers principle to a variety of specific problems in
Internet regulation. All of the examples involve highly controversial
regulations or disputes, the analysis of which is also disputed or con-
troversial. For each of the examples, we shall demonstrate that layers
analysis-i.e., analysis under the layers framework introduced above-
clarifies the issues or brings out important issues that have been
outside the reach of existing methods of analysis. Although our dis-
cussion is organized by the nature of the layer violation implicated by
the regulation discussed, it may be helpful to the reader to present a
brief descriptive preview. We will discuss the following examples:
(1) The Serbian Internet Interdiction Myth: 174 We discuss the
implications of the urban legend that the Clinton administration at-
tempted to interdict Serbian access to the Internet during the NATO
campaign against Serbia.
(2) Myanmar's "Cut the Wire" Policy: 175 We examine Myanmar's
policy of limiting Internet access by strictly controlling physical links
to the Internet.
(3) China's Great Firewall: 176 We analyze China's strategies for
blocking objectionable content.
(4) The French Yahoo! Case:1 77 We investigate the French gov-
ernment's attempts to force Yahoo! to exclude French end-users from
Nazi paraphernalia auctions.
(5) Cyberterrorism: 178 We speculate about the use of TCP/IP
based regulations to control cyberterrorist activities.
(6) Pennsylvania's IP Address Blocking Child Pornography Stat-
ute:179 We review Pennsylvania's statute that requires destination ISPs
to block the access of Pennsylvania customers to the IP addresses of
servers that provide child pornography.
(7) Port Blocking and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: 80 We hypothe-
size on the use of port blocking as a strategy for the control of peer-to-
peer file sharing of copyrighted content.
(8) Regulation of Streaming Video at the IP Layer:18' We lay out
the issues raised by regulations at the TCP/IP layer to control stream-
ing video content.
174 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
175 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
176 See infra Part III.A.3.b.
177 See infra Part III.A.3.c.
178 See infra Part III.A.3.d.
179 See infra Part II.A.3.e.
180 See infra Part III.A.4.a.
181 See infra Part III.A.5.
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2. Physical Layer Regulation Aimed at Content Layer Problems
The first category of layer-crossing regulations comprises regula-
tory actions that target the physical layer in order to solve a problem
at the content layer. The most extreme example that falls within this
category would be disabling or denying the physical connection-
"cutting the wire"-due to content layer problems. Nations at war, for
example, might resort to such extreme measures. A blockade against
a nation could include denial of communication services under a se-
vere embargo. Or, a politically threatened, unstable regime might cut
off communication links to the outside world, including Internet con-
nections. In a connected world, where the communication network is
rapidly becoming an essential part of the everyday functioning of soci-
ety, the network itself could come under attack as a result of very seri-
ous political conflicts.' 8 2  Under the layers framework, these
regulations directed at the physical layer due to problems at the con-
tent layer can be represented by Figure 6 below:
182 See William Yurcik & David Doss, Internet Attacks: A Policy Framework for Rules of
Engagement, PROC. 29TH RES. CONF. ON COMMUNICATIONS, INFO. & INTERNET POL'Y 2
(2001), available at http://www.sosresearch.org/publications/tprc01.PDF; see also
INST. FOR SECURITY TECH. STUD. AT DARTMOUTH C., CYBER ATTACKS DURING THE WAR
ON TERRORISM: A PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (2001), available at http://www.ists.dartmouth.
edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber-al.pdf (using case studies to discuss attacks on
the Internet).
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FiGuRE 6. REGULATION DIRECTED AT THE PHysicAL LAYER DUE TO
PROBLEMS AT THE CONTENT LAYER
Content Layer Problem Conduct Layer
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network / IP Layer
Link Layer
Physical Layer Regulation Layer
We begin by discussing the possibility that physical links to the
Internet could be cut during a war-using the NATO campaign
against Serbia as the focus for discussion.18 3 We then address My-
anmar, a nation that drastically limits its physical links to the In-
ternet.1 8 4 We wrap up this discussion by generalizing from the two
examples.185
a. Internet During Wartime: The Case of Serbia
During the NATO war against Serbia in 1999, the possibility of
the United States cutting off Internet connection to Yugoslavia be-
183 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
184 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
185 See infra Part III.A.2.c.
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came a highly visible, if short lived, issue among the Internet user
community. 186 A Belgrade based ISP, BeoNET, claimed that Loral
Orion-a United States based satellite communication service com-
pany that provides the bulk of Internet bandwidth to Yugoslavia-was
about to cut off the satellite link to the country under the U.S. trade
embargo against Yugoslavia. 18 7 The fears stemmed from Executive
Order 13,121, which went into effect on May 1, 1999. The Executive
Order prohibited trade with Serbia and Montenegro, including a
broad prohibition of supply of any goods or services and any transac-
tion in goods or services.188
Although some communication services such as telephone con-
nections are usually exempt in trade embargoes, it was not clear from
the order itself whether Internet access via a satellite link provided by
Loral Orion was covered by the Executive Order. In addition, there
were concerns about the cyberattacks launched by "hackers" in Serbia
against U.S. and NATO sites after the bombing on Serbia began. 18 9
Apparendy, Loral Orion did discuss the cut-off issue with the U.S.
government.1 90 However, the Clinton administration decided against
cutting off the satellite link and instead encouraged the Serbians to
use the Internet to break the media clamp down by the Milogevie gov-
ernment.19 1 Such liberal Internet policy may have been influenced by
the recognition that many of the Internet users in Yugoslavia were
against the MilogeviC regime. 19 2 It is an open question whether the
U.S. government would have taken such a liberal approach if the ma-
jority of the Internet community in Serbia had not been pro-West or
anti-Milogevi6, or if the cyberattacks from Yugoslavian users were quite
serious. In fact, during the earlier U.N. embargo against Yugoslavia in
1992, the BitNet link-the only available Internet connection to Ser-
186 Carlotta Gall, Yugoslavians Fear Web Will Be Cut Off N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, May
15, 1999, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/051599kosovo-in-
ternet.html. See generally STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? 126 (2001).
187 Matthew Broersma, Clinton Encourages Serbia Net Access, ZDNET NEWS, May 13,
1999, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-514639.html.
188 Exec. Order No. 13,121, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,021 (May 5, 1999).
189 Ellen Messmer, Serb Supporters Sock It to NATO, U.S. Web Sites, CNN.com, Apr. 6,
1999, at http://europe.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9904/06/serbnato.idg.
190 Bob Woods, White House Won't Impede Yugoslavia's Net Access, NEWSBYrES, May
14, 1999, at http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/051599.htm#5.
191 Broersma, supra note 187.
192 Dralen Pantie, Internet in Serbia: From Dark Side of the Moon to the Internet Revolu-
tion, FIRST MONDAY, April 1997, available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/is-
sue2_4/pantic; see also PBS, Bringing Down a Dictator: It's Time, at http://www.pbs.org/
weta/dictator/rock/itstime.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (discussing MilogeviCs at-
tacks on the media and the response by internet users in the former Yugoslavia).
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bia and Montenegro at the time-was cut off. 193 The West presuma-
bly did not know or care about the pro-West tilt of the Yugoslavian
Internet user community at the time. 194
Although Serbian Internet access was not interdicted by severing
the physical link, it could have been. How would this case be handled
by layers analysis? Interdiction at the physical layer to solve a problem
at the content layer is a layer-crossing regulation. Layers analysis sug-
gests that, as a consequence, interdiction would be both overinclusive
and underinclusive with respect to the regulatory goal-to disrupt
communications over the Internet that would aid the Serbian regime.
This suggestion is confirmed by the Serbian interdiction case. Had
the link been severed, the regime in Serbia would not have been able
to use the Internet to communicate as effectively with the outside
world; interdiction would achieve some of the desired effect. But, in-
terdiction would be overinclusive. Interdiction would have affected
antiregime groups within Serbia by denying Serbians access to an-
tiregime content. Interdiction would also have been underinclusive,
because of the nature of the Internet's basic architecture. The In-
ternet is designed to route around damaged physical links. Had one
link gone down, communications would still have flowed via other
physical links. Cutting off all the physical links would be difficult be-
cause of the wide variety of physical pipelines that can carry data. Sat-
ellite, fiber optic cable, copper wire, and microwave are all capable of
performing the job. Total interdiction would have required the coop-
eration of all of Serbia's neighbor states.
Notice, however, that layers analysis does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the wire should not be cut in wartime. Layers
analysis requires a compelling regulatory justification, but disrupting
enemy communications during wartime is surely the kind of interest
that would count as compelling. Layers analysis requires the consider-
ation of layer-respecting alternatives, but it seems quite possible that
in some wartime situations, no such alternative will be adequate. In
other words, layers analysis maps reasonable intuitions about how war-
193 Milan Serba, Internet Connectivity in Eastern Europe (Richard Budd ed., draft
Sept. 1992), at http://www.eff.org/Infra/Foreignandlocal/Multinational/east_
andcentral-europe-net.paper; see also Eric Bachman, Digital Communication via the
Internet in a War Zone: Conflict Resolution and the Internet, PROC. INET96, at H2 (1996),
available at http://www.isoc.org/isoc/whatis/conferences/inet/96/proceedings/h2/
h2_2.htm.
194 The reaction of the Serbian Internet community to the U.S. sanction in 1999 is
quite understandable in light of their previous experience of total Internet connec-
tion cut-off in 1992.
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time Internet interdiction should be analyzed by public Internet
regulators.
b. Internet and Regimes in Crisis: Myanmar
In contrast to the externally imposed communication disruption
by hostile nations at war, cutting off or severe restrictions of the physi-
cal communication link can be self-imposed by regimes in crisis. The
current situation in Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) is illustra-
tive for this type of extreme regulation at the physical layer.
Under a 1996 law, every telephone, fax machine, modem, or
computer in Myanmar must be authorized by and registered with the
government authorities. The law, passed in the midst of a major
crackdown on popular political activities, imposes imprisonment of
seven to fifteen years for unauthorized possession of a computer,
modem, or fax machine. 195 The law is not a mere technicality or
empty threat. In fact, in 1996, James Leander Nichols, Honorary Con-
sul to Norway and a friend of the opposition leader,1 96 was jailed for
owning unauthorized fax machines. He died in prison several months
later under questionable circumstances. 197
The draconian Burmese telecommunications law has since been
extended to specifically cover the Internet. 198 The law prohibits In-
ternet access unless granted by the authorities, and requires prior gov-
ernment approval of every web page created in the country.'9 9 The
government can effectively control all Internet access from Myanmar
because the only ISP in the country is the government-run Myanmar
Post and Telecommunications. 200 E-mail service is permitted to a lim-
195 Matthew Pennington, Fearing Free Speech Pandora's Box, Myanmar Rulers Block
Internet, CNEWS, Apr. 18, 2000, at http://www.canoe.ca/TechNews0004/18_myanmar.
html.
196 Aung San Sun Kyi is the leader of the National League for Democracy, who
won by a landslide victory in a general election in 1990. Placed under house arrest by
the military since her electoral victory, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
1991. Id.
197 AMNESTY INT'L, MEDICAL CONCERN: MYANMAR: DEATH IN CUSTODY OF LEO NICH-
oLs (July 16, 1996); see also U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 113(c), U.N. Doc. A/
51/204 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/
a51-204.htm (expressing the concern of the European Union about the deteriorating
political situation in Myanmar, and calling on the Myanmar authorities to respect
human rights).
198 Updates on Media Law Reforms, 1 COMM. L. IN TRANSITION NEWSL., Feb. 12, 2000,
at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/transition/issue04/updates.htm.
199 Id.
200 Myanmar's Net Inc., Internet Access in Myanmar, at http://www.myanmars.net/
myanmar/internet.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
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ited number of foreign businesses and Burmese users, but access to
the World Wide Web or any website outside the country is essentially
prohibited, except for a few government officials for security monitor-
ing purposes. 20 1
In Myanmar, a politically unstable regime threatened by popular
opposition imposed an extreme kind of regulation from the physical
layer by strictly controlling, under threat of severe criminal punish-
ment, communication lines, equipment, and network hardware. By
doing so, the regime has ensured that it has the power, when neces-
sary, to impose on the country a complete communication blackout,
including "cutting the wire" to the Internet. Layers analysis of the
Myanmar case is structurally similar to analysis of the Serbian interdic-
tion case. But, of course, the two cases are quite different. Most pol-
icy analysts would agree that wartime Internet interdiction is justified
under the right conditions; the very same analysts would likely con-
demn the Myanmar regime's "cut the wire" policy. This fact illustrates
a conclusion that we have already reached-layers analysis provides a
framework for the analysis of Internet regulations, but this framework
is necessarily incomplete. The difference between wartime interdic-
tion and the self-imposed isolation of a totalitarian regime is the fol-
lowing: some wars are justified, whereas no totalitarian regime should
be supported. Layers analysis gives us an angle of attack on the "cut
the wire" cases, but it does not do all the work.
c. Lessons from the "Cut the Wire" Example
In the Serbia and Myanmar examples above, the regulation is pri-
marily or solely directed at the physical layer. However, the object of
such regulation is to deny or restrict the data exchanged over the In-
ternet-that is, to strike at the content. Also, the conflict arose at the
content layer, as all political conflicts must, but the physical link was
attacked as the most extreme form of blockade on the content.
The extreme nature of "cutting the wire" regulation is quite obvi-
ous. In virtually all circumstances, the physical link must have substan-
tial innocent use, and "cutting the wire" regulation is extremely
overinclusive. Clearly, "cutting the wire" is the ultimate destruction of
transparency, as no content data whatsoever will get through. If im-
posed on an entire nation or region, transparency of the Internet over
the whole area would be completely destroyed. Such extreme regula-
201 Sandy Barron, Myanmar Works Hard to Keep the Internet Out, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB, July 14, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/cyber/articles/
14myanmar.html; see also Myanmar's Net Inc., supra note 200 (reporting that the In-
ternet is still operating in Myanmar).
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tion can only be justified, if ever, by extremely compelling reasons,
such as an all-out war of mass destruction.
When the problems at the content layer-the layer highest in the
Internet layer hierarchy-are attacked at the physical layer-the low-
est layer-we have the biggest layer violation that leads to the most
severe and substantial innocent use problem, as well as the most com-
plete destruction of transparency. Regulators must be intuitively
aware of the extreme and obvious nature of the problem, as such reg-
ulation is deployed only under highly unusual circumstances. Never-
theless, the "cut the wire" example is instructive in that it shows a clear
example of layer-violating regulation and problems with such
regulation.
3. IP Layer Regulation Aimed at Content Layer Problems
Regulation at the physical layer represents the most extreme
form of layer-crossing regulation. Moving one layer up, we now con-
sider regulations that operate at the IP layer, but aim to solve a prob-
lem at the content layer. We begin with some introductory remarks,
and then proceed to consider a series of examples.
a. Introduction: Definition and Comparisons
In one sense, this section represents the core of our Article. This
is where the action is, as becomes apparent from the four examples we
shall discuss-China's blocking of foreign sites,202 the French Yahoo!
case, 203 responses to cyberattacks or terrorism, 20 4 and Pennsylvania's
child pornography statute205-and some additional examples that are
important but left to a footnote. 20 6 The issues involved in these exam-
ples are diverse and complex in comparison to the issues involved in
202 See infra Part III.A.3.b.
203 See infra Part III.A.3.c.
204 See infra Part IIl.A.3.d.
205 See infra Part III.A.3.e.
206 Our list of examples is not intended to be exhaustive. Jonathan Zittrain pro-
vides at least two more: (1) "A German court has held that approximately sixty desti-
nation ISPs in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia can lawfully be asked to block
German customer access there to two U.S.-hosted Web sites determined by the Ger-
man government to contain banned Nazi propaganda," Jonathan Zittrain, Internet
Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REv. 653, 683 (2003), and (2):
[I] n a short-lived case that would have proved an interesting test of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act's provisions on injunctions, thirteen record
companies filed a lawsuit in August 2002 to force five major domestic ISPs,
in their role as destination ISPs and backbone providers within the Internet
cloud, to block their customers' Web access to www.listen4ever.com, an al-
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regulations at the physical layer. Furthermore, some of the concepts
introduced may not be familiar to most of the readers. We begin with
the task of defining what we mean by regulation at, or directed at, the
IP layer. Then, an explanation of how it is different from regulation
at other layers follows. The category of regulations at the IP layer that
are addressed to problems at the content layer is illustrated by Figure
7:
FIGURE 7. REGULATION DIRECTED AT THE IP LAYER DUE TO
PROBLEMS AT THE CONTENT LAYER
Content Layer Problem Conduct Layer
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network / IP Layer
Link Layer
Physical Layer
LAYER VIOLATION
Regulation Layer
In the "cut the wire" example above, few will dispute that the reg-
ulation was directed at the physical layer. Although the regulation
may ultimately seek to control the content, the objects of the regula-
legedly unauthorized China-based source of those companies' copyrighted
music.
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tion's control are the physical communication links. In an analogous
way, regulation directed at the IP layer seeks to control a function or
functions at the IP layer. As discussed above in the TCP/IP section,
the IP layer is the layer above the transport layer in the Internet layer
hierarchy.
Many regulations at the IP layer are not motivated by a desire to
control content. For example, switching over to the next generation
IP protocol-IPv6-will require global coordination of all Internet
users, ISPs, and backbone operators for the process to be fully effec-
tive.20 7 Although a successful upgrade to IPv6 would be an unprece-
dented, monumental worldwide cooperation with a staggering global
reach, it has nothing to do with content. The object of global coordi-
nation is purely about the "plumbing" of the Internet.208
Some regulations at the IP layer, however, are motivated by
problems at the content layer, or have the ultimate goal of controlling
content. A regulation that requires blocking an entire site (i.e., a host
or hosts from the site), due to concerns about the site's content, is
one such example. The offending site or user is identified with the IP
address of the host machine, and all data coming from, or going to,
the IP address is blocked. In effect, the problem at the content layer
is associated with the identifier at the IP layer-namely, the IP ad-
dress. The regulation is directed at the IP layer because it seeks to
control an IP layer function-that is, delivery of data from one host to
another according to its IP addresses. The regulation says: "If the data
are coming from or going to the IP address xxx.yyy.zzz, then don't
deliver that data."
Technically, the IP address blocking can be implemented in sev-
eral different ways at different levels or layers. The blocking can be
implemented by an IP filter (typically, an IP level device driver), by an
IP router that runs at the IP layer, or a proxy server (or firewall) that
runs at the "application level." 209 However, the technical implementa-
tion methodology should not be confused with the layer of the function
that is being sought to be controlled. Regardless of the implementa-
207 See generally ERIc CARmtS, THE TRANSITION TO IPv6 (2002), available at http://
www.isoc.org/briefings/006/isocbriefing06.pdf.
208 Our discussion is somewhat oversimplified. One of the benefits of IPv6 will be
to vastly expand the supply of IP addresses. Currently, there is a shortage of IP ad-
dresses in some regions, due mostly to distribution rather than the absolute number
of IP addresses. These distributional issues may have some impact on content and,
therefore, there may be a connection between IPv6 and content problems. These
issues are complex, and we set them aside for the purpose of this Article.
209 See generally WILLIAM R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, FiREwALLS AND IN-
TERNET SECURITY (1994); Am LUOTONEN, WEB PROXY SERVERS (1998).
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tion detail, the controlled function, or the function where the restric-
tion is imposed-delivery of data from one IP address to another-is a
function at the IP layer.
And, this is not a mere semantic distinction. The difference is a
fundamental and architectural one. Given TCP/IP's layered architec-
ture, the only place where a host machine is identified is at the IP
layer. The DNS host name-e.g., "www.amazon.com"-is used purely
for the convenience of human users. When the data travel from one
machine to another over the Internet, the source and destination are
identified by the IP addresses only. Thus, when an entire host (or
entire site) is blocked, it is fundamentally an IP layer function that is
being regulated.
A World Wide Web content filter at the application layer provides
an illuminating example of the fundamental differences between reg-
ulations targeted at different layers. As discussed above, HTTP is the
application layer protocol for the World Wide Web.2 10 The funda-
mental basic building block of HTTP is a "document." When a user
visits a website, every "page" presented to the user in the browser is a
"document" that is identified by a uniform resource locator (URL). A
URL might look like: "http://www.amazon.com/index.htm" if the
DNS host name is used, or "http://157.242.144.232/index.htm" if the
IP address is used directly.2 11 It is crucial to understand that a URL
does not identify a host machine; rather, it identifies a document at a
host machine. The host is identified by an IP address at the IP layer,
and the web document is identified by a URL at the application layer.
Within HTTP, there is no more basic unit of data than a docu-
ment. As an application layer protocol, HTTP has no provisions for
identifying a host machine, routing data packets, or delivering data
bits. It relies on the lower layer protocols for those functions. Thus,
within HTTP (the application layer protocol), it is not possible to
block an entire site or host; it can only block an individual document.
In the Amazon.com website example given above, blocking the home
page of the web site-identified as "http://www.amazon.com/in-
dex.htm"-would not block other documents on the site. For exam-
ple, "http://www.amazon.com/books.htm" would not be blocked,
and users can get to the document directly by entering the URL di-
rectly in their browser's address field. Of course, the entire site would
be blocked effectively if every document from the site is blocked. But,
within the HTTP or at the application layer, the blocking will have to
be done one document at a time. And this is precisely how the con-
210 See supra text accompanying note 60 (discussing HTTP).
211 This is not the actual IP address for www.amazon.com.
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tent filtering at the application layer would work. For example, the
World Wide Web Consortium's Platform for Internet Content Selec-
tion (PICS) specification works this way. Each document identified by
a URL is labeled with a standardized content rating, and the content
filter program allows or blocks each document according to the user
setting and the PICS label.2 12 Any other technology that performs se-
lective filtering within the web protocol or any application layer proto-
col would have to work by blocking individual documents or URLs.
21 3
If, on the other hand, a whole site or a host is blocked as one unit
using a single identifier, it will have to be done with an IP address. A
URL operates at the application layer, whereas an IP address operates
at the IP layer. These are fundamentally distinct constructs that iden-
tify architecturally distinct objects: the documents and host machines,
respectively. Therefore, regulation that requires blocking an entire
site or a host is a regulation that is directed at the IP layer, regardless
of how it is implemented.
It should be pointed out, however, that both types of blocking are
layer-violating regulations. Blocking an entire site or a host due to
concerns about its content is a regulation directed at the IP layer as a
result of problems at the content layer. Blocking of URLs, on the
other hand, is directed at the application layer in order to address
problem conduct at the content layer.
All Internet filter programs employ one or more of these meth-
ods. 214 The problems of filtering or blocking programs are well
known. 21 5 Among others, they are notoriously overinclusive and un-
derinclusive. A detailed analysis of the problem of filtering programs
will be given later in this Article. For now, it is illuminating to note
that, between the two methods of blocking, there is a significant dif-
ference in the severity of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.
When a whole site is blocked due to some offending content at the
site, all data on the host machine is blocked. When, however, block-
ing is done at a document level, the effect of overinclusion or under-
212 World Wide Web Consortium, PICS Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.w3.org/2000/03/PICS-FAQ (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
213 Because document names frequently include IP addresses and/or domain
names, it would be possible to block multiple URLs by searching for the IP address or
domain name within the URL string.
214 Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software
vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. Rxv. 509, 513-19 (2000).
215 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(citing the expert report of Benjamin Edelman); see also Geoffrey Nunberg, The In-
ternet Filter Farce, 12 AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, available at http://www.prospect.org/
print/V12/1/nunberg-g.html (discussing some of the problems with internet filters).
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inclusion is limited to the document. Therefore, blocking at the IP
layer-blocking of an entire site or a host-is inherently more overin-
clusive and underinclusive than blocking at the application layer-
blocking of individual documents.
And, the same goes for transparency. The blocking at the appli-
cation layer is done at a finer subunit of data than the blocking at the
IP layer-data in a document on a machine as opposed to all data on
an entire machine. Thus, blocking at the IP layer inherently has
greater impact on the transparency of the Internet than blocking at
the application layer.
Now, we can point to an interesting and important pattern that
emerges from layers analysis. The "cut the wire" regulation blocks all
data from all machines in a country or geographical region; blocking
an IP address blocks all data from a host machine; and blocking a
URL blocks all data contained in the document. Thus, when address-
ing the offending conduct at the content layer, the substantial inno-
cent use problems and transparency impairment are most severe
when the regulation is directed at the physical layer, less severe when
at the IP layer, and lesser still at the application layer. Therefore, the
severity of the layer violation is greater when the regulation is at-
tempted at a lower or deeper layer in the TCP/IP layer hierarchy in
order to address the problems at an upper or higher layer.
Layer-violating regulation at the IP layer, then, is regulation di-
rected at the IP layer due to problems at the content layer. As most
regulators refrain from "cut the wire"-type regulation due to the intui-
tively obvious nature of the problem, layer-violating regulation at the
IP layer is the most common form of severe layer-violating regulation.
This type of regulation is frequently deployed in the context of one of
the most interesting and controversial areas of Internet regulation-
regulation across national boundaries. Such regulations are invariably
motivated by the desire to control the extreme transparency of the
Internet on the part of the national governments. Below, issues
brought up by national regulation are considered by looking at three
examples-China's regulation of the Internet, the French Yahoo! case,
and post-September 11 responses to cyberattack or terrorism. A
fourth example, a Pennsylvania child pornography IP address block-
ing statute, deals with the same issues at the state (subnational) level
in a federal system.
Our discussion of the example of China's regulation of the In-
ternet is important, in part, because it is illustrative of a general prob-
lem that the Internet poses to developing countries. Typically, such
nations do not possess the political and cultural tradition of Western
democracies, but want to develop toward advanced society, at least in
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technological and economic aspects. 2 1 6 The French Yahoo! case rep-
resents the dispute among developed nations or Western democracies
instigated by a transparent Internet. And, the concerns about cyber-
attacks or cyberterrorism must be considered, as a changed attitude
among people and decisionmakers due to post-September 11 realities
is likely to shape the discussion about the transparency of the In-
ternet. The Pennsylvania child pornography case provides yet an-
other example-this time in the context of a category of content that
is almost universally condemned as evil, and as properly the subject of
regulation. We now turn to these four examples-beginning with the
case of China's attempts to block IP addresses.
b. China's Regulation of the Internet
China's regulation of the Internet presents a fascinating study of
the intersection of law, social policy, and technology (i.e., architecture
of the Internet) in a society in transition-a developing nation that
aspires to be a world leader in commerce and technology while main-
taining an authoritarian political system, or at least deferring possibly
inevitable political reforms. Since the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping
in 1978, the government of China (or rather the political leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party) has pursued two fundamental goals:
economic prosperity and political stability. 217 The Internet poses an
unprecedented dilemma for the Chinese government in its dual pol-
icy of pursuing economic prosperity through economic liberalization
while maintaining a single party authoritarian political system through
pervasive political control-and the dichotomy or tension between
the two objectives is especially apparent in the area of the Internet. 218
Many in the Chinese leadership perceive the information and
knowledge industry, including the Internet, to be the key to China's
future prosperity. By taking advantage of its superior human capital,
China hopes to rapidly catch up and become competitive with the
216 The Myanmar example, on the other hand, illustrated an example of countries
that do not want to develop toward a Western style liberal democracy.
217 Ken Davies, China's International Economic Policy, Lecture at the University
of Hong Kong (Oct. 19, 2000), at http://members.tripod.com/-Ken-Davies/
hkul .html; see also Pieter Bottelier, China's Economic Transition and the Significance
of WTO Membership, Huang Lian Memorial Lecture at Stanford University (Nov. 17,
1999), at http://credpr.stanford.edu/pdf/lienlecture.pdf. See generally NICHOLAS R.
LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION (1998) (discussing China's eco-
nomic reform policies);JuN MA, THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN THE 1990s (1997) (discuss-
ing the changes in the Chinese economy during the 1990s).
218 Philip Sohmen, Taming the Dragon: China's Efforts to Regulate the Internet, 1 STAN.
J. E. ASIAN Are. 17, 17 (2001).
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West.219 On the other hand, because of its global reach and transpar-
ent nature, the Internet also opens up floodgates to ideas and influ-
ences that the Chinese government wants to keep out, including
unsanctioned political activities that could threaten China's monopoly
political system. Thus, the People's Republic of China is faced with
the problem of allowing enough of the Internet necessary to take ad-
vantage of its benefits, but stopping enough of it sufficient to neutral-
ize potential threats. Examining the methods by which China is
attempting to achieve these conflicting goals offers a revealing
glimpse of the interaction of law and policy, and how such regulatory
attempts are manifested due to the inherent layered architecture of
the Internet.
i. The Great Wall: Controlling Access at the Physical Layer
China's Internet regulation has a physical access control compo-
nent strikingly similar to that of Myanmar. 220 Under the law, the Chi-
nese government has a monopoly over all Internet connections going
into and out of the country. 221 The regulations designate the Ministry
of Information Industry (MII) as the gatekeeper to the Internet, and
access to the global Internet by networks (ISPs) is restricted exclu-
sively to a handful of channels-the national backbones-provided or
sanctioned by the MII.222 The ISPs are required to apply for a license
for connection to the M11 backbone, and in so doing, must provide
information on the location of their host computers as well as the
nature and scope of their networks. The individual users of the In-
ternet who sign up with ISPs are also required to register with the
local Public Security Bureau (PSB). The registration process provides
the PSB with information on the location of each computer con-
nected to the Internet, as well as its owner, for surveillance and moni-
toring purposes. Failure to register is punishable with fines or a
prison sentence. 22-3
Unlike Myanmar, however, many of the draconian regulations at
the physical layer are not zealously enforced, especially against indi-
vidual users. 224 If having a computer and Internet connection comes
with constant surveillance and an ever-present threat of imprison-
219 Id.; see also William Foster & Seymour E. Goodman, The Diffusion of the Internet
in China, at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20022/chinainternet.pdf (last modified
Sept. 12, 2000).
220 See supra Part III.A.2.b.
221 Sohmen, supra note 218, at 20.
222 Id.; see also Foster & Goodman, supra note 219, at 35.
223 Sohmen, supra note 218, at 20, 23.
224 Foster & Goodman, supra note 219, at 35.
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ment, such regulation would inhibit the growth of the Internet indus-
try in China by scaring the Chinese population away from the
Internet; China would not reap the economic benefits that the In-
ternet promises. Thus, although the drastic physical access control
regulations similar to those of Myanmar are still technically on the
books in China, they are not enforced due to this overriding policy
objective. Nevertheless, in order to control potentially threatening ac-
tivities, the Chinese government resorts to a less severe form of In-
ternet regulation-i.e., regulation at the IP layer.
ii. The Great Firewall: Blocking Content at the IP Layer
Under the "Computer Information Network and Internet Secur-
ity, Protection and Management Regulations," access to certain objec-
tionable materials over the Internet is prohibited in China.225 The list
of prohibited materials includes those: subversive of state power or the
socialist system; damaging to national unity; inciting discrimination
between nationalities; disturbing to social order; propagating feudal
superstition; pornography, gambling or violence; insulting or libelous;
or violating the constitution or other laws. 22
6
Words such as "subversive," "damaging to national unity," "dis-
turbing social order," and "feudal superstition" are not defined, and
obviously are vague. However, foreign websites such as those of the
New York Times, the BBC, CNN, and Stanford University are routinely
blocked because these sites somehow run afoul of Chinese law.2 27 In
the Fall of 2002, the Chinese government blocked access to Google
for about three weeks.228
Blocking of sites is delegated to the ISPs, with the PSB sending
out a list of websites to be blocked from users in China.229 The ISPs
are required by law to follow the directions from the PSB, and essen-
tially operate as agents for the government.230 Technically, the ISPs in
China are required to block all traffic from or to specific IP addresses
handed down by the government. As the Chinese government has a
monopoly over the physical connection to the global Internet, and all
225 See generally Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of In-
ternet Filtering in China, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china (last modified
Mar. 20, 2003).
226 See id.
227 U.S. Embassy Beijing, U.S. Dep't of State, China's Internet "Information Skirmish"
(Jan. 2000), at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/sandt/webwar.htm.
228 Joseph Kahn, China Toughens Obstacles to Internet Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2002, at A3.
229 Sohmen, supra note 218, at 20.
230 Foster & Goodman, supra note 219, at 35.
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ISPs that connect to the government sanctioned backbones are re-
quired to be licensed-and thus are required to follow government
orders-the government can completely block all objectionable con-
tent from all of China, at least theoretically. It would be like building
an electronic Great Wall around China-hence the Great Firewall.23 1
In reality, however, voluntary compliance by Chinese ISPs is un-
even. 232 Also, uses of circumventing technologies-such as the peer-
to-peer applications connecting to anonymizing proxy servers outside
China-make it difficult to block access based on the IP address of the
true or ultimate destination. 233 Nevertheless, in contrast to physical
access control, China is dead serious about enforcement of its IP layer
regulation. First, rather than entirely relying on the ISPs to faithfully
block the banned sites, the Chinese authorities monitor and filter all
Internet traffic going through China's eight primary gateways to the
global Internet. 23 4 Presumably, the packets from the banned IP ad-
dresses are dropped at these backbone gateways. At the other end of
the ISPs, installation of site blocking software is required on all end
user computers with public access, such as the PCs in Internet cafes.
Recently, Shanghai police closed down almost 200 Internet cafes in
the city during a weeklong sweep for not blocking the sites as required
under the law.2 35 Last year, Chinese authorities reportedly shut down
17,000 Internet bars that failed to install the site blocking software. 23 6
Although closing down the service and confiscating the computers is
directed at the physical establishment, it should properly be regarded
as a part of IP layer regulation, as the nature of action is enforcement
of the regulations at the IP layer-i.e., blocking access to sites at spe-
cific IP addresses. Of course, the ultimate goal of the regulation is to
control social or political unrest by restricting the flow of information
in and out of China-all problems at the content layer. China's regu-
lation of the Internet is, as explained above, a clear example of layer-
231 A. LIN NEUMANN, COMM. TO PROTECTJOUNALISTS, THE GREAT FiREWALL (2001),
available at http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001 /China-jan0l /Great_.Firewall.pdf.
232 See Jasper Becker, China Wrestles an Online Dragon, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 19, 2002, at 6, 6.
233 Doug Nairne, China Tightens Web Control, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 14,
2002, available at http://asia.cnet.com/newstech/industry/0,39001143,39071903,
00.htm.
234 Dion Wiggins & Louisa Liu, China's Internet Strategy: Struggling to Maintain the
"Great Firewall, " GARTNER NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at http://securityl.gartner.com/
story.php.id.177.s.1.jsp.
235 Shanghai Cracks Down on Net Cafes, REUTERS, May 6, 2002, available at http://
www.wired.com/news/politcs/0,1283,52330,00.html.
236 Id.
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violating regulation targeted at the IP layer due to problems arising at
the content layer.
iii. Application of Layers Analysis to China's Regulation of
the Internet
China's regulation of the Internet is highly controversial, and has
been the object of vigorous protest or criticism from inside and
outside of China. The criticisms can be thought of as belonging to
one of three broad categories of arguments: (1) China's policy of cen-
sorship is objectionable because it is politically or morally wrong (i.e.,
violates human rights, free speech rights, etc.), whether or not the
censorship takes place on the Internet; (2) regardless of whether
China should exercise censorship within its borders, it should not do
the same on the Internet because the Internet is different; and (3)
even if China were to engage in content control on the Internet, it
should not do what is currently done because the approach is flawed.
The first position is outside the scope of our analysis in this Article. 237
The next two arguments are examined with an emphasis on what lay-
ers analysis can tell us about the issues. First, we present an analysis of
the general layer-violating characteristics of China's Internet regula-
tion. Then, issues of censorship are analyzed under the layers analysis
approach.
a) General Layers Analysis of China's Internet Regulation
China's regulation of the Internet is perhaps a severe example of
layer-violating regulation targeted at the IP layer due to problems aris-
ing at the content layer. The innocent use problem is substantial, as
most of the materials on the blocked websites would be beneficial or
desirable to millions of users within China, and are matters of little or
no concern even to the Chinese government. The regulation clearly
impairs the overall transparency of the Internet by preventing access
to popular Internet services from a very large region for a very large
number of people.2 38
237 Of course there are a variety of arguments against China's position. For a sur-
vey of free speech theory, see Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A
Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54 (1989). There is a
further question whether China's policy on free speech is an internal matter or is
properly within the scope of concern of foreign governments and international orga-
nizations. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2000).
238 At the end of 2001, there were over 33 million Internet users in China. See
Internet Surfers in China Hit 33.7 Million, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/25362.htm.
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However, the problems are certainly not as severe as would result
from "cutting the wire" regulation at the physical layer, as the dra-
matic differences between the Internet uses in Myanmar and China
clearly show. It is very interesting to note that, although China has on
the books exactly the same type of drastic regulations at the physical
layer as Myanmar, the Chinese regulators consciously chose to regu-
late at the IP layer to impair the functioning of the Internet-trans-
parency and substantial innocent use-to a lesser degree. In their
attempt to achieve the conflicting goals of economic liberalization
and political control, the regulators in China are attempting to strike
a right balance by fine tuning the grades of transparency of the In-
ternet-that is, transparent enough to take advantage of its benefits,
but opaque enough to keep out potential threats. And, the mecha-
nism they chose to adjust the transparency is regulation at different
Internet layers-moving from the physical layer to the IP layer.
Whether or not the Chinese regulators are aware of the nature of
their acts, they are in fact traversing the scale of severity in layer-violat-
ing regulations. Destruction or impairment of transparency is most
severe when the problems at the content layer are regulated at the
physical layer, which is at the bottom of the Internet layer hierarchy.
It is less severe when done at the IP layer, a layer above the physical
layer. China's attempt to achieve a balance of conflicting demands of
economic liberalization and political control is manifested in the In-
ternet regulation as traversing the scale of severity in layer-violating
regulations, reflecting the inherent layered architecture of the In-
ternet and transparency flowing from it.
b) The Internet as Res Publicae in Cyberspace
Despite the harmful effects of its severe layer-violating regulation,
China may stand on a firm ground when it argues that China, as a
sovereign nation, has the right to control what happens on the com-
puter networks located within its borders in a way that it sees fit. As
pointed out above, many object to this position on political or moral
grounds. Others argue that, regardless of what China does with other
media or methods of communication, China should not censor the
Internet, because the Internet is different. In fact, some argue that no
nation, including China, should restrict activities that take place on
the Internet. But, these arguments do not clash with the contention
that as a sovereign, China has the right to autonomously determine its
own Internet regulatory policies.
There are, however, arguments that do question the right of sov-
ereign national governments to regulate cyberspace. Perhaps the
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most extreme position against censorship on the Internet is that
cyberspace is its own autonomous space that is not subject to the juris-
diction of nations or governments in real space. 239 Although there
are good reasons to doubt this claim, consideration of this position is
not analyzed in this Article in part because there is already substantial
literature on the topic. 240 Instead, we focus on a somewhat narrower
position that argues against censorship on the Internet, even if cyber-
space is not completely outside the reach of government regulations.
This position-sometimes called the global free speech argument-
states that the Internet should be off limits to any government censor-
ship, with a possible exception for the materials that all or most na-
tions find objectionable or dangerous.24I The argument is that, due
to the global and borderless nature of the Internet, national or local
laws restricting freedom of expression on the Internet violate the
rights of Internet users around the world.2 42 For example, if citizens
of one country are prohibited from discussing political issues critically
online, then not only are their rights infringed upon, but so are the
rights of others around the world to seek and receive that informa-
tion. Similarly, a country's efforts to block certain content from
outside its borders implicates the right of those in other countries to
impart information. 243
Of course, a sovereign nation has the legal right to regulate un-
wanted information within its borders. And, the authors of the global
free speech argument need not disagree with this point about sover-
eign legal authority. Nevertheless, the proponents of the global free
speech movement contend that sovereign nations may have good rea-
sons to favor free speech on the Internet, even if they restrict free
speech through other media. With traditional media dissemination of
information, such as through books and magazines, the information is
embodied in tangible physical objects that can be subjected to na-
tional or local regulations within geographically defined jurisdictional
boundaries. However, on the Internet, information is not tied to
physical objects located within geographical boundaries. Further-
more, there are no recognizable national borders in cyberspace.
Therefore, the argument goes, it is difficult to enforce national or lo-
239 John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), at
http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
240 See, e.g., BIEGEL, supra note 186, at 25-49.
241 See GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, "REGARDLESS OF FRONTIERS": PROTECT-
ING THE HuMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION ON THE GLOBAL INTERNET (1998),
available at http://www.cdt.org/gilc/Regardless-of Frontiers.pdf.
242 BIEGEL, supra note 186, at 28.
243 Id. at 29.
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cal regulation of speech on the Internet without creating substantial
problems of overinclusion and underinclusion. 244 Content censor-
ship by one nation affects all Internet users around the world, and
regulations that aim to fence particular content out of geographic na-
tional boundaries are doomed to be partially effective at best.
The global free speech argument can perhaps be better appreci-
ated and sustained when considering the nature of the Internet as a
public conduit for the flow of ideas and information. Carol Rose has
argued that the Internet, along with the rest of the modern communi-
cation systems, can be considered to be analogous to public roads,
bridges, and waterways in real space- res publicae under Roman law. 245
Res publicae in real space were the conduits of commerce, while the
Internet of today is the backbone of the exchange of ideas and infor-
mation, including the commercial activities that form the "informa-
tion economy."
Public channels of commerce in real space were and still are sub-
ject to formal governance mainly due to the problems of physical con-
gestion and overuse of resources. But, even when there is little or no
formal regulation, the users of public channels were nevertheless ex-
pected to observe customary rules of behavior, as exemplified by
American case law dealing with citizen behavior on the informal roads
of the nineteenth century American countryside.2 46
The expectation of orderly conduct had largely to do with the
purpose and nature of the public roads. Public channels of com-
merce are by nature highly efficient means to promote social welfare,
because, as lanes of trade are more widely used, the benefits from
trades grow exponentially (due to the network effect), while the cost
of congestion and overuse increase only arithmetically. 247 This in-
creased efficiency engendered by smooth flowing corridors of ex-
change was the reason why the roads and bridges were built despite
significant initial investment. Thus, maintaining order and minimiz-
ing obstructions that disrupt the smooth flow of exchange was funda-
mental to the existence of the public channels of commerce in real
space. Consequently, the users on the public channels of trade were
required, or expected, to behave in an orderly fashion to avoid or
minimize obstruction to the free flow of traffic.
244 Id. at 28.
245 Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property
in the Information Age, YALE L. SCH. Pus. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, Feb.
2002, at 12, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=293142.
246 Id. at 10-11.
247 Id. at 9.
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An analogous claim can be advanced with respect to the Internet.
While traditional res publicae allowed relatively free flow of tangible
physical goods, the Internet has enabled nearly frictionless flow of
ideas and information around the world. And, as we have witnessed
for the past several years, the resulting diverse cross-fertilization of
ideas has brought about the most significant bursting of creativity and
innovation in generations. Therefore, just as free flow of commercial
traffic was fundamental to the public roads in real space, unfettered
free flow of information and ideas is critical to the very existence of
the Internet.
One important difference, however, is that problems of conges-
tion and overuse of resources are relatively insignificant on the In-
ternet compared to traditional res publicae in real space, due to the
tremendous information carrying capacity of the Internet's communi-
cation infrastructure and the relative ease of adding more capacity. 248
Thus, unlike the traditional res publicae, conduct related to congestion
or overuse is not the critical disruptive behavior that the Internet's
code of conduct needs to address. Rather, the main obstruction to
free flow of ideas and information on the Internet comes from direct
censorship of ideas themselves. Therefore, on the Internet, the im-
plicit code of conduct mandated by the very purpose and nature of
the res publicae is not to engage in, or at least to minimize, censorship
of ideas and information.
The public is expected to conform to both legal regulation and
informal social norms in res publicae: do not obstruct traffic while on
public roads; do not censor ideas while on the Internet. This is con-
duct expected of the public as a condition to its use of public re-
sources. People who disregard these rules not only violate the rights
of the parties who are directly affected, but also infringe upon the
rights of all others-the public-by impairing the effective function-
ing of the res publicae. Thus, there appears to be some merit to the
global free speech argument that says censorship by one nation affects
all Internet users around the world. The proponents of global free
speech are in essence calling for the recognition of a norm, an implied
or customary code of conduct on the Internet as res publicae for the
flow of ideas and information when claiming that no nation should
engage in censorship on the Internet unless the material is objectiona-
248 This is not to say that the problems of congestion do not exist on the Internet
or that such problems are not important. The point is that those problems on the
Internet are far less significant and much easier to overcome than the similar
problems on the public channels of commerce in real space. A very interesting point
to note is that the relative ease of adding more communication capacity on the In-
ternet comes from one of the fundamental architectural features of the Internet.
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ble or dangerous to all or most nations in the world. Regardless of the
validity or practicality of such an argument, this much is clear: given
the nature of the Internet as the public conduit with global reach for
flow of ideas and information-res publicae in cyberspace-and given
that the Internet is a global network with no built-in national or re-
gional boundaries, national regulation of ideas and information on
the Internet is a highly problematic undertaking, even if the regula-
tion purports to target activities within the national borders.
c) The Great Firewall in Public Space
The implied code of conduct in res publicae starts with general
rules, but allows for exceptions or accommodations depending on the
circumstances. For example, although one is expected to avoid ob-
structing traffic on a public road, sometimes obstruction is unavoida-
ble because the user's car malfunctions. In such situations, the user is
expected to minimize obstruction by moving the car to the side of the
road.
Similarly, although governments of Western democratic nations
have attempted to exercise censorship over some material on the In-
ternet, such regulations are exceptions rather than the rule. In fact,
debates over regulations are all about how exceptional circumstances
or compelling reasons justify exceptional censorship. 249 By way of
contrast, in China censorship is the general rule and access is the ex-
ception. This conclusion is apparent from the permission based regu-
lation of Internet access in combination with extensive control over
the physical links. Thus, China's content censorship on the Internet
is contrary to the implied code of conduct expected of all users on the
Internet-a shared public space for free flow of ideas and informa-
tion. In effect, China is seeking benefits from being on the Internet
without respecting the standard of behavior expected of everyone who
is in the public space of the Internet. Thus, one might argue that
China has an obligation of fair play to reciprocate and adhere to the
norm of open access to information that prevails on the global
Internet.250
On the other hand, China could argue that it has the right to
regulate activities that take place on the networks located within its
borders. After all, many corporations or organizations in the West
249 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (recognizing that the govern-
ment interest in protecting children from obscene material should not suppress adult
free speech rights to the extent of allowing only what is suitable for children).
250 Cf John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
3 (S. Hook ed., 1964).
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have firewalls, andfew challenge their control of activities on their
internal network. In fact, China's initial approach to the Internet was
building a "national intranet"-a sort of giant private network with
tightly controlled access to the outside world.2 51 Within the U.S. legal
system, an easy answer would be that the actions of government are
treated differently from those of private parties. But, the issue is
about the standard of conduct on global res publicae that applies to end
users of the Internet throughout the world-be it government body
or an individual-using the public resource. Thus, China's potential
counterargument cannot be simply dismissed by invoking a U.S. con-
stitutional principle. To the extent that much of the subglobal net-
work of networks within China may be distinct res publicae, China can
claim the right to have control over them as a sovereign nation.
Although China's initial approach to building a giant intranet has
been abandoned, the Chinese government still requires the ISPs to
block listed sites and filters all Internet traffic in and out of the coun-
try at its eight gateways to the global Internet. In effect, China is act-
ing as if it is a super-giant corporation that connects to the Internet
over a gigantic network of firewalls or proxy servers-at least, that
seems to be the desired Internet model being sought by the current
government. Many in the West would find this model quite unset-
tling. Some would point out that China is not a corporation, but the
world's most populous nation. But, that does not readily explain why
China should not be able to do what corporations can do on the net-
works over which they have legitimate control-be it private owner-
ship or state sovereignty.
It is important to remember that our analysis has a limited scope.
Two important questions have not been analyzed here. First, we have
not addressed the question whether China should, as a matter of polit-
ical morality, recognize strong rights of freedom of expression. There
may well be a compelling case for such recognition, but we do not
address that question here. Second, we have not explored the impli-
cations of international human rights law and theory on China's In-
ternet policy. There may be a case that China is obligated by
international law to ease its restrictions of Internet access. Moreover,
there may be a case that foreign nations or international organizations
may legitimately pressure China to recognize more robust rights of
freedom of expression. Instead, our focus has been on arguments
that assume, arguendo, that China may legitimately control domestic
251 Nick Wingfield & Courtney Macavinta, China's National Intranet, CNET
NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-262013.html (last modified Jan. 15,
1997).
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communications. We claim that, nonetheless, China is obligated to
respect the open nature of the Internet. Because our claim relies on
weak assumptions, 252 it provides reasons that can be accepted by the
Chinese leadership, even if the leadership rejects strong theories
about freedom of speech in particular, or human rights in general.
d) Layers Analysis of China's Censorship on the Internet
Our discussion above illustrates a type of problem that often
arises in debates over Internet regulation. Although a general princi-
ple, such as the end-to-end principle or the implied code of conduct
on the Internet as res publicae in cyberspace, clarifies or illuminates
hitherto unconsidered issue, analysis under it sometimes fails to gain
traction due to the very generality of the principles. When this hap-
pens, layers analysis frequently can provide an effective way out of the
impasse. By identifying the layer of the problem conduct, as well as
the layer where the regulation operates, layers analysis provides more
concrete and textured analysis of the issues by placing the disputed
function at a proper layer and providing a correct focus on the rele-
vant operation of the Internet. That is, a layers approach provides
traction at the point where theory meets practice.
As applied to the "Internet as public conduit" argument, an im-
portant starting point is to note that the public conduit function of
the Internet operates mainly at the IP layer and at the physical layer
below it. It can certainly be argued that upper layer spaces such as the
application layer are also public spaces. But the point is that the IP
layer is the greatest common denominator of the publicly shared re-
sources on the Internet. The public networks-WANs, regional net-
works, and the backbones-all operate at the IP layer and below.
However, it is the function of the IP layer (or the IP protocol) to fuse
a multitude of disparate networks into a single unified, seamless net-
work. 253 This is why the proper technical name for the IP layer is the
network or Internet layer. 254 In fact, the original meaning of "In-
ternet"-which is still used in much technical literature-was a public
252 By "weak assumptions," we mean that our assumptions are undemanding and
uncontroversial. "Strong assumptions," by way of contrast, are demanding and
controversial.
253 Internet Transparency, supra note 90 ("The key to global connectivity is the
inter-networking layer. [IP protocol] allows for uniform and relatively seamless oper-
ations in a competitive, multi-vendor, multi-provider public network."); see also David
S. Isenberg, The Dawn of the Stupid Network, ACM NETWORKER 2.1, Feb./Mar. 1998, at
24-31, available at http://www.isen.com/papers/Dawnstupid.html.
254 1 STEVENS, supra note 18, at 2.
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network of IP routers.255 Thus, from the point of view of applications,
it is the IP network that is the global public conduit for the free flow
of information.
The second crucial point is about the nature of IP routing-i.e.,
the nature of packet switching in the public IP networks. The routers
in the public IP networks are supposed to perform simple, "dumb," or
"stupid" network functions: just forward the packets to the desired
destination. However, there is no predestined path of travel from the
origin to the destination point. IP routing is done through a "hop-by-
hop" basis-that is, the packet is routed to any router that is willing to
pass the packet to another router from which the destination is reach-
able.2 5 6 Thus, the function of the "Internet" (public IP network)
does not depend on the operation of any particular router or compo-
nent network. One router is like any other. The uniform IP protocol,
along with the "stupid" hop-by-hop routing design, makes the Internet
a single, unified, seamless global network, where networks or routers
can be added as indistinguishable "commodities."257 This aspect of
Internet design is largely responsible for the legendary scalability, effi-
ciency, and survivability of the spectacularly successful global Internet.
For our purpose, the key point to note is that the design of IP
routing, or the process of IP packet switching, relies on the availability
of all routers reachable between the source and destination points.
Because no geographical distinction is made between the routers, all
of the public routers around the world are part of the seamless global
public Internet, and everyone on the Internet essentially relies on all
of those routers in order for the Internet to be the medium of seam-
less global communication. In fact, on the global Internet, it is not
unusual for packets to be routed through several countries en route to
a destination.
This fundamental property of the Internet as a public IP network
is inconsistent with China's Internet policy. For example, if China
were to implement a gigantic national intranet, the routers inside the
private intranet by definition do not participate in the public IP net-
work. Therefore, the public outside China would not be able to rely
on the thousands of routers located inside China as part of a public IP
network. However, by seeking benefits from the Internet, China takes
advantage of the millions of routers in other countries made available
255 INFORMATION SCIENCES INST., UNIV. S. CAL., INTERNET PROTOCOL: DARPA IN-
TERNET PROGRAM SPECIFICATION 1 (Jon Postel ed., 1981), available at http://
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0791.txt ("The Internet Protocol is designed for use in intercon-
nected systems of packet-switched computer communication networks.").
256 1 STEVENS, supra note 18, at 38.
257 Isenberg, supra note 253, at 30.
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for the global public Internet. In effect, China's tens of millions of
users would burden the world's public IP networks without contribut-
ing its share by allowing its routers to be used by the global IP net-
work. This point provides a distinction between private corporations
and China. Running the Internet as an intranet may be acceptable or
tolerable if done by an organization with thousands of users, but, if
practiced by a nation with tens of millions of users, the result would be
very disruptive to the operation of the global Internet as a public
conduit.
China gave up on building a national intranet fairly early on. 258
Rather, it blocks or filters traffic at the backbone gateways to the
global Internet, and requires blocking on the ISPs that connect to the
backbone. Although this practice does not make the routers inside
China unavailable to the global IP network per se, it interferes with
the proper functioning of the seamless, transparent IP network by
complicating the "stupid" routing function. For example, any packet
that is routed through the sites or networks blocked by Chinese au-
thorities could get dropped at the gateways or blocking points, even if
the final destination of the packet is not located inside China. This is
because the routing is done on a hop-by-hop basis-i.e., for any
router, the only thing it knows about a received packet is its destina-
tion address and the address of the immediately preceding router. A
router typically is not aware of the address of the origination point.
Since it is difficult to tell the geographical location of the destination
on the basis of the IP address, the blocking might be simply based on
the source IP address, in which case, packets routed through the
blocked sites or networks will get dropped, even if the final destina-
tion of the packets is not located inside China.
In effect, the routers in China would be committing a sort of
routing fraud, by agreeing to route the packet, then dropping it in the
middle. Although the routers themselves may not have been
programmed intentionally to mislead, the resulting effect would be the
same and this effect is a foreseeable consequence of the policy China
would adopt. To the extent that China claims a sovereign right to
control routers and networks located within its borders, China cannot
avoid its culpability for the results of its specific blocking policy on the
global Internet. This is an unavoidable consequence of China's layer-
258 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Myanmar and Vietnam still
maintain the "intranet" model. Myanmar was discussed above. For the case of Viet-
nam, see Minutes of the U.N.D.P. "Partnership to Fight Poverty" Meeting, Internet
Players in Vietnam (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://www.isoc-vn.org/www/archive/011013-
Minutes.html.
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violating regulation at the IP layer that is enforced to control activities
at the content layer. Implementing content controlling functions
deep at the IP layer, especially at the backbones or national gateways,
is fundamentally inconsistent with the workings of the Internet as a
global public conduit-the res publicae for flow of ideas and informa-
tion. Therefore, layers analysis proves at least a narrower version of
the global free speech argument-that is, due to the global, public
nature of the Internet (global public network of networks of IP rout-
ers), censorship of content deep in the IP layer infringes upon the
rights of everyone on the Internet by placing an unnecessary and un-
expected obstacle on the global public conduit shared by everyone.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that non-layer-violating or less
restrictive solutions would work for China's current policy objective.
Given the types of content it wants to filter out, e.g., the New York
Times and CNN, no content level labeling schemes such as PICS would
work for China. Policing high at the content layer, i.e., policing the
users in real space, is always an option. In fact, the authorities in
China have recently launched a broad censorship and monitoring
program called "Golden Shield," which involves, among other mea-
sures, deploying a gigantic network of digital surveillance cameras to
monitor the users and PCs in China's 200,000 or more Internet
cafes.259 The system is reported to "incorporate speech and face rec-
ognition, closed-circuit television, smart cards, credit records and
other surveillance technologies."260 It is highly doubtful, however,
such a system would be effective in the long run, due to its highly
complex and resource intensive character, as well as the political cost
and social burdens that come from the extraordinarily intrusive na-
ture of the system. Furthermore, such an Orwellian censorship system
is unlikely to be conducive to fostering an atmosphere of intellectual
creativity needed for China to take advantage of the benefits of the
Internet.
It is interesting to note that the Golden Shield project was insti-
gated largely due to the difficulties or ineffectiveness of the Great Fire-
wall model. 261 Such difficulty seems to bear out the prediction of the
fit thesis262-that China's severe layer-violating regulation has funda-
mental architectural problems that would prevent China from becom-
ing a full-fledged participant in the global Internet. Attempting to
impose similar restrictions at the content layer, however, demands ex-
259 Nairne, supra note 233.
260 Wiggins & Liu, supra note 234.
261 Id.
262 See supra Part II.D.2.
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traordinarily complex and intrusive measures that may have costly po-
litical consequences. It is quite possible that China's current policy
regarding the Internet is a fundamentally unstable approach that is
doomed to fail. Perhaps a political system that requires blocking of
the contents of the New York Times or CNN is fundamentally at odds
with the country's full participation in the global Internet.
c. The French Yahoo! Case
Our next application is the French Yahoo! case, in which the gov-
ernment of France sought to require Yahoo! to block access to partic-
ular content based on IP addresses as a proxy for national identity.2 63
Although our discussion focuses on Yahoo!, there are other similar
cases. One such example is Google's blocking of more than one hun-
dred Internet sites from the French and German versions of its web
based search engine. 264
Yahoo! is an Internet portal. The name stands for "Yet another
hierarchically organized outline," reflecting Yahoo!'s origins as a col-
lection of web links organized hierarchically in outline form. Yahoo!
is now a general purpose portal site, incorporating the original out-
line and adding a wide range of web based services, such as yellow
pages, mapping, movie guides, a search engine, and so forth. Yahoo!
originally had a North American focus, reflecting its California origins
and the fact that Internet use was heavily concentrated in North
America at the time Yahoo! came into being.265 Today, Yahoo! has a
global reach, with specialized Yahoo! portals for a variety of nations,266
including France.267 Among Yahoo!'s offerings is an auction site,
which is accessible from its French portal; and among the items of-
fered for sale on Yahoo!'s auction site are war memorabilia, including
items connected to the Nazi party. The French government at-
263 See generally Current Development, Enforcement of French Court Order Barring Ya-
hoo! Internet Auction Sale of Nazi Material Would Violate First Amendment, 19 COMPUTER &
INTERNET L. 24 (2002); Elissa A. Okoniewski, Comment, Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA: The
French Challenge to Free Expression on the Internet, 18 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 295 (2002);
Pamela G. Smith, Comment, Free Speech on the World Wide Web: A Comparison Between
French and United States Policy with a Focus on UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc., 21 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. 319 (2003).
264 SeeJohn Schwartz, Study Tallies Sites Blocked by Google, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002,
at C8.
265 See Yahoo!, The History of Yahoo!-How It All Started . at http://docs.yahoo.
com/info/misc/history.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
266 See Yahoo!, More Yahoo!, at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/family/more.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (listing twenty-five regional Yahoo!s).
267 See Yahoo! France, Homepage, at http://fr.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
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tempted to prevent Yahoo! from auctioning Nazi items to or from
France.
The French Yahoo! case illustrates that the problems created by
the Internet's global transparency are not limited to China or non-
Western nations. France and the United States are two of the oldest
and most advanced modern democracies in the world. However, even
among such nations, the transparency of the Internet can give rise to
conflicts as a result of the clash of differing cultural, political, or legal
norms or values. The French Yahoo! case is the case in point.
The French Yahoo! case raises important questions regarding the
interaction of national sovereignty, the nature of the Internet or
cyberspace, and the nature and limitations of regulation of the In-
ternet. First, the case makes clear that the problems of clashing cul-
tural and political values that the Internet's transparency brings
cannot be simply brushed off by denouncing the perceived backward-
ness of developing countries or non-Western societies. France and
the United States are not sworn enemies who subscribe to diametri-
cally opposed worldviews. Quite the contrary, they are among the
closest allies whose political and cultural values are similar in many
important ways-perhaps indistinguishable from the perspective of
some non-Western cultures. Yet, there are significant enough differ-
ences between them that result in exactly the same kind of problems
that the transparent Internet brings to China or non-Western nations.
The case also serves as an interesting illustration of an important
type of layer-violating regulation at the IP layer-nationality or terri-
tory based policing of the Internet using IP addresses. Under this type
of regulation, restrictions on the contents are imposed along the na-
tional or territorial boundaries, using IP addresses to identify the na-
tional or territorial location of the users. Below, implications and
problems of such regulation are analyzed under the layers analysis
framework. Then, possible non-layer-violating alternatives are consid-
ered. Finally, a non-layer-violating solution in the code layer, use of
digital certificates, is proposed as a much more effective approach
with far fewer problems than the layer-violating regulation at the IP
layer.
i. The French Ruling
In early 2000, two French organizations, La Ligue Contre Le Ra-
cisme Et L'Antis~mitisme (League Against Racism and Antisemit-
ism-LICRA) and L'Union Des ttudiants Juifs De France (French
Union of Jewish Students) brought a legal action against Yahoo! in
20041
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the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (the "French court") .268
The French petitioners claimed that the sale of Nazi and Third Reich-
related goods through Yahoo!'s auction site that is accessible in
France violated section R645-1 of the French Criminal Code, which
prohibits exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts for sale. 269 Ya-
hoo! is never a party in the transaction, as any buying or selling takes
place directly between the individual users. The transactions are auto-
mated through Yahoo!'s auction server, which is located in the United
States.270 Nevertheless, because any French citizen is able to access
the Nazi-related materials on the website, the French court found that
Yahoo!'s auction site violates French law, and entered an order requir-
ing Yahoo! to block French citizen's access to the areas of Yahoo!'s
auction site that offer for sale any Nazi-related materials. 27
1
Yahoo! asked the French court to reconsider its order, claiming
that it was technologically impossible to selectively block French citi-
zens from its auction site. 272 Relying on the testimonies from experts,
however, the French court found that blocking access from French
citizens was technologically feasible. 273 The panel of experts, includ-
ing Vinton Cerf, one of the original designers of the Internet, testified
that some seventy percent of the IP addresses of French users or users
in French territory could be correctly identified to be located within
the French territory.2 74 By combining the IP address method with vol-
untary identification or registration, the experts opined that Yahoo!
could filter French users with a success rate approaching ninety per-
cent.2 75 The French court thus denied Yahoo!'s request and reaf-
firmed its earlier order.276
ii. The U.S. Court's Response
The final ruling of the French court appears to be based on the
technical feasibility of blocking users on the Internet based on their
geographical location. However, a U.S. federal district court, a paral-
268 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
269 C. PEN. R645-1.
270 Yahoo!, Inc., at 1183.
271 Id. at 1188.
272 Id. at 1184.
273 Id. at 1185.
274 Experts Testify in French Yahoo! Case Over Nazi Memorabilia, CNN.coM, Nov. 6,
2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/11/06/france.yahoo.trial.ap
[hereinafter Experts].
275 Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
276 Id. at 1194
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lel decisionmaking body in the United States, did not rest on such
grounds when rejecting enforcement of the French order in this
country. Rather, the U.S. court concluded that the French order
could not be enforced in the United States because it would violate
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the techni-
cal feasibility of the selective nationality based blocking.2 77
In response to the French court's ruling, Yahoo! filed a complaint
against the French organizations in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the French court's orders were neither cognizable nor enforceable
under the laws of the United States.2 78 The defendants immediately
moved to dismiss on the basis that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them.2 79 That motion was denied.280 Yahoo! then
moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim. 281
When considering the case on its merits, the court first noted that
the case was not about the right of France or any other nation to de-
termine its own law and social policies.28 2 "A basic function of a sover-
eign state is to determine by law what forms of speech and conduct
are acceptable within its borders," said the court.28 3 The issue was,
according to the court, "whether it is consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States for another nation to regulate speech by
a United States resident within the United States on the basis that
such speech can be accessed by Internet users in that nation."28 4
Although there is potentially a substantial choice of law issue, the
court adopted the U.S. laws by simply stating that "it must and will
decide this case in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the
United States" without engaging in international choice of law analy-
sis.285 Having decided that U.S. laws applied, the court found that the
French order was a viewpoint based regulation that was impermissible
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court said
that "[a]lthough France has the sovereign right to regulate what
speech is permissible in France, this court may not enforce a foreign
order that violates the protections of the United States Constitution by
277 Id.
278 Id. at 1186.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 1185.
282 Id. at 1186.
283 Id. Hence, at least one court in United States should have no problem with
China's regulation of the Internet.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 1187.
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chilling protected speech that occurs ... within our borders."28 6 Ac-
cordingly, Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment was granted.
iii. Application of Layers Analysis to the French Yahoo! Case
The French Yahoo! case raises important questions regarding the
interaction of national sovereignty, the nature of the Internet or of
cyberspace, and the nature and limitations of regulation of the In-
ternet. Many of the questions raised do not find ready answers under
existing legal frameworks, be they local, national, or international.
And, proper analysis of all of the issues raised by the French Yahoo!
case would be more than enough to consume several full length
articles.
For example, neither the French nor U.S. court's analysis of per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice of law issues is illuminating or satisfying.
Does Yahoo!'s website, located within the United States, violate
French law? Is it subject to the jurisdiction of the French courts? If
so, which law applies? The French court completely sidestepped the
issues by simply declaring that Yahoo!'s U.S. website violated French
law because the French users can access the site, without engaging in
even a cursory analysis of why such a position is justified and what
consequences such a position entails. The U.S. district court did
somewhat better, although the court's analysis still leaves many issues
unresolved. However, discussion of the complex issues of personal
jurisdiction and conflict of laws is not taken up in this Article, as a
proper treatment would require a full length article on this topic
alone.
Instead, this Article will focus on the feasibility and desirability of
the regulation at the IP layer. Assuming, arguendo, that a national
sovereign can legitimately regulate content on the Internet along na-
tional territorial boundaries, is it possible to do so based on IP ad-
dresses? Even if possible, is it wise to do so? What are the alternate
approaches? Are there better solutions that are more effective?
a) General Layers Analysis of the French Yahoo! Case
Even within these narrow confines, the French and U.S. courts'
analyses are rather incomplete or outright unsatisfactory. The French
court, for example, simply accepted the report from the experts on
the technological feasibility of identifying territorial identity of users
based on their IP addresses. It then turned the expert opinion on the
narrow question of technical feasibility into a legal mandate without
286 Id. at 1192.
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any analysis or critical assessment of the consequences of such order.
The absence of analysis seems especially inadequate when considering
the fact that the main expert witness, Vinton Cerf, publicly expressed
his reservation on the wisdom of the blocking measure before the
French court's final ruling. 28 7
The U.S. district court, on the other hand, sidestepped the issue
of blocking by concluding that, regardless of the technical feasibility of
the selective nationality based blocking, the French order could not
be enforced in the United States because it would violate the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by "chilling protected speech
that occurs . . . within our borders."28 8 However, the court did not
explain how blocking French citizens (and/or users from French ter-
ritories) chills speech in the United States. Did the court mean that
chilling occurs in the United States because Yahoo!'s servers are lo-
cated in this country? If the only people affected by the blocking mea-
sure are all physically located outside the United States, how does any
chilling of speech occur in this country? The court provided no analy-
sis of these fairly obvious questions.
In this regard, the U.S. court would have benefited from analysis
of the "technological feasibility," as it would have shed light on the
issue of chilling effect in a very concrete way. Among the methods of
identifying the nationality of the users, voluntary registration is most
likely to be an ineffective method. Only the IP address based method
would have any significant basis for success. Taking the experts' opin-
ion at its face value, it is possible to identify the nationality of the
location of the computers on the Internet on the basis of their IP
addresses with about seventy percent accuracy. Thus, the blocking
ordered by the French court would block about seventy percent of the
users from France, as well as many outside the country. At least theo-
retically, it is possible that some of the thirty percent of the users who
are erroneously blocked reside in the United States. Therefore, it is at
least plausible that there will be some chilling effect in the United
States.
The real problem, however, is what the seventy percent figure
represents. First of all, the experts themselves emphasized that "there
287 See Experts, supra note 274. Cerf, a founding father of the Internet, expressed
doubts about whether such attempts were worthwhile. "There are 100 million In-
ternet sites in the world," he said, "[i]n five years, there will be a billion. Even if we
only block some of them, the list is long. And if we block too many of them, we risk
blocking the whole system." Id.
288 Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
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is no evidence to suggest that the same will apply in the future."289
That is, the figure has no predictive value. Seventy percent is a statisti-
cal figure that is estimated from the accidental history of how IP ad-
dresses were allocated around the world.290 It is not based on
architecture or design constraints of the Internet. And there is noth-
ing in the architecture of the Internet to prevent reassignment or real-
location of blocks of IP addresses to a different region or country.
Thus, the seventy percent figure given by the experts is not a stable
figure that can be a basis for lasting regulation or policy. Therefore,
any territorial blocking based on IP addresses is inherently overinclu-
sive and underinclusive. How severe the problem is may be anyone's
guess at a particular point in time.
The second problem is that IP address based blocking can be eas-
ily circumvented by readily available technologies such as the
anonymizers. With such technology, users connect to a site through
another server that hides the true origin of the user, and determina-
tion of the geographic location of the user based on IP address is con-
sequently made impossible. 29 1 Thus, anonymizers can render the
regulation ordered by the French court entirely underinclusive where
it really counts. That is, those users in France who insist on purchas-
ing the Nazi-related materials on the Yahoo! site will easily circumvent
the IP based blocking, and the regulation would have very little
impact.
Granted, there are technologies that can be used to "dynamically
discover" the geographic location of the hosts based on their IP ad-
dresses. 292 But, these technologies involve some sort of guessing
game-e.g., guessing physical distance by network response delay-
that cannot guarantee a high rate of success. 293 In fact, under the
current Internet architecture, any effort to map IP addresses to geo-
graphic location is bound to be a guessing game. This is because allo-
cation and distribution of IP addresses are fundamentally activities
289 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis~mitisme v. La Socit6 Yahoo! Inc.,
T.G.I. Paris (Nov. 20, 2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/
001 120yahoofrance.pdf.
290 Memorandum from K. Hubbard et al., Network Working Group, to the In-
ternet Community (Nov. 1996), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2050.txt.
291 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisofmitisme, supra note 289.
292 See, e.g., Venkata N. Padmanabhan & Lakshminarayanan Subramanian, An In-
vestigation of Geographic Mapping Techniques for Internet Hosts, 2001 PROC. ACM
SIGCOMM 01, at 173, available at http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/
sigcomm200l/pl4-pabmanabhan.pdf (evaluating the performance of various tech-
niques for determining the geographic location of Internet hosts, and identifying
challenges in deducing geographic location from an IP address).
293 Id. at 178.
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above the TCP/IP layers-addresses are assigned without any architec-
tural constraints or mandates-and information about them is simply
not communicated to the IP layer, as required by the principle of sep-
aration of layers. Thus, all efforts to map IP addresses to geographic
location are in effect layer-violating actions, and as such, mapping has
the inherent problems of being overinclusive and underinclusive-
problems which we summarize as the fit thesis.29 4
Therefore, the U.S. district court's conclusion that enforcement
of the French court's order would have a chilling effect on protected
speech in this country may have been correct after all. It is important
to note, however, that the crucial supporting reason for the chilling
effect conclusion can only be identified by analyzing technological
feasibility, using the tools provided by the layers model. This leads to
an observation that has substantial significance, both in the French
Yahoo! case and in other contexts: whenever technological feasibility is
mentioned in the context of Internet regulation, what is really in-
volved most of the time is the interaction between the architecture of
the Internet and the law. Recall that the code thesis told us that the
nature of Internet or cyberspace is determined by the code that imple-
ments it. Code is the prime regulator on the Internet. Thus, in In-
ternet regulation, what is really discussed under technological
feasibility is the possibility of change in code (or architecture) as the
prime regulator of the Internet. The legal regulation will be only as
good as is permitted by the architecture of the Internet, and the na-
ture and limitations of the legal regulation will be determined by the
nature of the code being implemented. Therefore, whenever an ana-
lyst or policymaker is evaluating a given Internet regulation, analysis
of a proposed change in code and its interaction with legal regulation
should be included as part of a comprehensive analysis. One of the
goals of this Article is to show that layers analysis in conjunction with
end-to-end analysis provides an effective approach to the analysis of
regulation by law in the context of the architecture that determines
the effect the law will have. The analysis of the layer-violating regula-
tion ordered by the French court in this subsection, as well as the
analysis of the Internet as res publicae in cyberspace in the China sec-
tion above, illustrates this point.
b) Non-Layer-Violating Alternatives Analysis
If we were to take the French court's order to require blocking of
French users based on their IP addresses, that would be a regulation
294 See supra Part II.D.2.
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directed at the IP layer, due to problems at the content layer. In con-
trast to China's blocking of entire websites and services, however, the
French court's order mandates only a selective blocking of certain
materials on Yahoo!'s site that are found to be objectionable in
France. In addition, the blocking is directed at the IP addresses of the
users accessing the site, not the site itself.
On the other hand, the blocking would affect a large number of
people-i.e., most users in France and many outside the country.
Thus, it would significantly impact overall Internet transparency by
affecting the transparency for a large number of people. In addition,
the regulation is likely to suffer from rather substantial innocent use
problems, as discussed above. A consequence of the substantial inno-
cent use problem is a chilling effect on protected speech in the
United States.
What is France to do, then? Are there non-layer-violating solu-
tions that work just as well or better? What if there is no non-layer-
violating solution? Given that controlling importation of Nazi-related
material is justifiably important for France, should we accept the layer-
violating solution because no viable non-layer-violating solution ex-
ists, and the regulation is justified by a compelling reason?
Consider non-layer-violating alternatives. The most obvious alter-
natives are traditional models of regulation in real space at the con-
tent layer. They are: traditional real space regulation within national
borders, international agreements, and supranational regulation
frameworks such as that provided by the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
Under traditional national real space regulation, importation or
transaction of offending materials can be regulated at or within the
nation's borders. For example, if a French citizen were to purchase a
Nazi item on Yahoo!'s auction site from a foreign seller, France can
stop the material from coming into the country by enforcing the ban
on Nazi materials at customs entry points. If the transaction is be-
tween French citizens, the task of control is not any different from
general policing of those materials within France.
The problem with this approach, however, is speech and digital
content. If what is prohibited is speech-as is the case in France
where display of the Nazi-related item itself is banned whether or not
any sale takes place-then controlling physical goods at or within
France's borders has no effect on banned speech on the Internet
posted by sites outside the national borders. Digital content presents
even greater problems. Digital materials can be downloaded, bought,
and sold directly over the Internet. Such material could be legal in
one country but illegal in another. For example, Hitler's Mein Kampf
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may be available for sale in eBook format to buyers in France over the
Internet from a seller in the United States, where such material is not
illegal. Although, in theory, nations can regulate possession, buying,
and selling of illegal materials within their borders, national regula-
tion of digital content transmitted over the Internet would be nearly
impossible unless the activities on the Internet can be effectively
monitored and selectively blocked.
Alternatively, nations can agree on a uniform standard of con-
duct on the Internet through some internationalcooperation mecha-
nism.295 Then, the policing can presumably be done by each nation
within its borders, which may not be any different from regulation of
any other problem. However, a problem common to all international
agreement approaches is that the process of negotiation and settle-
ment is extremely complicated, laborious, and slow. 296 Thus, most in-
ternational agreement models may not be suitable approaches for
regulation on the Internet, due to dizzying complexity and vast diver-
sity of the issues involved, as well as the lightning speed of the change
of technology and patterns of conduct on the Internet.
Another problem characteristic of all existing models of interna-
tional regulation is that they are primarily designed for negotiation
and transaction among relatively sophisticated parties, such as govern-
ments, public organizations, or businesses. 297 They are not designed
to deal with millions of individual citizens around the world. As an
illustration of this point, consider the problem of tariffs in interna-
tional e-commerce transactions. Enforcement of tariffs at nations'
borders involves rather complicated questions of classification, valua-
tion, and origin. 298 The amount of tariff imposed depends upon
which category the product belongs under the nation's tariff sched-
ule, how much the good is worth, and from what country the product
295 For an overview of various international regulatory approaches to the Internet,
see BIEGEL, supra note 186, at 157-86.
296 See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 145-46.
International dispute settlement mechanisms do not spring up overnight.
Instead, they are carefully built, often with agonizing slowness, through a
process of give-and-take among negotiators wrangling over the subject mat-
ter of disputes, the procedures for adjudicating them, the identity of parties
who can bring claims, and the authority of the decision makers who will rule
on those claims.
Id.
297 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 197. ("[I]nternational agreements for the most part
are agreements between sophisticated actors. Before cyberspace, ordinary consumers
were not international actors.").
298 See DAVID SERKO, IMPORT PRACTICE: CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
69-133 (2d ed. 1991).
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is deemed to originate. Although standards for these issues have been
made uniform under the WTO for its member countries, these ques-
tions frequently involve complex legal issues that are beyond the
reach of most ordinary citizens. When citizens of different countries
buy or sell digital products through the Yahoo! auction site, the issues
of tariff determination and enforcement present great difficulties to
the traditional model. Neither the individuals nor Yahoo! can be ex-
pected to know how to determine the tariffs. And Yahoo! cannot be
expected to enforce tariff imposition and payments to proper govern-
ment bodies. Enforcement of quotas has the same difficulties. At pre-
sent, the WTO has a temporary moratorium on customs duties for
digital transactions over the Internet, in part due to these
difficulties. 2 99
The WTO framework is by far the strongest and most effective
international agreement mechanism with real enforcement powers.
30 0
But, the current WTO system, even limited to the questions of interna-
tional trade, does not seem to be an effective approach to interna-
tional Internet regulation. Moreover, the WTO is limited in scope to
trade issues, and for that reason is not an appropriate vehicle for ad-
dressing many problems raised by digital content. In sum, for resolv-
ing much more complex problems like the clash of cultural, political,
or legal values concerning speech, as represented by the French Ya-
hoo! case, none of the existing models of real space regulation at the
content layer is likely to be effective.
It seems, then, that regulation at the code layers is inevitable.
30 1
If we accept the proposition that regulation of Nazi materials is impor-
tant for the French government, then it may be necessary to institute
some change in code-i.e., changes to the architecture of the Internet
that are justified by a compelling purpose. When considering appro-
priate code changes, however, the architecture of the Internet must
be taken into account. The principle of minimizing layer crossing
tells us that the closer the regulation layer is to the content layer, the
less the impairment of transparency and the impact on substantial in-
nocent use. Minimizing layer crossing tells us to place the solution as
close as possible to the content layer where the function is ultimately
299 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE GENEVA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/ecome/mindecle.htm.
300 Joost Pauwelyn, Note and Comment, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the
WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 339
(2000).
301 It is taken as obvious that France will not resort to "cut the wire" regulation at
the physical layer.
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consumed. The principle says that the closest-possible-to-the-content-
layer solution will be more effective because more complete informa-
tion is available to implement the function properly.
The code change ordered by the French court is blocking based
on IP addresses-i.e., code change at the IP layer. Other choices are
content labeling such as the PICS at the application (protocol) layer,
and digital certificates at the application/services layer.30 2 These op-
tions are illustrated by Figure 8 below.
FIGURE 8. CODE BASED REGULATION CHOICES
Problem Conduct Layer
Code Based Regulations
Digital Certificates
Content Labeling (PICS)
IP Based Blocking
"Cut the Wire"
Among the choices, the layer principle and end-to-end argument
tell us to choose the digital certificate solution. The principles predict
302 Recall that application protocols are for Internet communications at the appli-
cation level, such as HTTP, while applications/services are application programs
themselves, such as web browsers.
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services Layer
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network / IP Layer
Link Layer
Content Layer
Physical Layer
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that the digital certificate approach will be, in effect, the least restric-
tive or discriminating means to achieve the compelling end of the
French government. And this is, in fact, the case. Digital certificates
are electronic files that can serve to identify the users or computers,
including their nationality or territorial location.3 0 3 The certificates
are issued by a trusted third party and are encrypted with strong en-
cryption technology so that they cannot be forged or tampered with.
Verification of identity can be done securely, privately, and anony-
mously by using automated authentication servers.3 0 4 Under this ap-
proach, the French government can- enforce installation of digital
certificates with national identification on the computers and web
browser programs located within France's territory. Then, Yahoo!'s
auction server can receive the digital certificates from the users or
computers that access the site, and the server can refuse access to the
areas that contain Nazi-related items, if the users or computers are
found to be from French territory-based on the authentication re-
sult of their digital certificates. This approach would have a far higher
success rate than a complicated guessing game of unstable mapping of
IP addresses to geographic locations.
It is important to note that, although the digital certificate ap-
proach is a code layer solution, it does not target networking layers-
i.e., one of the TCP/IP layers. Thus, it is not a layer-violating regula-
tion-this concept is limited to regulations crossing into the TCP/IP
layers. As a result, it has no effect on the networking function of the
global Internet. And, its impact on the transparency of the Internet,
as well as the problems of substantial innocent use, should be mini-
mal, if any. The effects of adopting digital certificates are limited to
the application/service space-it is like adopting any other program
or software, such as choosing a web browser or media player. In fact,
digital certificates are already in wide use without any impact on the
network function of the Internet. Whenever we go online with a "se-
cure site," such as an online purchase at Amazon.com, we are using
the server's digital certificate to encrypt the data so that the transac-
tion is "secure," even though the transaction data is sent over the pub-
lic networks that make up the global Internet. There is little evidence
that such wide use of digital certificates on the Internet has any delete-
rious impact on the workings of the Internet. Such a change with
303 See Netscape, Tech Briefs, at http://wp.netscape.com/security/techbriefs/in-
dex.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
304 See, e.g., VeriSign Inc., Authentication Service Bureau, at http://www.verisign.
com/products/asb/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (detailing the company's
product offerings that enable an enterprise to authenticate the identities of custom-
ers, medical professionals, and business entities in online transactions).
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minimal impact would certainly be justified by the French govern-
ment's compelling purpose to control the dissemination of Nazi
materials.
Our purpose is not to advocate (or oppose) a digital certificate
approach. It may well be that the disadvantages of digital certificates
outweigh their advantages. It is possible that the French government
simply cannot achieve its goal of effectively regulating Nazi parapher-
nalia. Our point is that analysis of the French Yahoo! case is illumi-
nated and clarified by layers analysis. Without layers analysis, the*
French government is essentially shooting in the dark without night
vision equipment. With layers analysis, the French government has
the tools to assess the effectiveness and costs of various policy
alternatives.
d. Cyberterrorism
Although there appears to be a nonayer-violating solution for
the French Yahoo! case, it is still an open question to ask whether the
Internet's global transparency should be maintained at all cost. The
area where this question is most relevant and pressing is the issue of
security-i.e., concerns about cyberattacks or cyberterrorism over the
Internet-especially in light of the post-September 11 realities. The
security concerns in this regard are a clear example of a compelling
purpose.
Security issues that arise because of the transparent global In-
ternet, or "cybersecurity," are identified as one of the key areas of se-
curity concerns by the current U.S. administration. 30 5 The new
Homeland Security Administration includes an Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Division. The new department would
comprehensively assess the vulnerability of America's key assets and
critical infrastructures, including the information and telecommuni-
cations systems. Most of the groups or agencies within the federal gov-
ernment that deal with computer or cybersecurity are set to be
transferred to this department.30 6 In addition, the President's budget
for 2003, the federal government's first post-September 11 budget,
specifically requested significantly increased funding for "cyberspace
security, an essential new mission for the 21st century given our grow-
305 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Remarks by Secretary
Tom Ridge to the Council for Exellence in Government (Sept. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=1597.
306 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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ing dependence on critical information infrastructure, most impor-
tantly the Internet.13 0 7 The President's budget emphasized:
The information technology revolution has changed the way busi-
ness is transacted, government operates and national defense is con-
ducted. These three functions are now fueled by an interdependent
network of critical information infrastructures of which the Internet
is key. America must do more to strengthen security on the Internet
to protect our critical infrastructure. 30 8
The budget called for creation of a Cyberspace Warning Intelli-
gence Network (CWIN) that would link the major players in govern-
ment and the private sector to manage future cyberspace crises, in
addition to requesting money for a feasibility study for a secure
"GovNet. 309
A recent cybersecurity report by Congress identifies critical infra-
structures as: information and communications; electric power gener-
ation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas storage and
distribution; banking and finance; transportation; water supply; and
emergency assistance. 3 10 The report further acknowledges the chal-
lenges "arising from an increased dependence on information systems
and networks to operate critical infrastructures. '31 1 That is, all areas
of critical infrastructures may be vulnerable or be affected by attacks
or terrorism perpetrated via cyberspace or over the Internet.
Already, we have seen a "hacker" from Sweden disable portions of
the emergency 911 system in southern Florida, and a Massachusetts
teenager disable communications to an aviation control tower.3 12
What would happen if members of the al Qaeda network break into
the computer system that controls the operation of a nuclear power
plant? A national power grid? The Hoover Dam? The results could
be as devastating as (or far worse than) the September 11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
There are now calls to build a "national firewall"-China's Great
Firewall does not seem so bad now-and quarantine or block Internet
traffic from certain nations.3 1 3 Suddenly, the transparency of the In-
307 GEORGE W. BUSH, SECURING THE HOMELAND, STRENGTHENING THE NATION 19
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland-security_
book.pdf.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 22.
310 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 107TH CONG., SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: NEW
CHALLENGES, NEW STRATEGIES 12 (Comm. Print 2002).
311 Id. at 13.
312 Id. at 21.
313 Simson Garfinkel, Leaky Cyber Borders, TECH. REV., June 2002, at 31.
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ternet may be regarded as much more of a liability than an asset.
When there are real concerns about the consequences of porous phys-
ical borders, arguments for having no borders-transparency-in
cyberspace may not fall on sympathetic ears.
The concerns over cyberterrorism are compelling reasons for
adopting regulations, although compelling motivations are never the
reason to adopt misguided or inappropriate means without proper
analysis. Nevertheless, if the West or the United States adopts regula-
tions that severely impair the transparency of the Internet, it is most
likely to be a result of hurried or reflexive reactions to September 11,
or subsequent threats of terrorism and a serious erosion of everyday
safety. And, once adopted in the context of security concerns, the
layer-violating regulations will also be used in other contexts.
On the other hand, we also need to keep in mind that trans-
parency across national borders-global transparency-was really not
the purpose or original design of the Internet. For the original In-
ternet, transparency meant within the United States or, at most, trans-
parency among the Western nations. As we discussed, the Internet
was justified, if not created, in some part, by the Cold War military
project to build a communication network that would survive cata-
strophic failures.314 It was designed to be used initially by the U.S.
military, government agencies, universities, and researchers working
on the project, who were by and large trusted parties. Thus, the ad-
vantages of transparency clearly outweighed any possible problems it
might cause.
That certainly is not the situation on today's global Internet.
Given the post-September 11 realities, perhaps the world is not yet
ready for the utopian total transparency of the original Internet de-
sign. Certain transparency losses-"tuning" of transparency across na-
tional borders-may be necessary considering today's global political
reality. Even if this is the case, however, there still is the question of
what the appropriate mechanism is to control or tune transparency
across national borders.
There is a need to consider, for example, whether IP based block-
ing really gives us better security. As evidenced in the French Yahoo!
case, the problems of overblocking and underblocking resulting from
the inherent violation of the Internet design will plague effectiveness
as well. The IP address was never designed to be the basis of geo-
graphic or national identification. As we saw, solutions implemented
at the IP layer to address the problems at the content layer inherently
314 See KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORI-
GINS OF THE INTERNET 54-81 (1996).
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cannot work effectively because it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
convey content layer information-geographic allocation and assign-
ment of IP addresses-to the IP layer. Furthermore, as analyzed in
the China section, national firewalls operating at the IP layer have se-
rious destructive consequences to the proper functioning of the
global IP networks. If national IP firewalls are deployed by the United
States and a few other major Western nations, it would essentially
mean the end of Internet as we know it-at the seamless global
network.
As was the case in the French Yahoo! case, use of a digital certifi-
cate with encoded national ID would be both more effective and less
damaging to the transparency of the Internet. Granted there may be
problems with misappropriation or counterfeiting of digital certifi-
cates, but such a problem isn't any worse than the problem of control-
ling passports in real space. National firewalls-really application
proxy servers in this case-that control traffic based on digital certifi-
cates would work much more effectively than IP based firewalls, with
far less harmful effect on the workings of the global Internet.
e. IP Address Blocking and Child Pornography
Yet another example of an IP layer regulation targeted at a con-
tent layer problem is a Pennsylvania statute that requires ISPs to block
access by Pennsylvanians to IP addresses associated with servers that
provide access to child pornography.31 5 The statute provides in rele-
vant part:
An internet service provider shall remove or disable access to child
pornography items residing on or accessible through its service in a
manner accessible to persons located within this Commonwealth
within five business days of when the Internet service provider is
notified by the Attorney General pursuant to section 7628 (relating
to notification procedure) that child pornography items reside on
or are accessible through its service.3 16
Jonathan Zittrain, in his important article, Internet Points of Control,3 17
notes that the Pennsylvania statute represents an important new cate-
gory of Internet regulation-regulations targeted at the "destination
ISP."1318
This form of regulation has strong attractions for public Internet
regulators, for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, destination
315 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7622 (West Supp. 2003).
316 See id.
317 Zittrain, supra note 206.
318 Id. at 672.
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ISPs fit easily into traditional paradigms of geographically based regu-
latory authority. Commercial ISPs enter into contracts with custom-
ers, and rely on local physical infrastructure (wireline telephony,
cable, or satellite dish) to bring the Internet to their customers. Thus,
an ISP "does business" in, and has "contacts" with, the nation, state, or
locality that might seek to regulate the ISP.3A9 Such contacts provide a
basis for the two crucial prerequisites of effective regulatory power:
personal (or territorial) jurisdiction and choice of law.
Second, destination ISPs do not have a substantial economic in-
terest in contesting IP address blocking. From the customer's point of
view, the impact is opaque and minimal-opaque because the cus-
tomer may never learn that she could not connect with a server be-
cause her ISP was blocking the address; minimal because only a tiny
fraction of all IP addresses will be blocked. Because customers are
unlikely to switch ISPs because of compliance with an address block-
ing regulation, the ISP is not placed at a competitive disadvantage. Of
course, address blocking imposes some costs on the ISP, but those
costs are not likely to be so substantial as to justify resistance by litiga-
tion or lobbying.
Pennsylvania has employed this statute to force WorldCom to
block the ISP addresses of at least two content providers.3 20
WorldCom's objections to this action are illuminated in juxtaposition
to layers analysis. WorldCom argued that it was unable to limit IP
address blocking to Pennsylvania customers; it would have to block all
WorldCom subscribers, irrespective of geography.321 This argument
is perfectly congruent with the fit thesis, because the regulation uses
an IP layer solution to a content layer problem, it is inherently overin-
clusive. As Zittrain notes,322 a similar problem has led one district
court to invalidate an Internet regulation on the basis of the dormant
Commerce Clause.323 Moreover, IP address blocking is at best a crude
tool, because IP addresses change over time or, in the case of an indi-
vidual using a peer-to-peer file sharing program, may be assigned dy-
319 Id. at 672-73 ("Destination ISPs are by their nature local, easing jurisdictional
concerns since ISPs will have equipment and assets within the reach of the interested
jurisdiction.").
320 See id. at 674-75 (describing proceedings in the Pennsylvania trial court).
321 Letter from Craig Silliman, Director of Technology and Network Legal,
WorldCom, toJohnJ. Burfete,Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attor-
ney General of Pennsylvania (September 23, 2002) (on file with Jonathan Zittrain),
cited in Zittrain, supra note 206, at 675.
322 See Zittrain, supra note 206, at 676.
323 See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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namically. The IP addresses that are blocked may well have innocent
uses the day, week, or year after the blocking order is made.3 24
Of course, child pornography is a great evil, and therefore, pro-
vides a compelling regulatory justification. Layers analysis suggests
that a second question ought then to be asked: Is a layer-respecting
alternative available? One alternative is takedown by the host ISP. In
fact, WorldCom notified the firms that hosted the offending content
and, in most cases, this resulted in the content being removed by the
host. 325 Of course, the firms providing hosting service for the content
(which might be online service providers such as Yahoo! or ISPs in the
case of peer-to-peer file sharing) may be located outside of Penn-
sylvania. That fact may increase the cost of enforcement. Assuming
that Pennsylvania had personal or territorial jurisdiction, it could ob-
tain an injunction, which then could be recognized and enforced by
another state or nation. Ifjurisdiction is unavailable or judgments will
not be recognized, a treaty or other international solution may be
available-although again at increased cost. Layers analysis suggests
that the costs of extraterritorial enforcement alone do notjustify pref-
erence for the layer-violating regulation. Unless those costs are so
burdensome as to make layer-respecting enforcement measures infea-
sible, the layers principle suggests that Pennsylvania's approach is not
justified.
4. Transport Layer Regulations Aimed at Content Layer Problems
Yet another category of layer-violating regulation includes regula-
tions targeting the transport or TCP layer. The core idea of such reg-
ulations is to block access to content (i.e., target a content layer
problem) by utilizing a transport layer regulation (e.g., block IP ad-
dresses that are associated with the targeted content). We analyze a
mostly hypothetical example of this kind of regulation-the possibility
that copyright owners would seek to compel ISPs to block the ports
used by peer-to-peer file sharing programs.326 This category of layer-
crossing regulation is illustrated by Figure 9 below.
324 Id. at 679-80.
325 Id. at 675 (citing Letter from Craig Silliman, supra note 321).
326 See infra Part III.A.4.a.
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FIGURE 9. REGULATION DIRECTED AT THE TRANSPORT LAYER DUE TO
PROBLEMS AT THE CONTENT LAYER
Content Layer
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network / IP Layer
Link Layer
Physical Layer
Problem Layer
LAYER VIOLATION
Regulation Layer
a. Port Blocking and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
This type of regulation could come up in the context of current
P2P litigation. 327 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) re-
quires ISPs to comply with the takedown provisions of the Act in order
to avoid liability.3 28 Due to DMCA concerns, many universities and
private organizations have implemented the blocking of Gnutella or
other peer-to-peer protocol traffic by blocking the TCP port used by
the protocols. A public Internet regulator, i.e. a court, could order
ISPs to block the TCP ports used by the P2P applications. No such
327 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
328 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
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order has been issued so far, perhaps because the lawyers and judges
are not aware of such possibilities yet.
Technically, a TCP port number is just a parameter used in the
TCP header of the data packet. But every Internet application or ap-
plication protocol must have a unique port number assigned to it in
order to properly achieve its communication functions over the In-
ternet. Using the port numbers encoded in the data packets, the TCP
layer puts together the multitude of data packets received from the IP
layer into coherent data streams intelligible to the applications. 329
For example, the port number for the web application protocol,
HTTP, is 80. Among the myriad packets it receives, the TCP layer
puts together the packets with the same port number 80 to recon-
struct the communication data stream for HTTP, i.e., the web
application.
The TCP ports are classified into three categories: well known
ports, registered ports, and dynamic/private ports.330 The well known
port numbers are from 0 to 1023, and are assigned and managed by
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA), which is now a part
of ICANN. 33 I The registered ports range from 1024 to 49,151.332 Ac-
cording to IANA, anyone can use or register a port number in this
range, but IANA registers and lists the uses of these ports as a conve-
nience to the community. 33 3 The dynamic/private ports are those
from 49,152 through 65,535.334
All of the P2P applications use TCP port numbers above 1023-
i.e., either registered or private ports. For example, Gnutella uses
port 6346, and the FastTrack technology based applications, Grokster,
KaZaA, and Morpheus, all use the port 1214.335 However, many of the
P2P applications can change port numbers on the fly in order to cir-
cumvent port blocking by universities or private organizations. In re-
sponse, most organizations with firewalls block all ports higher than
1023, except for those specifically allowed by the organization.
329 1 STEVENS, supra note 18, at 226.
330 Internet Assigned Numbers Auth., Port Numbers, at http://www.iana.org/as-
signments/port-numbers (last modified Oct. 23, 2003).
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 See Gnutella & Firewalls, GNUTELLA NEWS, at http://www.gnutellanews.com/in-
formation/firewalls.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004); Grokster Ltd., Help and Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.grokster.com/helpfaq.html#FAQ7 (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
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Despite the understandable security and legal concerns on the
part of the universities or private organizations, the wholesale block-
ing of the entire range of TCP ports raises the issue of its impact on
overall Internet transparency. Although localized port blocking by
private parties or schools would not impair the overall transparency
significantly by itself, the cumulative effect could amount to a serious
overall impairment if the practice becomes prevalent around the
world. Furthermore, the TCP port blocking, as currently practiced,
has serious substantial innocent use problems, because most ports
above 1023 have innocent, legitimate, or noncontroversial uses.
b. Port Blocking and the Layers Principle
There was an important reason why the original design of the
TCP/IP provided as many as 65,536 ports-far more than what was
needed in the foreseeable future. They were laid down as a part of
-the initial Internet design to give users and developers the freedom to
innovate without artificial scarcity of port numbers. For this reason,
the decision to disable some ninety-eight percent of the ports without
considering the impact on the functionality of the Internet is, at the
very least, open to question.
The issues of TCP port use and assignment are not likely to go
away. Eventually, the stakeholders may seek legal regulation directed
at the TCP layer, either through the courts or the legislature. In addi-
tion to a port blocking approach, they may seek to deauthorize or
deregister the ports through ICANN/IANA. At the moment, regula-
tion over the "ownership" of the TCP port numbers is quite minimal.
For the assigned and registered ports, one may apply for the port
through IANA's website at www.iana.org. The dynamic/private ports
are completely "free" or unregulated. And, there is no dispute resolu-
tion process for port assignment, in contrast to the ICANN process
available for domain name assignments. Traditionally, TCP port as-
signment has not been a source of dispute because most of the popu-
lar Internet applications are client-server applications using well
known assigned TCP ports. However, because of the explosive popu-
larity of the highly controversial peer-to-peer applications using "regis-
tered" or private ports, the TCP port assignment or registration could
become a new arena for legal challenges.
5. IP Layer Regulations Aimed at Transport or Application Layer
Problems
Not all problem behaviors of layer-violating regulations arise at
the content layer. Although most disputes arise at the content layer, it
2004]
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is possible for conflict to rise at the level of one of the TCP/IP
networking layers in a protocol war of a technological nature. An ex-
ample of this type of dispute has come up in the hotly debated area of
regulation in the broadband market-specifically, regulation of
streaming video over high-speed cable Internet service.
a. Streaming Video over the Internet: A Brief Introduction
There are at least three different methods of delivering video or
audio materials over the Internet: "downloading," "progressive
downloading," and "continuous play."3 3 6 First is downloading, where
the entire file for the video program is first downloaded to the user's
computer and then played after the transfer is completed.3 3 7 An obvi-
ous disadvantage of this method is that the user must wait until the
entire material has been downloaded before the user can start playing
the material, even if the user is interested only in the beginning por-
tion of the material. A method called progressive downloading ad-
dresses this shortcoming.3 3 8 With this method, the playing of the
material starts after a portion of the file has been downloaded, but the
transfer of the yet-to-be-played portions of the file continues in the
background so that the user has the perception of continuous play.
Or the user might terminate the data transfer after a partial play if the
material is found to be uninteresting.
The delivery methods based on downloading, however, present a
very serious problem for the content providers. That is, a perfect copy
of the program remains on the user's computer as a digital file, which
in turn can be copied perfectly an unlimited number of times without
authorization from the content owners. One way to deal with this
problem is Digital Rights Management technology, where the number
of times material can be played or copied is controlled by the content
owners.33 9 Another approach is to not leave a complete digital file on
the user's computer in the first place. Under this approach, the video
or audio program is played "live" directly into the user's computer
over the Internet without leaving a permanent file on the user's com-
336 See KEXP 90.3 FM, Streaming Media Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.kexp.org/listen/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Robert McGarvey, Digital Rights Management: 10 Emerging Technologies That Will
Change the World, TECH. REv.,Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 102, 103; see also Cross-Industry Work-
ing Team, Managing Access To Digital Information, at http://www.xiwt.org/documents/
ManagAccess.html (last modified July 12, 1999) (addressing various issues surround-
ing the management of rights and permissions in the digital environment).
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puter.3 40 Most webcasts and Internet radio or television programs use
this method.
Various methods of delivering video or audio programs "live," or
in "real time" over the Internet are called streaming technologies. 341
Such technologies are needed because delivering video or audio pro-
gram is a time sensitive or time critical task. To be effective, a video or
audio program must be played at a correct speed or rate. Otherwise,
Pavarotti's aria might sound like a munchkin's chant, or a fast-paced
action movie might look like a slow-motion replay. Thus, the data
packets that make up the movie or song must be delivered continu-
ously in correct sequence at a correct rate-a process called "stream-
ing. '3 42 Interactive "live" communication over the Internet, such as
Internet phone or video conferencing, must also employ streaming
technologies regardless of copyright concerns due to the "live" or
''real time" nature of the communication.
b. Broadband Internet Service over Cable: A Very Brief
Overview
Until recently, streaming video over the Internet has not been a
source of widespread controversy, because the telephone modems
most people utilized to get on the Internet were not fast enough to
provide the data transfer rate required for live playback of any decent
quality video material of any nontrivial length. The dispute arose as a
result of the convergence of two separate lines of development occur-
ring during the late 1990s: rapid growth of the broadband Internet
industry, and vigorous expansion of traditional media companies into
the Internet service market.343
In the context of Internet access speed, the term broadband re-
fers to high-speed network data transmission capabilities ranging from
more than a million bits per second (megabits per second) to billions
of bits per second (gigabits per second).344 In contrast, typical "56K"
modems over traditional telephone connection can transmit at about
340 See KEXP 90.3 FM, supra note 336.
341 Jian Lu, Signal Processing for Internet Video Streaming: A Review, PROC. SPIE IMAGE
& VIDEO COMM. & PROCESSING, Jan. 2000, at 1, available at http://streamingrnedia-
land.com/sp4streaming2.pdf.
342 Id.
343 Franqois Bar et al., The Open Access Principle: Cable Access as a Case Study for the
Next Generation Internet, in THE ECONOMICS OF QUALITY SERVICE IN NETWORKED MAR-
KETS (W. McKnight & John Wroclawski eds., forthcoming 2004), available at http://
www.stanford.edu/-fbar/Drafts/OpenAccess-MITPress.pdf.
344 TOM SHELDON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NETWORKING 112 (1998).
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45,000 bits per second. 345 Although high-speed transmission technol-
ogies have been in use for more than a decade by large organizations,
ISPs, and Internet backbone operators, access to high-speed connec-
tions has become available to individual consumers or home users rel-
atively recently. Broadband technologies currently available to home
users are: digital subscriber line (DSL) service over telephone lines,
digital communication over the cable TV wires, satellite communica-
tion, terrestrial or fixed wireless systems, and fiber optic lines (called
fiber to the home-FTTH). 346
Among these technologies, DSL and cable services are the most
widely adopted broadband solutions in this country, in part because
they utilize existing physical links already connected to most homes-
i.e., phone lines and cable TV wires. Of the two, cable installations
have about a two to one lead over the DSL installation base. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) of 4.3 million high-speed lines in service as of June 30,
2000, about one million were DSL service lines and about 2.2 million
were cable connections. 347
And, cable's lead over DSL is likely to continue for a few years. 348
A major constraint that limits the spread of DSL technology is that the
user's home must be within about 12,000 to 18,000 feet (about three
miles) from a telephone switching station equipped to handle DSL
traffic.349 Although certain equipment updates to the cable TV net-
works are necessary in order to support high-speed digital communi-
cation over the cable wires, the resultant effect of constraints are not
as severe. At the end of 2000, only twenty-three percent of U.S. house-
holds were within DSL serviceable areas, while fifty-two percent could
access high-speed digital cable services. 350
Thus, cable technology is likely to be the most dominant method
of high-speed Internet access for some time to come. However, the
cable companies are also media companies whose traditional business
345 See Laurent Belsie, Hurry up and Wait to Buy Newer, Faster 56K Modem, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 3, 1998, at 13, 13.
346 LENNARD G. KRUGER & ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RES. SERV., ISSUE BRIEF FOR
CONGRESS: BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2-4 (2002), availa-
ble at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Science/st-49.cfm.
347 FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS:
SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OFJUNE 30, 2000 (2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/LAD/hspdlOOO.pdf.
348 Tiffany Kary, Cable Will Rule Broadband, Report Says, CNET NEWS.COM, May 7,
2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1033-901501.html?tag=prntfr.
349 This is a limitation on ADSL, a slower form of DSL technology. For faster DSL
services, the distance needs to be even shorter. See SHELDON, supra note 344, at 312.
350 Bar et al., supra note 343, at 7.
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is selling video programs. As such, broadband Internet over cable rep-
resents media companies' expansion into the rapidly growing (and
potentially highly lucrative) Internet service market. A situation is cre-
ated where the same company sells products at the content layer as a
media company, owns the cable wires at the physical layer as a cable
company, and has the ability to impose controls at the code layers as
an ISP. Such vertical integration of functions across the layers may
raise anticompetitive or antitrust concerns, especially when consider-
ing the cable companies' local regional monopolies in the high-speed
Internet service market-perhaps the most important segment of the
market because that is where the future lies.35 1
Most of these issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Nonetheless, as the issues are of substantial importance for In-
ternet regulation, we give a brief summary of the arguments made by
Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig.3 52 First, Lemley and Lessig ob-
serve that the cable companies' practice of bundling ISP service with
access and prohibiting users from choosing another ISP removes ISP
competition within the residential broadband cable market. This is a
marked shift from the situation in highly competitive narrowband ISP
markets. The authors argue that it is important that the ISP market
remain competitive. The nature of ISP service is not inherently fixed,
and they can and do provide a wide range of diverse services, includ-
ing audio and video content. In short, the independent ISPs are en-
gines for innovation in markets we do not yet imagine. Thus, vertical
integration of ISP and access services by the cable companies threat-
ens the future of innovation on the Internet by locking out indepen-
dent ISPs from the broadband residential consumers. More generally,
it is important to allow effective vertical competition. The Internet
market generally has been characterized by massive shifts in the com-
petitive center. Hardware companies (e.g., IBM) have been displaced
by operating system companies (e.g., Microsoft); operating system
companies have been threatened by browser corporations (e.g., Net-
scape) and by open platform "meta-operating" systems (e.g., Sun's
Java). "Far and away the most important [factor in market structure]
is that competition came.., from another.., layer."353 Cable compa-
nies' vertical integration of content, ISP, and access market threatens
351 Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architec-
ture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 927 (2001).
352 See id.
353 See Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future
Structure of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT
MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 161 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach &
Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
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to stifle the innovative future of the Internet by eliminating this strate-
gic competitive factor in the critically important residential broad-
band market.
c. Streaming Video over Cable Internet Service: The
Controversy
An example of the possible effects of vertical integration is the
controversial issue of cable companies' control of streaming video
over their cable lines. Because cable companies' traditional business
is the sale of video programs, there may be no incentive for them to
allow streaming video content delivery from their potential competi-
tors over their high-speed cable Internet services. In fact, when the
cable companies started offering high-speed Internet services over
cable, most of them did not allow full length streaming video on their
cable lines.354 For example, @Home, an ISP providing service over
the AT&T cable lines, prohibited its users from downloading more
than ten minutes of streaming video over the Internet.355 The CEO of
AT&T Broadband and Internet Services made clear that he "will not
allow others to freely transmit movies and TV shows via his company's
high-speed Internet connections."3 56 He was reported to say: "AT&T
didn't spend $56 billion to get into the cable business to have the
blood sucked out of our vein."357
Such an aggressive posture and inflammatory rhetoric might have
been influenced by the "Internet gold rush" high-stakes business envi-
ronment of the late 1990s. The cable industry's attitude seems to have
toned down quite a bit since then. To begin with, the limit on video
delivery generated so much controversy that it drew the concerns of
the chairman of the FCC, as well as some members of Congress.3 58
Then, the limitation came up as a prominent issue during the closely
watched and highly publicized FCC regulatory application process in
connection with the AOL Time Warner merger. The Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) filed with the FCC by AOL Time Warner
contained eleven points, one of which specifically addressed the video
streaming issue: "AOL Time Warner will allow ISPs to provide video
354 Jerome H. Saltzer, "Open Access" is Just the Tip of the Iceberg (1999), at http://
web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/openaccess.html; see also Lemley & Lessig,
supra note 351, at 934-95.
355 Excite@Home Keeps a 'Video Collar,' MSNBC, Oct. 31, 1999, at http://
zdnet.com.com/2102-11-501520.html.
356 David Lieberman, Media Giants Net Change, Major Companies Establish Strong Foot-
hold Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at B3.
357 Id..
358 See Excite@Home Keeps a 'Video Collar,'supra note 355.
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streaming. AOL Time Warner recognizes that some consumers desire
video streaming, and AOL Time Warner will not block or limit it."35 9
The FCC's written question to the MOU raised the issue again, to
which AOL Time Warner replied, reaffirming its commitment to al-
lowing streaming video without restriction. 360 In a separate exchange,
AOL Time Warner also had to answer the FCC's questions regarding
its relationship with AT&T, which had an interest in Time Warner En-
tertainment through the MediaOne cable company.36'
Since the AOL Time Warner merger, none of the major cable
owner ISPs seems to have placed an explicit ban on streaming video
traffic in its user agreement or policy documents. And @Home is no
longer in existence after a highly publicized bankruptcy at the end of
2001-one of a series of the "dot com crashes" in that year. 3 6 2 Never-
theless, some cable owners, including AT&T, are still being accused of
requiring independent subscriber ISPs not to sell streaming video on
their own. 363 For example, Comcast requires their users to not en-
gage in activities that would result in performance degradation of
their networks.3 64 At least in principle, receiving high-quality stream-
ing video for an extended period of time can be viewed by the cable
companies as prohibited activity that leads to performance degrada-
tion. Thus, although a specific ban on streaming video for individual
users is no longer explicitly imposed, the cable companies' regulation
of streaming video over the Internet may still be alive and well.
d. Streaming Video and Layer-Violating Regulation
The Internet service providers' concern about overuse or abuse
of shared network capacity (the "bandwidth") cannot be limited or
made specific to video traffic, as any type of data can cause network
359 See Memorandum of Understanding, between Time Warner Inc. & American
Online, Inc. (Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/aoltw/mou.doc.
360 See Responses to Written FCC Questions, at 11-12 (Aug. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/aoltw/techresp.doc.
361 Letter from Peter D. Ross, Counsel for America Online, Inc. & Arthur H. Har-
ding, Counsel for Time Warner Inc., to Deborah Lathen, Chief, Cable Services Bu-
reau, Fed. Communications Comm'n (Oct. 25, 2000), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/mb/aoltw/attexp.pdf.
362 Consumer Affairs, High-Speed InternetJust A Memory For Many, CONSUMER NEWS,
Dec. 3, 2001, at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/excite.html.
363 Consumer Federation of America et al., Statement on the AT&T-Comcast Merger
Submitted to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights And Competition, Senate Judiciay
Committee (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/CFA-et-al-ATT-
Comcast.testimony.pdf.
364 See, e.g., Comcast, Terms of Service, Acceptable Use Policy § viii (Nov. 11, 2003),
available at http://http://www.comcast.net/terms/use.jsp.
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congestion. However, the technologies developed to control network
congestion can be employed to single out streaming video and treat it
differently in a way that is not reasonably related to network conges-
tion control.
One such example is limiting video traffic from a specific IP ad-
dress. In fact, technical literature for Cisco's broadband router prod-
uct gives this as a specific example for its use:
[T] he network operator may specify policies to be executed for traf-
fic, which either conforms to or exceeds a specified rate limit. The
following actions may be executed in either case: Transmit (switch
the packet) .... Drop (discard the packet) .... Example packet
classification policies include ... video traffic from a specified 1P ad-
dress is classified as medium priority. 365
Limiting video traffic may be a valid exercise of network conges-
tion control when, for instance, nearly all "bandwidth hogging" traffic
is streaming video. In such a case, however, the limitation would need
to apply equally to all video traffic to be effective, not just to those
from a specific source. A more plausible explanation for limiting
video traffic from a specified IP address would be that the ISP is at-
tempting to limit or block video content delivery from a specific
source.
If cable companies were to take such measures, however, the na-
ture of their objection would not be against content per se. Although
the ultimate concern of the cable owners is that of business interest-
i.e., unwelcome competition against their own video content busi-
ness-their regulating behavior is most directly aimed at protocols,
not content. That is, the nature of concerns by the cable companies is
not about the content itself, but the nature of streaming video traffic.
The streaming video protocols guarantee delivery of image
frames at a steady video rate so that the series of images delivered
appears to be the conventional video playback. The same image
frames delivered by the ordinary web protocol, HTTP, would be inef-
fective as video material due to unsteady or erratic rate of delivery. In
fact, none of the cable companies ever had restrictions banning deliv-
ery of individual images frame by frame by HTTP or FTP protocols.
What the cable companies objected to was the streaming nature of the
images delivered-i.e., the streaming protocols themselves. 366
365 Cisco Systems, Inc., Committed Access Rate, at http://www.cisco.com/warp/pub-
lic/732/Tech/car (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (emphasis added).
366 On the other hand, blocking streaming video protocols would operate as effec-
tively as the blocking of video content over the Internet, because the content provid-
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Streaming video can be implemented at the application protocol
layer using the Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) ,367 or at the
transport layer using the Real Time Transport Protocol (RTP).368
And restricting data transmission from an IP address is regulation at
the IP layer because it targets an IP layer function. Thus, limiting
streaming video from a specified IP address is a regulation at the IP
layer because of an objection to upper layer protocols-RTP at the
transport layer, or RTSP at the application layer. The restriction will
typically be implemented in a router, as described in Cisco's technical
literature quoted above, where packets from the specified IP address
are looked at, then dropped or delayed if the protocol field of the IP
packet indicates RTP or RTSP protocol. Thus, an application layer
protocol-RTSP-or a transport layer protocol-RTP-is discrimi-
nated by an IP layer function. It is a layer-violating regulation, but
the immediate objectionable conduct is not at the content layer.
Rather, what are directly discriminated are upper level protocols.
Of course, the ultimate goal of the cable companies may be to
prevent delivery of video content over the Internet. And video rate is
arguably an integral and necessary part of video content. Our point,
however, is that the video content is denied indirectly by directly block-
ing the protocols at the application or transport layer. Thus, the regu-
lation can be viewed as one involving three or four layers, as
illustrated in Figure 10 below.
ers would not want the video files to be downloaded over FFP or HT-IP due to
unauthorized copying concerns, as discussed above.
367 Memorandum from H. Schulzrinne et al., Network Working Group, to the In-
ternet Community (Apr. 1998), at http://www.ieff.org/rfc/rfc2326.txt.
368 Memorandum from H. Schulzrinne et al., Network Working Group, to the In-
ternet Community (Jan. 1996), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1889.txt.
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FIGURE 10. LAYER-VIOLATING STRUCTURE OF STREAMING VIDEO
REGULATION
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e. Issues Raised by Streaming Video Regulation
Regulation of streaming video by cable companies provides an
interesting example of layer-violating behavior within the TCP/IP lay-
ers. The example shows how complex regulating behaviors can be-
come within the TCP/IP layers, although the ultimate goal may be
control at the content layer. Indeed, this type of control may become
more prevalent in the future, as the players become more familiar
with the technologies. For this type of behavior, the end-to-end analy-
sis approach focusing on the application ends is inherently incom-
plete. End-to-end analysis will completely miss the actual
discriminatory functions operating inside the TCP/IP layers. And, the
resulting effects at the content layer may not be conclusive of the dis-
criminatory intent or effect. As discussed above, a cable company may
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claim network congestion as the justification for blocking streaming
video protocols. Such concern is certainly a compelling reason for an
ISP or access provider, and cannot be dismissed without sufficient
showing of facts to the contrary. Layers analysis, on the other hand,
provides an analytic framework that is much more comprehensive as
well as incisive by considering the entire spectrum of layers from the
content to the physical layer, while placing the "core" TCP/IP layers at
the center of the analysis.
Although a restriction on streaming video traffic from certain IP
addresses is a layer-violating regulation within the TCP/IP layers, it
nevertheless has problems similar to other layer-violating regulations.
If these practices were adopted by many or all of the largest ISPs-
which also happened to be cable media companies, such as AOL
Time Warner or AT&T-the overall transparency of the Internet
would be seriously impaired, as Internet transmissions using legiti-
mately recognized protocols will not be able to reach a large number
of users. Furthermore, the protocol blocking regulation would have a
serious substantial innocent use problem. The discriminated stream-
ing protocols have substantial innocent use because there is nothing
inherently objectionable or illegitimate about the streaming proto-
cols. In fact, the ISPs who are not in the video content business-e.g.,
noncable broadband providers such as DSL or TI providers-do not
prohibit streaming protocols. On the contrary, they encourage such
usage in order to sell higher bandwidth services.
More specifically, there is nothing inherently objectionable about
streaming protocols running over cable lines. Streaming traffic does
not conflict with or impair any existing cable technology or equip-
ment. If the cable company ISPs were not vertically integrated with
the video content business, they would have no reason to object to
streaming protocols. Thus, the cable lines or the IP routers employed
by the cable company ISPs have substantial innocent use with respect
to the streaming protocols at the upper layers.
As for ISPs' legitimate concerns over managing network
bandwidth and controlling congestion-referred to as Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) issues in the network industry-there are non-layer-violat-
ing solutions such as Differentiated Services (DiffServ) or Resource
Reservation Protocol (RSVP) .369 It should also be pointed out, how-
369 See Memorandum from S. Blake et al., Network Working Group, to the In-
ternet Community (Sept. 1998), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2475.txt; Memoran-
dum from R. Braden et al., Network Working Group, to the Internet Community
(Sept. 1999), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2205.txt.
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ever, that there is growing appreciation of the shortcomings of the
traditional QoS approaches. 370
6. The Case Against Layer-Violating Regulations Revisited
Having considered various examples of layer-violating behavior,
we now revisit the abstract argument of Part II in light of our concrete
discussion of particular examples. Layer-violating regulations on the
Internet should be given very serious considerations before they are
adopted because of (1) the transparency violations that undermine or
chip away at the Internet's status as the innovation commons,3 71 and
(2) the substantial problems of fit inherent in such regulations.3 7 2
What then is a proper approach to such regulations in light of our
discussion of a variety of concrete problems (real and hypothetical)
faced by public Internet regulators?
We have not proposed an absolute ban3 73 on layer-violating or
layer-crossing regulations because there may be cases where compro-
mising the integrity of the layers is justified on the basis of a compel-
ling regulatory interest.374 The discussion of examples reveals a
variety of reasons (some good, some bad)37 5 that public Internet regu-
lators might regard as compelling. Our discussion of cyberterror-
ism,3 76 for example, suggests a compelling interest-national security.
The on-balance justification will be especially strong if the localized
loss of transparency-caused by the violation of the layers principle-
would not affect the overall transparency of the Internet so as to
threaten its function as innovation commons.
On the other hand, a permissive approach-allowing layer-violat-
ing regulations in general unless there is a good reason to prohibit
them-may also not work, because we may totally miss the cumulative
effect of many localized transparency violations by using an ad hoc,
370 Andy Oram, A Nice Way to Get Network Quality of Service?, O'REILLY NETWORK,
Jun. 11, 2002, at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/06/1 1/platform.
html.
371 See supra Part II.D.1.
372 See supra Part II.D.2.
373 See supra Part II.A.4.c.
374 See supra Part II.A.4.b.
375 The layers principle cannot guarantee that public Internet regulators will use
good judgment or well grounded values in identifying compelling regulatory justifica-
tions. Thus, the regime in Myanmar may view its own survival as a compelling regula-
tory justification. Of necessity, the layers principle takes public Internet regulators as
it finds them. Some are better; some are worse; some are terrible. Our attempt has
been to articulate and shape the principle and its corollaries in a way that achieves the
greatest practical good, given the world as it is.
376 See supra Part III.A.3.d.
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case-by-case analysis.3 77 By the time the cumulative effect is notice-
able-the tyranny of small decisions-it might be too late to preserve
the transparency of the Internet. The damage will have already been
done, and the Internet would no longer be the innovation commons
it once was. Our discussion of layer-compromising solutions to the
threat to copyright interests posed by peer-to-peer filing is suggestive
of a scenario whereby Internet regulators might slide down a slippery
slope, ending with serious damage to the transparency of the Internet.
Each individual act of IP address blocking 78 or port closing 379 would
not be serious by itself, but the cumulative effect of many such actions
would be an opaque Internet.
We have argued that the best approach is a principle raising a
strong presumption against layer-violating regulations.380 Our discus-
sion of several concrete examples enables us to provide further guide-
lines for application of the layers principle at this point. We have seen
that the presumption should be especially strong if one or more of the
following factors are present: (1) when the layer-violating regulation
affects or has potential to affect a large number of users-such as the
regulations affecting the nation's largest ISPs or backbone operators,
the regulations that affect the entire nation or nations, or the regula-
tions that block most of the available TCP ports; or (2) when the layer-
violating regulation is directed at a lower networking layer, such as
the TCP, IP, or physical layer, due to problems at an upper end layer,
such as the content or application layer.
When the layer-violating regulation affects a large number of
users, the regulation's impact on overall Internet transparency would
be especially destructive. Thus, policymakers need to be especially
cautious when adopting or mandating such regulations. When the
layer-violating regulation is directed at a lower end layer to counter
the objectionable conduct at an upper end layer, the problem of sub-
stantial innocent use would tend to be especially serious-e.g., the
"cutting the wire" regulation discussed above. Thus, a higher level of
caution should be exercised when considering a regulation that
targets the TCP, IP, or physical layers.
B. Application at the Communication System Levels
So far, we have analyzed the layer-violating regulations that target
the networking layers-i.e., the TCP/IP layers or the physical layer in
377 See supra Part II.A.4.a.
378 See supra Part III.A.3.e.
379 See supra Part III.A.4.a.
380 See supra Part II.A.4.b.
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the Internet networking context. Within the framework of communi-
cation system layers-the more generalized conception of layers ar-
ticulated by Benkler-there is a class of regulations that have a
structural similarity to the layer-violating regulations, but are differ-
ent in such significant ways that they need to be analyzed separately.
These regulations also target a lower layer in order to address
problems that arose at an upper layer, but they do not directly target
the networking layers. We shall call this type of regulation a layer-
crossing regulation in the communication system layers.
1. Layer-Crossing Regulations in the Communication System Layers
A layer-crossing regulation may target, for example, a code layer
in order to counter the problems that arose at the content layer. In
fact, the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA are an example of
such a layer-crossing regulation. The DMCA prohibits manufacture
or distribution of any technology, product, service, or device that cir-
cumvents copy protection technology.38 1 Thus, the DMCA targets the
circumventing programs (the codes) that are not a part of a network
system-i.e., do not belong to the networking layers-due to concerns
about issues at the content layer-i.e., copyright infringement.
Layer-crossing regulations in the communication system layers
are structurally similar to the layer-violating regulations in the In-
ternet layers in that they both target a lower layer to address problems
from an upper layer. Typically, both types are motivated by similar
desires-i.e., cut the problem behavior down at its knees by targeting
the enabling technologies.
However, they are different in significant ways as a consequence
of a critical distinction between the TCP/IP layers and the communi-
cation system layers. The TCP/IP layers represent the implementa-
tion of the design principles of the Internet-layer separation,
transparency, and end-to-end. The communication system layers, on
the other hand, are descriptive categories to conveniently organize
the existing concepts in communication systems. Thus, there is no
general transparency requirement or expectation across the commu-
nication system layers. The end-to-end argument in its general form,
however, is still applicable in the communication system layers as a
normative principle that argues against placing a function away from
the level where it is ultimately consumed or used.
381 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1)-(2), (b)(1) (2000).
THE LAYERS PRINCIPLE
2. A Layers Approach to the Substantial Noninfringing Use Doctrine
In the seminal 1984 Sony case, the owners of copyrights on televi-
sion programs attempted to counter alleged infringing activities by
targeting VCR technology.38 2 Rather than going after the consumers
who were actually taping their programs-the direct infringers-the
television industry chose to attack VCR technology itself by suing the
manufacturers of the video recording machines for contributory in-
fringement. 383 The Supreme Court, however, refused to hold the
manufacturers generally liable because the VCR technology was "capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing uses. '384
Within the framework of communication system layers, the regu-
lation that the television industry sought to implement in Sony can be
viewed as a layer-crossing regulation that targets the physical layer-
the VCR machines-in order to counter the objectionable conduct at
the content layer-the unauthorized copying of the programs on TV.
It is significant, then, to note that the Supreme Court ruled against a
layer-crossing regulation when it found substantial innocent use at the
lower layer with respect to the problems at the upper layer. When
faced with a structurally similar problem, the law came up with a solu-
tion-the Sony substantial noninfringing use doctrine-that is consis-
tent with arguments against layer-violating regulations presented in
this Article based on the fit thesis.
Despite the analogy, there are fundamental differences between
the communication system layers and TCP/IP layers. First, there is no
transparency requirement across the communication system layers,
whereas layer transparency is a fundamental design principle inherent
in the TCP/IP layers architecture. Second, not all lower layer devices
or technologies in a communication system layer have substantial in-
nocent use. It is conceivable that, for certain devices or technologies,
all or nearly all uses of the device are unlawful. In such cases, there is
identity or near identity of the problem conduct and the technology,
and there is no substantial innocent use of the technology or device.
In contrast, within the TCP/IP layers, substantial innocent use of
lower layers with respect to problems at an upper layer is a necessary
consequence of the architectural properties inherent in the TCP/IP
layers architecture. Thus, the argument against the layer-violating
regulations in the Internet layers is completely consistent with the so-
lution provided by the Supreme Court in Sony. In fact, it is an a forti-
ori argument, because, in addition to the necessary substantial
382 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
383 Id. at 420.
384 Id. at 442, 456.
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innocent use problem, the layer-violating regulations threaten to de-
stroy or impair the Internet's tremendous value generating function
by destroying or impairing its transparency.
It should also be pointed out that the Sony doctrine can be
thought of as a kind of end-to-end principle applied to the field of
legal regulation. Within the communication system layers, the Sony
doctrine can be interpreted as suggesting a proposition that says: un-
less there is near identity of the problem and the technology, the law
should not target the lower technology layer in order to regulate the
problems at the upper layer. Where possible, a regulation should be
directed at, or match, the layer where the problematic conduct arose.
3. The Implications of the Substantial Noninfringing Use Doctrine
for the Layers Principle as a Legal Doctrine
This leads us to a crucial point about the application of layers
analysis to layer-crossing regulations in the communication system lay-
ers. The Supreme Court's decision in Sony is based, at rock bottom,
on a rationale that is structurally homologous to layers analysis. Al-
though the Sony court did not discuss layers-it would have been a
miracle of prescience if it had-the reasoning in Sony is fundamen-
tally based on what we have called the fit thesis, the inherent overin-
clusiveness of regulating a communications technology with
substantial innocent uses in order to regulate content. As we have
demonstrated, the case for the layers principle is even stronger in the
context of the TCP/IP layers than it is for the communications sys-
tems layers. The problems of fit created by layer-crossing regulations
at the TCP/IP layer are even more profound than the problems of fit
that undergird the Sony rule. To these problems of fit are added the
even more compelling problems identified by the transparency thesis.
In other words, the underlying rationale of Sony applies more strongly
to layer-violating regulations in the TCP/IP layers than it does on the
facts of Sony itself.
The implication of these facts for legal doctrine is profound. The
layers principle rests on a foundation of both facts and norms. Sony
shows that the layers principle is already embedded in the woof and
warp of the law, at least in the United States. 385 The normative basis
385 We recognize that our discussion of the legal status of the layers is incomplete,
because it is not comparative. A more thorough analysis would consider the question
whether the Sony doctrine has siblings or cousins in other legal systems. Even this
U.S.-centric analysis of the legal implications of the layers principle is long and com-
plex, and the costs to the authors of a comprehensive extension of our analysis and
research of other jurisdictions would be substantial.
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for the layers principle is already anchored in the deep structure of
American law. The factual basis for the layers principle rests on the
well established findings of network engineering. In other words, the
layers principle is, in a jurisprudentially significant sense, already
there-in the constitution and case law-waiting to be discovered.
CONCLUSION
The layers model is the key to understanding the fundamental
architectural principles of the Internet. These principles-layer sepa-
ration, transparency, and end-to-end-are the cornerstones of low
cost innovation. Without this transparency-preserving architecture,
there would not have been a World Wide Web, peer-to-peer, or e-mail.
For a variety of reasons (some good, some bad), public Internet regu-
lators have begun to act in ways that compromise the Internet's basic
architecture-violating layer separation and targeting regulations at
one layer to solve a problem that arises at a different layer. Public
Internet regulators are subject to strong temptations to act in ways
that could compromise the integrity of the layers.
As a remedy, we propose that public Internet regulators should
adopt the layers principle and its corollaries as a framework for the
evaluation of any proposed Internet regulation. In general, a regula-
tion should be directed at, or match, the layer where the problematic
conduct arises. Absent compelling justification, the law should not
target a lower layer in order to regulate the problems that occur at an
upper layer. There should be a strong presumption against regula-
tions targeting one or more of the lower networking layers (the TCP,
IP, or physical layer). The presumption should be especially strong
when the layer-violating regulation affects or has the potential to af-
fect a large number of users, or when the target layer and the problem
layer are far apart in the layers hierarchy. If a layer-violating regula-
tion is justified, the regulation should be implemented at the layer
closest to the problem layer. Care should be taken to implement the
regulation narrowly so as not to create overbroad regulations, thereby
creating or destroying important rights inadvertently and without due
consideration. In every case, public Internet regulators should con-
sider the availability of layer-respecting alternatives before violating the
layers principle.
In the real world, public officials tend to focus on problems and
solutions. Of necessity, public Internet regulators, especially in legis-
latures and administrative agencies, are concerned with incremental
costs and benefits. It goes without saying that legislators and regula-
tors are subject to political pressures. Moreover, most public Internet
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regulators (courts, regulatory agencies, executive departments, and
legislative bodies) are ill informed about network engineering. To
them, the architecture of the Internet is little more than a mysterious
black box. But, for Internet regulation to succeed, public Internet
regulators must have a basis for understanding how proposed regula-
tory action will interact with the architecture of the Internet. For In-
ternet regulators to avoid unintended consequences, they must gain
an appreciation of the layers and the impact of layer-violating regula-
tions on the transparency (and hence the functional value) of the In-
ternet. The layers principle and its corollaries distill the complexities
of network engineering into guidelines for regulation. They trans-
form information about Internet architecture into norms for Internet
regulation.
The future of innovation and creativity on the Internet hangs in
the balance. It would be especially tragic if the most vibrant blossom-
ings of innovation and creativity in modern times were extinguished
unintentionally because we did not understand the nature of this acci-
dental gift of history. This potential tragedy can be avoided if public
Internet regulators follow a simple injunction: respect the integrity of the
layers.
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